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This work examines Niklas Luhmann’s (1927-1998) concepts of trust, confidence 
and familiarity, and their functions in Luhmannian systems theory. Janne Jalava is 
especially interested in the way these concepts would function in the context of 
Luhmann’s advanced systems theory. This is because Luhmann wrote his 
principal work on trust, Vertrauen, as early as in 1968. Although Luhmann can be 
thought of as a system theorist already during that time, his magnum opus, Soziale 
Systeme, on advanced systems theory was not published until 1984. 
 
This work concentrates especially on five research problems. Firstly, it concerns 
Luhmann’s own theory of trust, confidence and familiarity. Secondly, Jalava 
studies the theoretical precursors (Talcott Parsons and Georg Simmel), who 
influenced Luhmann’s writings on the topics as well as analyse how Luhmann’s 
theory of trust, in turn, has affected the current theories on the topic (Anthony 
Giddens and Piotr Sztompka). Thirdly, Luhmann’s theory of trust is then 
examined in the context of advanced systems theory. Special emphasis is laid on 
the way the growing importance of risks has affected the validity of trust, 
confidence and familiarity. Fourthly, the connections between the advanced 
Luhmannian concepts of trust, confidence and familiarity and the concept of 
strangers are analysed. Fifthly, the analysis will move from personal level to 
systemic and organisational levels. The work concentrates on the problematic of 
trust and confidence in the context of the system of the welfare state, system of 
care and caring organisations. 
 
The most important result of this work, then, is to specify the history, position, 
and meaning of trust in Luhmann’s systems-theoretical thinking. Jalava will also 
show how it can be fruitful to examine the problems of ‘strangers’, the system of 
the welfare state, and the system of care and caring organisations in the context of 










Työn tarkastelun kohteena on Niklas Luhmannin (1927-1998) luottamuksen 
käsite. Erityisesti Janne Jalava on kiinnostunut siitä, miten Luhmannin 
luottamuksen käsite toimii kehittyneen systeemiteorian kontekstissa. Tämä johtuu 
siitä, että Luhmann kirjoitti luottamusta käsittelevän pääteoksensa, Vertrauen, jo 
vuonna 1968 ja hänen systeemiteoriaa tarkasteleva pääteos, Soziale Systeme, 
ilmestyi vasta vuonna 1984. 
 
Jalava lähestyy luhmannilaista luottamuksen problematiikkaa viidestä eri 
näkökulmasta. Ensin hän tarkastelee Luhmannin omaa luottamusteoriaa. Vaikka 
työn pääongelmana on tarkastella luottamuksen käsitettä, jakaa Luhmann omissa 
kirjoituksissaan luottamusproblematiikan kolmeen käsitteeseen: luottamukseen 
(trust), luottavaisuuteen (confidence) ja tuttuutteen (familiarity). Jalava pohtii 
myös Luhmannin luottamusproblematiikan kannalta olennaisia teoreettisia 
vaikuttajia (Talcott Parsons ja Georg Simmel) sekä Luhmannin luottamusteorian 
nykyistä sosiologista merkitystä (erityisesti Anthony Giddensin ja Piotr 
Sztompkan tutkimusten teoreettisena innoittajana). 
 
Tämän jälkeen Jalava analysoi sitä, miten Luhmannin varhainen luottamusteoria 
toimii kehittyneen systeemiteorian kontekstissa. Erityisesti Jalava pohtii riskien ja 
kommunikaation vaikutusta luhmannilaisten luottamuskäsitteiden sosiologiseen 
käyttökelpoisuuteen. Neljänneksi keskitytään muukalaisuuden ja luottamuksen 
välisiin suhteisiin. Jälkimodernissa maailmassa olemme kaikki toisillemme 
enemmän tai vähemmän muukalaisia. Enää siis Georg Simmelin klassinen 
muukalaisuusteoria, jossa muukalaiset nähtiin yhteiskunnan toimivuuden kannalta 
positiivisina ja luotettavina henkilöinä, ei ole yhteiskunnan toimivuuden kannalta 
kovinkaan relevantti. Miten siis yleistynyt muukalaisuus ja terrorismi vaikuttavat 
luottamusproblematiikkaan? 
 
Seuraavaksi työssä tarkastellaan luottamusta systeemien ja organisaatioiden 
tasolla ja pohditaan luottamuksen ja luottavaisuuden problematiikkaa 
hyvinvointivaltion kontekstissa. Jalava näkee hyvinvointivaltion syklisenä 
kokonaisuutena, joka koostuu kansasta, politiikasta ja hallinnosta. Erityisesti hän 
pohtii sitä, miten luottavaisuus kansan ja politiikan välillä rakentuu. Työssä 
tutkitaan myös vanhusten hoivasysteemiä, joka on Jalavan analyysin mukaan 
vähitellen kehittynyt hyvinvointivaltiollisen inkluusion myötä. Tässä yhteydessä 
Jalava tutkii hoivasysteemin systeemiteoreettisia ongelmia ja sitä, onko kuitenkin 
mielekkäämpää tarkastella hoivaa erilaisten organisaatioiden avulla ja täten 
kyseenalaistaa hoivan systeemiluonne. Työn lopussa analysoidaan myös 
hoivaajan ja hoivattavan välistä luottamusproblematiikkaa.   
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This work examines Niklas Luhmann’s (1927-1998) concept of trust and its 
functions in Luhmannian systems theory. Its most important aim is to show 
how the Luhmannian concepts of familiarity, trust and confidence would 
function in the context of advanced systems theory. Originally I acquainted 
myself with the concept of trust by viewing the discussions of the 
problematics of uncertainty, risks and complexity in the context of 
postmodernity or reflexive modernisation. In no time it was revealed that 
trust is a central element of these discussions. I concentrated on Anthony 
Giddens’ writings on trust (see Jalava 2001), which, in turn, are largely 
affected by Niklas Luhmann. During a half-year period of studying 
Luhmann’s systems theory in Bielefeld, under the supervision of Luhmann 
specialists (especially Rudolf Stichweh and Klaus Japp), I became 
convinced that Luhmann’s concept of trust is sociologically unique and 
highly important (see Jalava 2003), and that there are still many open 
questions concerning this topic. In particular, I was interested in how 
Luhmann’s concept of trust would function in the context of his systems 
theory. This is because Luhmann wrote his principal work on trust, 
Vertrauen, as early as the 1960s. Although Luhmann can be thought of as a 
system theorist already at that time, his magnum opus, Soziale Systeme, 
dealing in advanced autopoietic systems theory, was not published until 
1984. Therefore, in this work special attention is given to the way that the 
concept of trust would function in the context of advanced systems theory. 
In addition, I study the way in which the concept of trust would function in 
the context of ‘strangers’, the welfare state and the system of care. I see 
trust as a decision, the function and meaning of which is to reduce the 
complexity of society. 
 
Luhmann’s reputation in the field of trust research is high. His writings on 
trust have been widely used as a theoretical background in many 
sociological (Giddens 1990; Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999 
etc.), political (Inglehart 1997; 1999, Hardin 1991; 1993; 1999; Warren 
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1999 etc.), philosophical (Baier 1986; 1992; 1994, Lagerspetz 1996, 
Loukola 1999), historical (Frevert 2000) and even commercial (Gefen 
2000) contexts. However, none of these have seen trust as a part of 
Luhmann’s advanced systems theory, but instead followed Luhmann’s 
Vertrauen. This might be a consequence of the fact that Luhmann’s 
Vertrauen, as stated above, had already been published in 1968 and Soziale 
Systeme – where Luhmann studies the problem of trust only en passant – 
sixteen years later. None of these researchers have perhaps noticed that the 
meaning of Luhmann’s concept of trust might also have changed during the 
development of his systems theory. 
 
Another reason why Luhmann’s concept of trust has been detached by 
many researchers from his systems-theoretical context is that his theory is 
very complicated. This is largely because the primary unit of Luhmann’s 
systems-theoretical analysis – in contrast to mainstream sociological 
theorists – is neither the individual nor groups of people, but 
communication. Unlike many other sociologists, Luhmann does not 
primarily fall into questions of empirical, normative, ethical, and moral 
issues nor does he stress the problems of everyday knowledge. What makes 
Luhmann’s view on trust sociologically distinctive is the fact that the 
urgency of the topic is intensively tied to the reality of societal 
communication. 
 
Yet it is extremely important to note that Luhmann himself did not 
extensively analyse the concept of trust in the context of advanced systems 
theory nor has it been explored by other systems theory oriented researchers 
(for example Dirk Baecker, Rudolf Stichweh, Klaus Japp, Helmut Willke, 
Hartman Tyrell and Armin Nassehi). There appears to be a systems-
theoretical ‘silence’ on the subject of trust; a silence which this work seeks 
to end. 




The Research Problem 
 
Trust can be grasped as an important or even essential matter in human life. 
Trust is more than just an interesting, difficult, and only recently widely 
studied social phenomenon in sociology. The recent growing interest in 
both trust as well as the closely related group of concepts such as social 
capital, respect, recognition, confidence, associability, social cohesion, 
legitimacy, and civil society may have to do with a widely shared, though 
largely implicit, diagnosis of the basic problems of late modernity: the 
growing importance of risks, the complexity of society, and the declining 
significance of the nation state as a community based on shared norms and 
values. In the Luhmannian concept of trust there is not a great amount of 
room for normative, ethical or moral questions; the most important 
intellectual influences behind Luhmann’s systems-theoretical thinking are 
Talcott Parsons’ action theory, Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco 
Varela’s biological theory of autopoiesis, Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenological philosophy, George Spencer-Brown’s mathematical 
model of distinction, and Luhmann’s lifelong debate with Jürgen 
Habermas, all of which – as well as Georg Simmel’s writings on trust – will 
in turn be taken into consideration in the present study of the advanced 
Luhmannian problematics of trust (see Figure 1). 
  
This work concentrates on five research problems. The first looks at 
Luhmann’s theory of trust. Secondly, the theory is examined in the context 
of advanced systems theory. Then, thirdly, the connections between the 
advanced Luhmannian concept of trust and the concept of ‘strangers’ are 
analysed. Following this the analysis moves from the personal level to the 
systemic and organisational level. The fourth research problem concentrates 
on the problematics of trust and confidence in the context of the welfare 
state, and then (the fifth problem) in the context of the system of care and 
caring organisations (see Figure 1). The most important result of this work, 
then, is to specify the history, position and meaning of trust in Luhmann’s 
systems-theoretical thinking. In addition, I will show how it can be fruitful 
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to examine the problems of ‘strangers’, the welfare state and the system of 
care in the context of the Luhmannian trust.   
 
The most important writings by Luhmann, to which the perspective of this 
work is closely tied, are Trust (1979 [Vertrauen, 1968]) and Familiarity, 
Confidence and Trust (1988). Starting from these texts, one can examine 
Luhmann’s own theory of trust and confidence (see Figure 1). However, in 
order to study trust and confidence in an advanced systems-theoretical 
context, it is not enough to examine the topics only from the point of view 
of Luhmann’s works concentrated directly on trust. The perspective of this 
work is therefore tied also to Soziale Systeme (1984) and Die Gesellschaft 
der Gesellschaft (1997), which are Luhmann’s principal works and where 
he extensively analyses the autopoietic systems-theoretical problematics of 
society (see Figure 1).  
 
Furthermore, to analyse the advanced concepts of trust and confidence in 
the special areas of ‘strangers’, the welfare state and care (see Figure 1) I 
will – in addition to the four texts mentioned above – concentrate on 
Luhmann’s view of the welfare state presented in Political Theory in the 
Welfare State (1990 [Politische Theorie im Wohlfartsstaat, 1981]) and Risk: 
A Sociological Theory (1993 [Soziologie des Risikos, 1991]), as well as 
some of his writings on organisation theory. Along with Luhmann’s own 
work, my analysis of the advanced concepts of trust and confidence is 
influenced by several post-Luhmannian writings. The most influential 
authors who have continued to elaborate Luhmannian systems theory here 
are Rudolf Stichweh (1997; 2000; 2002; 2002b), Raf Vanderstraeten (2000; 
2002, 2003), Roar Hagen (2000), Michael King and Chris Thornhill (2003; 
2003b), Jan Inge Jönnhill (2003), Niels Andersen (2003) and Risto Kangas 
(1995; 2001). The influences and research problems of this work are 





Figure 1. Influences on, and problems in, the systems-theoretical concepts 
of trust and confidence. 
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It is impossible to study either trust or society ‘as such’. This is because 
society is an ‘imaginary institution’ that no one has seen but everyone talks 
about; in fact, it exists only because we do talk about it (see Willke 1993). 
This idea is also suitable for describing the character of trust. No one has 
seen it, everyone talks about it, and there could neither be trust nor 
recognition of trust without communication. I approach the problem of trust 
mainly through Luhmann’s texts. I observe how he has observed, or 
‘talked’ about, trust.  
 
However, I have not read Luhmann’s systems theory systematically, but 
rather selectively. This type of reading has given me a chance to select the 
problems of society wherein Luhmannian trust and confidence are needed. 
These problems intertwine here especially with the growing importance of 
risks, the indifferent character of ’strangers’, the taxation and steering 
problems of the welfare state and the differentiation of the system of care. 
Moreover, these problems open new functional spheres for trust and 
confidence. Luhmann’s own wish was that one might enter his work at any 
point and discover it in many different ways. He hoped that his work would 
find readers wanting to recombine the very elements of systems theory and 
its descriptions of social phenomena. (Baecker 2003, 9.) Combining the 
concepts of trust and confidence with the descriptions of ‘strangers’, the 
welfare state and care, I have several times diverged from wholly abstract 
thinking. 
 
Luhmann’s studies of the welfare state, risks and trust are not as 
theoretically oriented as the main part of his output.1  This fact has affected 
                                                 
1 The first book, which is not as theoretically oriented as most of Luhmann’s work, is 
Vertrauen (1968). It is not so much systems-theoretically focussed but instead concerns 
itself with the everyday problems of trust. The German preoccupation with the welfare 
state in the 1970s also inspired Luhmann to challenge the concept of ‘the welfare state’ in 
his book Politische Theorie im Wohlfartsstaat (1981). Moreover, the political rise of the 
Green Party in Germany and the publication and influence of Ulrich Beck’s 
Risikogesellschaft (1986) seem to have had the effect of dragging Luhmann down from the 
theoretical stratosphere and motivating him to confront current social issues head-on. The 
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my own position and writing style. Although the present work is 
theoretically oriented, the analysis has been enriched by many quasi-
empirical examples. Also the fact that I, writing in English myself, have 
used English translations of Luhmann’s work, has inevitably had an effect 
on the style of the text at hand. Wherever translations have not been 
available, I have provided my own.  
 
The Architecture of the Study 
 
The presentation of this work follows the logic of the development, or 
differentiation, of Luhmann’s concept of trust. I begin with an examination 
of Luhmann’s own writings on trust, confidence and familiarity. It should 
be stressed that although the operative concept is trust, in Luhmannian 
terms trust is a threefold concept consisting of familiarity, trust and 
confidence. Therefore the connections between familiarity, trust and 
confidence will also be addressed.  
 
In Chapter Three I examine the theoretical precursors which influenced 
Luhmann’s own writings on trust as well as analyse how Luhmann’s theory 
of trust, in turn, has affected the current theories of trust. In particular, I 
outline the development of Talcott Parsons’ normative open systems theory 
and the role of trust in it, as well as provide an overview of Georg Simmel’s 
conception of trust. Through studying the influences of Parsons and Simmel 
it is possible to deepen the knowledge of the sociological traditions of trust 
which have affected Luhmann’s concept of trust and also his general 
systems theory. The following questions are important: What are the points 
of reference between Luhmann, Parsons and Simmel, and how have 
Parsons’ and Simmel’s writings on trust affected Luhmann’s conception of 
the topic? Furthermore, I look into why some well-known psychological 
accounts of trust as well as the traditional normative and moral 
philosophical accounts have had hardly any influence on the development 
                                                                                                                                                        
results of these motivations can be found in Ökologische Kommunikation (1986; in Finnish 
2004) and Soziologie des Risikos (1991). 
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of Luhmann’s research on trust.2 Anthony Giddens’ and Piotr Sztompka’s 
functionally oriented sociological approaches of trust will also be reviewed. 
What make these two sociologists important from a systems-theoretical 
perspective are the facts that they have appropriated many ideas from 
Luhmann’s writings on trust and, like Luhmann, they refer to trust as 
something that involves risks.  
 
In Chapter Four I outline the logic of Luhmann’s autopoietic systems 
theory, to provide the necessary background for the study of the functions 
of trust and confidence in the context of advanced systems theory. I analyse 
the four streams of influences (sociology, biology, philosophy and 
mathematics) that stimulated Luhmann’s systems theory. Furthermore, the 
basic concepts of autopoietic systems theory– autopoiesis, meaning, 
communication, evolution, differentiation, interpenetration, double 
contingency and structural coupling – are also explored. I concentrate in 
particular on the following two questions: How does Luhmann construe the 
giving of meaning to different things, and what are the roles of 
communication, evolution and differentiation in Luhmann’s systems 
theory? Furthermore, I make an excursion to the critical debates presented 
against Luhmann’s general systems theory. Most importantly, I concentrate 
on the critique of Jürgen Habermas. This critique culminates in a 
comprehension of the concept and process of communication and deviant 
political preferences that is different from Luhmann’s. I also analyse the 
basic features of Ulrich Beck’s and John Mingers’ critiques of Luhmann. 
The first criticises Luhmann’s general systems theory with a strict choice of 
words and the latter argues that social autopoiesis offers an abstract and 
reductive view of the social world.  
                                                 
2 It must be mentioned here that although Luhmann did not explore normative and moral 
philosophical accounts of trust, in general he had an intensified interest in the history of 
ideas and especially the philosophical tradition since Greek antiquity as an inventory of 
intellectual experiments to be made use of in constructing a scientific discipline. 
Luhmann’s trust in the productivity of conceptual work guided by interdisciplinary 
concepts as well as concepts from the history of philosophy was obviously supported by 
his legal education and his familiarity with legal dogmatics as a tradition grounding the 
autonomy of jurisprudence on influence from many nonlegal interests in conceptual work 
done in legal dogmatics. (See Stichweh 1999; 2005, 1-2.) 
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Chapter Five analyses the problematics of the systems-theoretical concepts 
of trust and confidence (see Figure 1). In other words, Luhmann’s own 
theory of trust – which in this work is called the ‘early’ theory of trust – is 
examined in the context of his advanced systems theory. The most 
important question here is this: How can we adapt Luhmann’s concept of 
trust to his advanced systems theory? This chapter is the most important of 
the thesis. It analyses trust on an advanced systems-theoretical level, and 
the results are adapted to specialised contexts in the following chapters. 
Following Luhmann, I divide the topic into familiarity, trust and confidence 
and analyse each in turn from the point of view of advanced systems theory. 
Special emphasis is given to the ways in which the growing importance of 
risks has affected the validity of these three variants of trust. Furthermore, 
Giddens’ and Sztompka’s concepts of trust are analysed from the 
perspective of Luhmann’s advanced systems theory.  
 
Having examined the functions of trust and confidence in the framework of 
Luhmann’s systems-theoretical scheme, the work proceeds to test the 
Luhmannian concept of trust on new theoretical grounds. The functions of 
trust and confidence are studied in the contexts of ‘strangers’, the welfare 
state and the system of care (see Figure 1). The first context foregrounds on 
interpersonal problems of trust, whereas in the latter two the problems of 
confidence (as well as trust) are discussed in terms of the functions of 
systems and organisations.  
 
By following this type of logic in my work, I am able to offer a wide-
ranging view of the functions and problematics of the Luhmannian concepts 
of trust and confidence. My examination is not, then, restricted to 
Luhmann’s own analysis but brings the discussion to current theoretical 
problems of interpersonal trust (the problem of strangers and the trust 
problems between a caregiver and a patient) and problems of systemic 
confidence (confidence in the system of the welfare state and confidence in 
the system of care and caring organisations). 
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The problems and connections that exist between strangers and trust are the 
topic of the sixth chapter. First, I go back to the classics and analyse Georg 
Simmel’s concept of the stranger and explicate the problems of and 
connections between strangers and the Simmelian trust. Why was Simmel’s 
‘potential wanderer’ a trustworthy person? Second, to grasp the trust-related 
problems concerning today’s universal strangers, I examine Rudolf 
Stichweh’s systems-theoretical concept of the ‘indifferent stranger’, and the 
connections between it and the systems-theoretical model of trust. In 
addition to Simmel’s and Stichweh’s theories of ‘stranger’, I examine 
today’s problem of the stranger from Zygmunt Bauman’s perspective of the 
‘new poor’. I argue that today’s strangeness is linked to communication 
possibilities and inclusions in systems. The central questions here are: What 
are the specific features of the ‘indifferent strangers’, and why may we trust 
them? The importance of the friend/enemy binary opposition will also be 
discerned. Is it really true, as Stichweh claims, that strangeness and 
friend/enemy binary opposition are not at all strategic problems in today’s 
world? The growing importance of the new types of ‘strangers’ and the 
fundamental threat of terrorism illustrate, rather, something quite the 
opposite. 
 
In Chapter Seven I examine Luhmann’s concept of the welfare state. The 
analysis begins by considering the concept of inclusion, through which 
Luhmann largely formulates his systemic model of the welfare state. I then 
illustrate the functions, logic and problems of the Luhmannian cyclic model 
of the welfare state, which consists of three subsystems: the public, politics 
and administration. Following this, the functions of confidence within the 
welfare state are characterised, and here the most important question is how 
does the public’s confidence in politics and administration function. 
Moreover, because the systemic model of the welfare state consists of 
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several organisations, Luhmann’s organisation theory3 and the Luhmannian 
logic of organisational trust and confidence are also explored.    
 
In Chapter Eight I combine the systems-theoretical analyses of the 
functional differentiation of the systemic model of the welfare state, 
organisation theory, and the concepts of trust and confidence. Care, 
especially care of the elderly, is considered a functional subsystem of 
society which has gradually been developed or differentiated over the years 
in the modern welfare state. First, after a brief review of different theories 
of care, I address care as communication, and look at how the 
communication of care works. How is the emergence of the systems-
theoretical model of care possible? What are the functions of care in 
Luhmann’s sense? Second, I specify the elements of contemporary care 
organisations, and, with the help of organisation theory, further develop the 
systems-theoretical model of the system of care. Third, aspects of the 
interaction between a caregiver (social worker, nurse etc.) and patient are 
examined from the systems-theoretical point of view. Fourth, some 
problems which question the systemic character of care are analysed. And 
fifth, the connections between Luhmann’s concepts of trust and confidence, 
and the systems-theoretical model of care and caring organisations are 
addressed. What are the roles of trust and confidence in the system of care 
and caring organisations?  
 
Finally, after analysing trust in the context of advanced systems theory as 
well as with respect to the special categories of ‘strangers’, the system of 
the welfare state and care, I am able to critically analyse the functions and 
importance of the Luhmannian concepts of trust and confidence. Here the 
                                                 
3 Tore Bakken and Tor Hernes’ book Autopoietic Organization Theory (2003) is very 
impressive, as it concretises the role of organisations in Luhmann’s systems-theoretical 
thinking. The authors provide useful insights in two respects: they elucidate Luhmann’s 
general ideas in the specific context of organisations, and they demonstrate how our 
understanding of organisations can benefit from these ideas (see Bakken and Hernes 2003; 
2003b). I have adapted these findings for understanding the emergence and functions of the 




important questions are as follows: Why did Luhmann not extensively 
examine trust in his advanced systems-theoretical writings? What are the 
consequences of the ‘disappearance’ of trust (and confidence), and what, in 































2. Luhmann’s Conception of Trust 
 
As noted in chapter one, Luhmann himself did not extensively discuss the 
concept of trust in the context of his advanced systems theory, a gap which 
the current work tries to fill. In order to be able to analyse the topic in the 
context of advanced systems theory, I will first examine Luhmann’s own 
analysis of trust. Luhmann’s most important text on trust, Vertrauen (1968), 
has been important for the reception of Luhmann’s work by English-
speaking readers, since it was translated into English already in 1979. 
Luhmann’s other text dealing directly with the problems of trust - 
Familiarity, Confidence, Trust. Problems and Alternatives (1988) – can be 
seen as his answer to the growing discussion of the problems of trust in the 
midst of English-speaking sociologists in the 1980s.4 For one reason or 
another, this article does not seem to follow the systems-theoretical 
approach of Soziale Systeme, but is mainly based to the findings of 
Vertrauen. The greatest incentives for Luhmann to examine trust were the 
facts that 1) the concept of trust has never been a topic of mainstream 
theoretical sociology, 2) social psychology has placed too great an 
emphasis on the role of consciousness and has made no difference between 
familiarity, trust and confidence, and 3) empirical research has perceived 
trust too generally.  
 
Neither classical authors nor modern sociologists use the term in a 
theoretical context. For this reason the elaboration of theoretical 
frameworks, one of the main sources of conceptual clarification, has been 
relatively neglected. Furthermore, empirical research – for example, 
research about trust and distrust in politics – has relied on rather general 
                                                 
4 Familiarity, Confidence and Trust (1988) was influenced largely by Bernard Barber’s 
The Logic and Limits of Trust (1983). Barber reviewed the manifestations of trust in 
various institutional and professional domains of modern society, and proposed a useful 
typology based on the kind of expectations that trust involves. He proposed to distinguish 
between three different dimensions in which trusting expectations may fail: the continuity 
of the natural and the moral order, the technical competence of actors in roles, and the 
fiduciary obligations of actors. Although this distinction refers to the content of 
expectations and causes of disappointment, it does not consider the functions of trust. As 
Luhmann (1988, 95) notes: “It leaves unspecified, however, the social mechanisms which 
generate trust in spite of possible disappointment. It is this question, and in a more general 
sense the problem of the function of trust, which is my primary interest, and which leads to 
a different approach to conceptual problems.” 
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and unspecified ideas, confusing problems of trust with positive or negative 
attitudes toward political leadership or political institutions, with alienation 
(itself a multidimensional concept), with hopes and worries, or with 
confidence. (Luhmann 1988, 1.) 
 
Luhmann’s aim was to examine the function of trust and the social 
mechanisms through which trust is generated. Furthermore, he wanted to 
avoid confusion between familiarity, confidence and trust, which before 
Luhmann had been considered synonymous in sociology.5 His starting point 
was to specify the reason why society in general needs trust. Luhmann 
(1979, 4) admitted that there cannot be a society without trust, because 
“trust is a basic fact of social life” and a complete absence of trust would 
prevent us even from getting up in the morning. Trust is something that we 
can affect. The necessity of trust can also be regarded as an appropriate 
starting point for the derivation of rules for proper conduct, or for ways of 
acting successfully in the world of complexity and uncertainty.  
 
Complexity, and the capacity for dealing with it, however, is not just the 
hidden motive, the unifying purpose behind the whole conceptual 
orientation of the functional method; it is at the same time the most 
fundamental substantive problem for functional research. It is only from the 
standpoint of its uttermost complexity that it is worthwhile attacking the 
problem of the world as a whole, the universal horizon of all human 
experience. Since it has no boundaries, it is not a system. There being 
nothing external to it, it cannot be threatened. Even radical changes in its 
form of energy can only be interpreted as internal events. (Luhmann 1979, 
5.) 
 
Luhmann defines the concept of complexity in very abstract terms. It can be 
defined “in terms of a distinction between system and environment and in 
terms of a system’s potential for actualization” (Luhmann 1979, 6). 
“Complexity itself designates a unity that acquires meaning only in 
reference to difference, indeed in reference to the difference of system and 
environment” (Luhmann 1989, 11). The starting point of Luhmann’s 
                                                 
5 Georg Simmel has discussed the differences between trust and confidence already before 
Luhmann, and has influenced Luhmann’s way to conceive trust. For Simmel, trust 
represents a force that works for and through individuals, but at the same time for and 
through human association more generally. This latter type of trust is in this work 
understood as confidence. (See Möllering 2001.) 
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definition of the concept of complexity, is the distinction between a system 
and its environment. By increasing its internal complexity, a system is able 
to reduce complexity in the relation between itself and its environment. 
This pertains to two different levels of system-environment relations. 
Firstly, the societal subsystems (politics, economy, law, etc.) can 
concurrently reduce the complexity of the environment of the whole 
society. In other words, the more complex a society becomes through 
functional differentiation, the better it is able to reduce the complexity of 
the environment. Secondly, a subsystem can reduce the complexity of its 
own environment within society. For example, by increasing its internal 
differentiation the economic subsystem can reduce the complexity of the 
relations between itself and the other subsystems (which, in this respect, 
form its environment). 
 
However, there are no comprehensive means to eliminate and control 
complexity, or any rules for an increase of complexity. This is because for 
any system the environment is always more complex than the system itself. 
“No system can maintain itself by means of a point-for-point correlation 
with its environment, i.e., can summon enough to ‘requisite variety’ to 
match its environment” (Luhmann 1989, 11). Each system has to “reduce 
environmental complexity – primarily by restricting the environment itself 
and perceiving it in a categorically preformed way” (Luhmann 1989, 12). In 
conditions of increasing social complexity human beings can and must 
develop more effective ways of reducing complexity. 
 
The world is overwhelmingly complex for every kind of real system, 
whether it consists of physical or biological units, of rocks, plants or 
animals. Its possibilities exceed those to which the system has the capacity 
to respond. A system locates itself in a selectively constituted 
‘environment’ and will disintegrate in the case of disjunction between 
environment and ‘world’. Human beings, however, and they alone, are 
conscious of the world’s complexity and therefore of the possibility of 
selecting their environment – something which poses fundamental 
questions of self-preservation. Man has the capacity to comprehend the 
world, can see alternatives, possibilities, can realize his own ignorance, and 
can perceive himself as one who must make decisions. (Luhmann 1979, 6.) 
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Following Luhmann, I would say that one such decision, through which one 
can ‘organise’, ‘direct’ or reduce complexity, is the decision to trust. 
“Where there is trust there are increased possibilities for experience and 
action, there is an increase in the complexity of the social system and also 
in the number of possibilities which can be reconciled with its structure, 
because trust is an effective form of complexity reduction” (Luhmann 1979, 
8). Before turning in greater depth to the problematics of trust I will 
consider the concept of familiarity.   
 
From Familiarity to Trust 
 
Can I trust that tomorrow the sun will rise again? Can I trust that after the 
last of December will come a New Year? The answer is obvious: yes. These 
are familiar things and “familiarity is an unavoidable fact of human life” 
(Luhmann 1988, 95.) These are things, whose meanings have not been very 
much changed during the evolution. All that is familiar is self-evident or 
‘taken for granted’. What is familiar is not complex. The familiar world is 
consistently anonymous and latent, the full range of experiential 
possibilities which it allows – the extreme complexity of the world – will be 
excluded from consciousness. This means that the familiar world is 
relatively simple. (Luhmann 1979, 19.)  
 
Familiarity presupposes asymmetric relations between a system and its 
environment. “Familiarity draws the (asymmetric) distinction between 
familiar and unfamiliar fields and puts up with the familiar. The unfamiliar 
remains opaque.” (Luhmann 1988, 99.) In ancient societies life was based 
on this type of distinctions. The difference between the familiar and the 
unfamiliar was controlled by religion, and there was no need for conscious 
self-reflection. However, in the course of time, contingency increased and 
new control techniques were required for coping with problems of 
familiarity, trust and confidence. If we agree with Luhmann, that the 
function of trust is to reduce complexity, there is no place for trust in the 
familiar world. According to Luhmann (1979, 18): 
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In familiar world everybody is presupposed and co-experienced as sharing 
the same formal, empty entity of another ego, as being another ‘I’, and 
impersonal ‘one’. There is consequently no differentiation in the operation 
of constituting meaning and world, which brings everybody together in a 
diffuse consensus. Up to this point, no special need for trust in one’s 
fellow-man arises. 
 
For Luhmann, trust includes a future orientation. But at the same time, he 
admits, that there cannot be a future without a past. Therefore, “trust is only 
possible in a familiar world; it needs history as a reliable background” 
(Luhmann 1979, 20). It sounds paradoxical that first Luhmann insists there 
would be no need for trust in a familiar world but immideately after this the 
place of trust would, it appears, be in the familiar world. However, it must 
be noted that for Luhmann, familiarity is the precondition for trust. They 
are “complementary ways of absorbing complexity and are linked to one 
another, in the same ways as past and future are linked” (Luhmann 1979, 
20). We cannot trust each other without this essential basis and without all 
previous experiences.  
 
As noted above, Luhmann is convinced that complexity cannot be 
eliminated but it is possible to reduce it. When the complexity in the 
environment within society grows, social order simultaneously becomes 
more variable. Luhmann’s ‘recipe’ for taming the complexity is connected 
with the growing importance of trust. In order to be able to reduce the 
complexity, we must turn our eyes to the future. 
 
Yet the very complexity of the social order creates a greater need for co-
ordination and hence a need to determine the future – i.e. a need for trust, a 
need which is now decreasingly met by familiarity. In these circumstances, 
familiarity and trust must seek a new mutually stabilizing relationship 
which is no longer grounded in a world which is immediately experienced, 
assured by tradition, and close at hand. (Luhmann 1979, 20.) 
 
Luhmann does not mean that this would entail the disappeareance of 
familiarity. But he wants to distinguish the problem of trust from the 
general familiarity of the world we live in. The overall, anonymously 
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generated familiarity of the world, including nature and human 
relationships, which is constructed in generalised terms, is and will continue 
to be the self-evident ground of being, the practical basis for all intentional 
approaches to specific problems of trust. Familiarity is the prerequisite for 
trust, “but man does not see the intersubjective constitution of this basis, 
nor does he perceive it as a problem unless he is in the position of having to 
turn this familiarity with the objective world into trust in the process of its 
intersubjective constitution” (Luhmann 1979, 21). 
 
Readiness to trust is thus bound to familiarity. In addition to familiarity, in 
Luhmann’s view self-confidence is another prerequisite for trust. 
Experience of everyday life tells us that people are more willing to trust if 
they possess inner security, if they have some sort of an indwelling self-
confidence which enables them to anticipate possible disappointments of 
trust with composure, without turning what is merely a conceivable 
possibility immediately into grounds for action. Self-confidence makes it 
easier for people to trust each other; it can be seen as an inner mechanism, 
which (in addition to familiarity) makes trust possible. Besides, through 
self-confidence it is possible to solve the problems of complexity if the 
reduction of complexity through trust has been impossible.  
 
From the functional point of view, self-confidence as a foundation for trust 
is to be traced back to the availability of internal mechanisms for the 
reduction of complexity. Trust can come about if these internal reduction 
mechanisms are stabilized in such a way that they complement the 
environmental reduction and thus are in a position to reinforce it at critical 
points. In other words, trusting is made possible and easy by the fact that 
the trusting system has inner resources available which are not structurally 
tied up, and which in the case of a disappointment of trust can be put into 
action and take over the burden of the reduction of complexity and the 







Trust and Take a Risk 
 
Following Luhmann, then, in a complex society there is a growing need for 
trust. It is needed in interpersonal relations. Trust, for Luhmann, is 
principally interpersonal. This means, that the other person (alter ego) is the 
fellow-begetter of complexity and fellow-dethroner of familiarity, but at the 
same time, paradoxically, the source for reducing this complexity and the 
source of trust. As Luhmann (1979, 22) puts it:   
 
[Trust] serves to overcome an element of uncertainty in the behaviour of 
other people which is experienced as the unpredictability of change in 
object. In so far as the need for complexity grows, and in so far as the other 
person enters the picture both as alter ego and as fellow-author of this 
complexity and of its reduction, trust has to be extended, and the original 
unquestionable familiarity of the world suppressed, although it cannot be 
eliminated completely. 
 
Interpersonal trust, following Luhmann, goes beyond the information it 
receives and risks defining the future. It must be noted that in sociology 
trust or at least its perception is very modern. Traditionally, the use of 
familiar terms for coping with the unfamiliar has been the province of 
religion. Trust is intensively bound to risk, whose perception is also quite 
modern. Since the early modern time the relationship between trust and risk 
has affected our decisions, and consequently detracted the effectiveness of 
familiarity and religion in our decision making. Although there is an 
obvious connection between trust and risk already in Vertrauen, in 
Familiarity, Confidence and Trust Luhmann specifies the connection 
between trust and risk.   
 
Only in early modern times did a new term (riesgo, rischio, risk) appear to 
indicate that unexpected results may be a consequence of our decisions, and 
not simply an aspect of cosmology, an expression of the hidden meanings 
of nature nor the hidden intentions of God. This discovery of ‘risk’ as a 
general feature of life – roughly replacing what had previously been know 
as fortuna – does not facilitate the task of religion, but it adds another 
dimension to human experience. It becomes ever more typical and 
understandable that decisions cannot avoid risk. Such awareness of risk – 
the risks of technological development or of investment, or marriage or of 
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prolonged education – is now a very familiar aspect of everyday life, but it 
does not necessarily convey a cosmological or religious meaning. Secrecy, 
and therefore dissimulation and distrust, are no longer the essence of life 
and of prudence, but trust is bestowed at your own risk. (Luhmann 1988, 
96). 
 
Risks are now basic aspects of everyday life. Trust is a risky investment. To 
trust is to take a risk.6  “The world is being dissipated into an 
uncontrollable complexity; so much so that any given time people are able 
to choose freely between very different actions” (Luhmann 1979, 24). Risks 
exist only as a component of decision and action. They do not exist in 
themselves. It is a purely internal calculation of external conditions which 
creates risk. As Luhmann (1988, 97-100) notes: 
 
Trust presupposes a situation of risk... Trust is based on a circular relation 
between risk and action, both being complementary requirements. Action 
defines itself in relation to a particular risk as external (future) possibility, 
although risk at the same time is inherent in action and exists only if the 
actor chooses to incur the chance of unfortunate consequences and to trust.  
 
This means that in making a decision concerning trust, we must make a 
distinction: to trust or not to trust. Trust, as stated above, is a decision. It is 
present only when the expectation to trust makes a difference to a decision, 
otherwise what we have is a simple hope. “One who hopes simply has 
confidence despite uncertainty. Trust reflects contingency. Hope ignores 
contingency7.” (Luhmann 1979, 24.) 
                                                 
6 It should be noted here that Luhmann’s wider analyses of risk, Soziologie des Risikos 
(1991), was published over twenty years after Vertrauen. But it seems that the ‘early’ risk 
connected to trust in Vertrauen might well have the same characteristics as the ‘later’ risk 
analysed in Soziologie des Risikos. In this book, Luhmann sets out to explain the social 
phenomenon of risk by examining ‘risk communication’. Risk turns to the conceptual 
distinction risk/danger, which sees risk defined as “loss which social processes attribute to 
decisions” and danger as origins in cases where “future losses are seen not at all as the 
consequences of a decision that has been made, but are attributed to an external factor” 
(Luhmann 1993, 101-102). Luhmann’s concern is in observing the observers’ future 
uncertainty and describing how in modern society the concept of risk is used for linking 
what might happen in the future with present decision-making. Also the trust-risk 
relationship in Vertrauen is linked to the future through present decision-making. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Luhmann’s ‘early’ conception of risk has many similar 
features with his ‘later’ concept of risk. 
7 Here Luhmann speaks about the classic concept of contingency. Something is contingent 
insofar as it is neither necessary nor impossible. I will offer a more detailed examination of 
the problematics of contingency and double contingency in chapter four. 
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Trust is bound to time in more ways than one. In each system the present is 
no longer the present once something is seen as having changed. When we 
have decided to trust we have taken a risk, and it is too late to cancel the 
decision. A decision to trust requires, then, previous experiences, the 
present, and the future.  
 
The complexity of the future world is reduced by the act of trust. In 
trusting, one engages in action as though there were only certain 
possibilities in the future. The actor binds his future-in-the-present to his 
present-in-the-future. In this way he offers other people a determinate 
future, a common future, which does not emerge directly from the past they 
have in common but which contains something comparatively new. 
(Luhmann 1979, 20.)  
 
The same also applies to distrust. Following Luhmann (1979, 71), “distrust 
is not just opposite to trust; it is also a functional equivalent of trust. For 
this reason only is a choice between trust and distrust possible (and 
necessary).” This functional equivalence means that the reduction of 
complexity is possible also through negative expectations, that is to say, 
distrust. Very often it is even the case that the “substantial injections of 
distrust are needed” because it keeps us alert and capable of innovations, 
“not to fall back into the customary pedestrian ways of relying on one 
another” (Luhmann 1979, 91). Trust and distrust are thus also connected to 
each other. They are bound to the situation of decision – affected by 
previous experiences, the present as well as the future – in which one would 
be functionally a more rational choice than the other. However, it can be 
said that choosing to trust makes the decision-maker more ‘vulnerable’ and 







The Four Conditions of Interpersonal Trust 
 
As noted above, for Luhmann, trust is primarily interpersonal. Only free 
human beings are capable of reducing or reconstructing complexity. As 
Luhmann (1979, 39) puts it: 
 
Trust is extended first and foremost to another human being, in that he is 
assumed to possess a personality, to constitute an ordered, not arbitrary, 
centre of a system of action, with which one can come to terms. Trust, then, 
is the generalized expectation that the other will handle his freedom, his 
disturbing potential for diverse action, in keeping with his personality – or, 
rather, in keeping with the personality which he has presented and made 
socially visible. 
 
When it comes to trust, one chooses an action in preference to others in 
spite of the possibility of being disappointed by those in whom we have put 
our trust. When we trust someone, it is possible for him to abuse our trust. I 
would even say that by trusting we ‘break’ familiarity. According to 
Luhmann (1979, 42-43, 62) personal trust has four conditions8: 
 
1.   The process of trust demands mutual commitment and can only be put to 
test by both sides becoming involved in it, in a fixed order: First, the truster 
and then the trustee. 
2.   The participants must know the exact situation and they must know from 
one another that each one knows it. The building up of trust therefore 
depends on easily interpretable situations and, therefore, not least on the 
possibility of communication (‘the rule of situation’). 
3.   It is not possible to demand the trust of others; trust can only be offered and 
accepted. 
4. Trust has to be earned. 
 
It follows from these conditions that there has to be some cause for 
displaying trust. Building trust always requires at least two actors and 
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because of this, mutual commitment is an absolute precondition for trust. In 
addition to this, “there has to be defined some situation in which the person 
trusting is dependent on his partner; otherwise the problem does not arise. 
His behaviour must then commit him to the situation and make him run the 
risk of his trust being betrayed.” (Luhmann 1979, 42.) As already 
mentioned, it is always possible for the partner to abuse the trust. 
 
 How does ‘the rule of situation’, the second one of the four conditions for 
personal trust outlined above, work? The actors who engage in the process 
of trust have to recognise the situations that involve trust. These kinds of 
situations can be recognised only if they are familiar (easily interpretable) 
and there also have to be possibilities of communication. Communication9 
and action play an important role in building interpersonal trust. They can 
also be harmless and cause risks, because all communication says 
something about the person who is behaving in a certain way. Therefore, 
communication is a risky undertaking which requires some kind of 
safeguard. “An individual’s behaviour always gives away more information 
about himself than he can reconcile with his ideal self and more than he 
consciously wants to communicate. Thus, his mere appearance presumes 
some minimum trust, trust that he will not be misinterpreted but that he will 
be accepted by and large as what he wishes to appear”. (Luhmann 1979, 
40.) I would say that this minimum trust is closely connected with the 
feelings of familiarity and self-confidence. 
 
Trusting should also be voluntary. Only the initiator may confer trust, or 
perhaps utilise an opportunity raised by chance, to show himself 
trustworthy. Following Luhmann, trust is not primarily bound to norms, 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 As we can see by looking at these conditions, the concept of trust has similar 
characteristics with the concept of contract. However, unlike contracts, trust is not based 
on formal or juridical logic. 
9 As we see, Luhmann stresses already in Vertrauen the role of communication, which 
became later one of the major elements of advanced systems theory. However, in 
Vertrauen Luhmann (1979, 40) grasps communication only as a “perceivable form of 
behaviour”, whereas in the context of advanced systems theory it is the other meaning-
processing system and consists of three different selections: information, utterance and 
understanding. 
 24
because trust relationships do not follow from previous prescriptions but are 
tied to future and risks. If anything, trust relationships cause norms to 
emerge. “The truster sees in his own vulnerability the instrument whereby a 
trust relationship may be created. Only his own original trust offers him the 
possibility of putting it forward as a norm that his trust is not to be 
disappointed, and thus bringing the other over to his side.” (Luhmann 1979, 
43). Moreover, the earning of trust means that whoever wants to win trust 
must take part in social life and be in a position to build the expectations of 
the other into his own self-presentation. Whoever presents himself from the 
outset as unapproachable (for example by walking past really quickly or by 
snubbing), distances himself in this way and therefore is in no position to 
acquire trust because he offers no opportunities for learning and testing. 
(Luhmann 1979, 62.)  
   
‘In Functions We Have System Trust’ 
 
However, personal trust is not enough to explain the wider processes of 
trusting. Social order and reducing complexity do not stand and fall by the 
few people one communicates with and trusts. There must thus be other 
ways of building up trust, which do not depend on the personal element. 
This is where system trust comes to play. 
 
In simple social systems (like tribes) the model of living was largely 
established by means of religiously based assumptions about real existence, 
nature and supernatural, by means of myth, language, and natural law. The 
right ordering of things was taken as normative and established as 
trustworthy. In this type of systems, complexity was excluded and norms 
were enough to guarantee the stability of everyday life. As Luhmann (1979, 
48) notes: “No impersonal forms of trust were required. Whenever it was 
necessary to communicate, or to explain this order of things, this was 
achieved via the authority of gods, saints or knowledgeable interpreters 
trusted as persons.” 
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In today’s functionally differentiated society the situation is different. The 
religious system cannot alone guarantee the order of society. Society 
consists of many systems and many differentiated media of communication; 
there is no central system that could direct others. Therefore, there are as 
many logics of system trust as there are systems.  
 
[Because of these systems] the need for the social capacity for selection to 
be connected with the scale of the individual’s ability to take decisions and 
to act becomes a more complex and differentiated affair. The differentiated 
media of communication, their language and their symbols, bring new sorts 
of risk and thus pose a new type of problem in regard to trust. (Luhmann 
1979, 49.) 
 
Following Luhmann, behind system trust functions a tactical and supportive 
perspective. Anyone who trusts in a system basically assumes that the 
system is functioning and places his trust in that function, not in people 
(Luhmann 1979, 50). In system trust there is no interpersonal mutual trust 
relations but system trust – like familiarity – functions beyond trust. For 
example, system trust in the economic system functions in the following 
way: 
 
Anyone who trusts in the stability of the value of money, and the continuity 
of a multiplicity of opportunities for spending it, basically assumes that a 
system is functioning and places his trust in that function, not in people. 
Such system trust is automatically built up through continual, affirmative 
experience in utilizing money. It needs constant feedback, but does not 
require specific built-in guarantees. (Luhmann 1979, 50.) 
 
This means that we know how the medium of money is functioning and we 
trust its functionality. The more we have money, the more we have 
opportunities to take part of the ‘actions’ of the economic system and at the 
same time ‘illustrate’ our trust in its function. This type of system trust is 
easier to acquire than personal trust. On the other hand, it is much more 
difficult to control because it does not depend only on two communicative 
actors but is tied to complex processes of society. Moreover, “trust in the 
large reduction mechanisms is so inevitable that it need not be consciously 
perceived as a subjective activity which one can continue or drop, as in the 
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case of personal trust. Thus system trust hardly becomes an open matter for 
public discussion, and, again, the fact that it is something latent helps 
maintain its integrity.” (Luhmann 1979, 57.) I would like to note that in 
some cases, system trust can also be a substitute for personal trust. For 
example, anyone who has enough money or power has no intense need to 
trust others. He is thus able to reduce complexity by means of money or 
power. In other words, he trusts that he can solve the problems by means of 
the capacity of money or power he has. 
 
However, this is not the whole truth about system trust. In Familiarity, 
Confidence and Trust: Problems and Alternatives (1988) Luhmann 
completes his opinion of system trust by theorising the concept of 
confidence. Some scholars (for example Seligman10) take Luhmann’s 
concepts of system trust and confidence to be almost synonymous. In 
contrast to their opinions, I would like to argue that there is a subtle 
difference between the topics. Confidence is already a more systems-
theoretically advanced concept than system trust. For example, Luhmann 
no longer sees such a compact connection between confidence and risk as 
there was between system trust and risk, and stresses the difference between 
a system and its environment more strongly than before. If anything, 
confidence is bound to danger more than risk. Like familiarity, confidence 
also presupposes an asymmetric relation between system and environment, 
and is therefore a mode of asserting expectations of self-assurance. As 
Luhmann (1988, 99) says: “Confidence…emerges in situations 
characterized by contingency and danger, which makes it meaningful to 
reflect on pre-adaptive and protective measures. The source of 
disappointment may be social action. Anticipation therefore differentiates 
between social actors”. Although there are different types of anticipations 
and disappointments, our behaviour is controlled (mainly) by (systems of) 
                                                 
10 According to Adam Seligman (1997, 19), what Luhmann in his earlier work - Vertrauen 
(1968) - terms “system trust” approximates in his later work - Familiarity, Confidence, 
Trust: Problems and Alternatives (1988) - to “confidence”. Seligman’s opinion is thus 
different from mine. He does not want to separate system trust and confidence at all from 
each other.  
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politics and law. In other words, in dangerous and contingent situations we 
can have confidence in functions of different systems, which in turn reduce 
the complexity of their environment within society through their system-
environment relation.  
 
This does not mean that systems would be stable. The complexity of some 
system’s environment might endanger its function and programmes. For 
example, high unemployment rates can affect the workings of the political 
system. In this type of situation, the political system’s system-environment 
relation can change, which in turn may cause new dangers, affect our 
confidence in the functions of the system, and have an effect on our ability 
to make risk-based decisions. However, these are risks (or dangers) to 
which a person is unavoidably exposed, and not those to which a person 
exposes oneself intentionally (as it is in interpersonal trust situations). 
Therefore, it can be said that the difference between danger and risk is not 
distinctive. Rather, risk decisions contain always the reflection of danger. In 
general, however, in Familiarity, Confidence and Trust Luhmann still 
proceeds in the line of the old division – there is confidence in the system 
and trust in partners – but goes more deeply into his analyses of the 
connections and differences between familiarity, trust and confidence than 
he does in Vertrauen.    
 
Differences and Connections between Familiarity, Trust and 
Confidence 
 
Familiarity is a precondition for trust but also for confidence. The 
conditions of familiarity have been dramatically changed over the ages by 
the invention of writing, by literacy, by printing press and the development 
of information technology. The social world can no longer be completely 
reconstructed by the division of familiarity/unfamiliarity. 
 
The world itself could be compared to a book, written by God in partly 
illegible letters; and immediately Protestants, philosophers, and scientists 
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began to read it in different ways. The unfamiliar no longer screens off 
possible dissensus, tension, and conflict. The social world is reconstructed 
in terms of ‘interests’. Now, you may try to calculate and to outwit 
interests; you may see ways to use the interests of others which are reliable 
precisely because they are interests. (Luhmann 1988, 101.) 
 
The distinction of familiar and unfamiliar becomes more or less blurred. 
Risks, complexity and the growing importance of interests emphasise the 
need of confidence and trust. Therefore, “confidence and trust are the 
decisive issues, and familiarity survives as a purely private milieu without 
function for society as a whole.” (Luhmann 1988, 102). However, I would 
like to remind that we cannot totally forget the role of familiarity in a 
complex society. Unlike Luhmann, I would say that familiarity has a 
function because it functions as a precondition for trust and confidence.    
 
The concepts of trust and confidence refer to a set of expectations which 
may lapse into disappointments. The normal case is that of confidence. You 
are confident that your expectations will not be disappointed: that 
aeroplanes do not fall, that politicians are not corrupted and that nobody 
tries to kill you on your Sunday afternoon walk. It can be said that 
confidence is a matter of routine and normal behaviour. Confidence 
depends on inherent danger but not always on risk. However, there are 
always contingent events that you cannot know beforehand. Therefore, you 
neglect the possibility of disappointment. “You neglect this because it is a 
very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what else to do.The 
alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and to withdraw 
expectations without having anything with which to replace them”. 
(Luhmann 1988, 97.)  
 
To trust, as stated above, is to take a risk. It requires a previous engagement 
on your part. Trust depends not on inherent danger but on risk. Risks, 
however, emerge only as a component of decision and action. They do not 
exist by themselves. For example, you may or may not buy a car which 
turns out to be a ‘lemon’. “You can avoid taking the risk, but only if you are 
willing to waive the associated advantages…If you refrain from action you 
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run no risk. It is a purely internal calculation of external conditions which 
creates risk.” (Luhmann 1988, 97; 100). The distinction between trust and 
confidence depends on perceptions and attribution.  
 
If you do not consider alternatives (every morning you leave the house 
without a weapon), you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one 
action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being 
disappointed by the action of others, you define the situation as one of trust. 
In the case of confidence you will react to disappointment by external 
attribution. In the case of trust you will have choice. (Luhmann 1988, 97.)  
 
Confidence is thus connected to danger and not necessarily to risk as it 
were in the case of system trust. Furthermore, it seems that in Vertrauen 
Luhmann somehow still tried to match up system trust with interpersonal 
relations. More precisely, Luhmann (1979, 58; 22) says that “system trust 
counts on explicit processes for the reduction of complexity, i.e. on people, 
not nature” and that “system trust is not only applicable to social systems 
but also to other people as personal systems”. In Familiarity, Confidence 
and Trust (1988) Luhmann evidently stresses the difference between 
system and environment as well as the growing importance of functional 
systems more than he does in Vertrauen. Through these theoretical 
improvements the division between trust and confidence (or system trust) 
also becomes more evident. 
 
Essential structures and territorially bounded cultural entities are largely 
displaced by time-limited entities such as fashion and style. These new 
conditions, of access and temporal pressure, of opportunity and 
dependence, of openness and lack of intergration, change the relation 
between confidence and trust. Trust remains vital in interpersonal relations, 
but participation in functional systems like the economy or politics is no 
longer a matter of personal relations. It requires confidence, but not trust. 
(Luhmann 1988, 102.)  
 
What are, then, the connections between trust and confidence? Modern life 
is characterised by the inclusion of persons in important functional systems 
like economy, politics and law. One cannot avoid participation in these 
systems because “at the level of social inclusion there is no choice of opting 
in or opting out; nor is it a question of being well born or of being 
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‘elected’” (Luhmann 1988, 103). Because we participate in functional 
systems, they depend not only on confidence but also on trust. Lack of 
confidence might mean dissatisfaction with some system. If someone has 
lost his confidence in some system (for example politics), this usually has 
no immediate impact on the functions of the system. If trust is lacking, the 
situation is different. This is because the development of trust (and distrust) 
depends on local milieu and personal experience. These conditions may be 
extended by television or newspapers, for instance in the case of political 
leaders. People might lose their trust in political leaders, which, in turn, can 
increase dissatisfaction with the political system. “A lack of confidence 
may mean, without further reflection, a lack of trust, and lack of trust means 
that behaviour which presupposes trust will be ruled out” (Luhmann 1988, 
103). Thus, a lack of confidence and a need for trust may form a vicious 
circle. Confidence needs trust and vice versa. 
 
A system – economic, legal, or political – requires trust as an input 
condition. Without trust it cannot stimulate supportive activities in 
situations of uncertainty or risk. At the same time, structural and 
operational properties of such a system may erode confidence and thereby 
undermine one of the essential conditions of trust. (Luhmann 1988, 103.)   
 
Although confidence needs trust and vice versa, Luhmann insists that this 
does not lead to the conclusion that the distinction between confidence and 
trust is obsolete. A lack of confidence will ultimately lead to feelings of 
alienation. Or, as Luhmann (1988, 103) puts it, “if there is a lack of 
confidence there will also be a diffuse sentiment of dissatisfaction and 
alienation or even anomie”. A lack of trust, on the other hand, simply 
withdraws activities.  
 
[The lack of trust] reduces the range of possibilities for rational action. It 
prevents, for example, early medication. It prevents, above all, capital 
investment under conditions of uncertainty and risk. It may lead to a bad 
life in moral terms, because one no longer expects to be rewarded after 
death. It may reduce public interest in innovative art which is not yet 
recognized and confirmed by the establishment of experts. Through lack of 
trust a system may lose size; it may even shrink below a critical threshold 
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necessary for its own reproduction at a certain level of development. 
(Luhmann 1988, 104.) 
 
To conclude, for Luhmann, familiarity, confidence (or system trust), and 
trust are different modes of asserting expectations. Our ability and 
willingness to trust other people and have confidence in different systems 
are not self-evident things but need familiarity as their historical 
background. Familiarity is connected to a past and functions as a 
precondition for trust and confidence. In addition to familiarity, we need 
self-confidence in order to be able to trust. It can be seen as a type of 
internal mechanism of a human being, which enables the reduction of 
complexity. However, living in a totally familiar world is no longer 
possible, or at least it is very rare. This is because in today’s society we are 
dependent on other people and different function systems. Thus trust and 
confidence, and not familiarity, are the decisive issues. 
 
The decision to trust is always oriented towards the future; to trust it is to 
take a risk. The process of trust demands at least two persons: the truster 
and the trustee. We cannot force anybody to trust us, trust has to be earned. 
It is also always possible for the other to abuse the trust. The development 
of trust (or distrust) is thus personal and local. 
 
Personal trust is not enough to explain the wider trust processes. Following 
Luhmann, social reality is not only dependent on persons but also on 
functional systems. We are participants in many systems (like economy, 
politics, law etc.) with which we cannot have an interpersonal relationship. 
But in order to be able to act within the context of these systems, we must 
have confidence (or system trust) in their functions. This type of confidence 
or system trust is general, not personal or local. Therefore confidence is 
easier to acquire than personal trust but also much more difficult to control. 
 
Confidence (or system trust) in a system and trust in partners are different 
attitudes with respect to alternatives, but they may influence each other. 
This is because confidence, which functions on a systemic level, requires 
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trust as an input condition. Interpersonal and local trust thus strengthens the 
systemic confidence. At the same time, then, confidence can to stimulate a 
persons’ activities in situations of uncertainty and risk. It could be said that 
confidence functions as a background noise for trust. At the same time, 
however, this noise is not possible without risk-taking interpersonal 
communication, i.e. trust. Confidence needs trust and vice versa. Together 




























3. Luhmann’s Theory of Trust in Context: 
Theoretical Precursors and Current Influence 
 
Having analysed Luhmann’s own writings of trust, I shall now move on to 
explore Talcott Parsons’ and Georg Simmel’s classical theories of trust, 
which acted as major sociological influences for Luhmann’s own writings 
concerning the topic. It was Talcott Parsons, whose writings about systems 
and trust can be seen as the most important starting point for Luhmann’s 
research on trust. Another sociologist who undoubtedly affected Luhmann 
was Georg Simmel. As Guido Möllering (2001, 408) says: “ If social 
scientists today are at all aware of Simmel as a source on trust, then it 
appears to be mainly due to Niklas Luhmann.”  
 
I shall also look into why some well-known psychological and 
philosophical accounts on trust do not play an influential role in Luhmann’s 
trust research. Furthermore, I shall also examine how Luhmann’s theory of 
trust has affected the recent sociological writings of trust. In particular, I 
shall concentrate on Anthony Giddens’ and Piotr Sztompka’s approaches, 
which have been remarkably influenced by Luhmann. Their approaches – 
like Luhmann’s – are also theoretically oriented. That is to say that 
especially Giddens, and partly Sztompka as well, have not really 
problematised the origin, culture or empirical use of trust but rather 
concentrate on the theoretical functions of trust.  
 
Parsons: Trust as a Part of Familiarity 
 
The most important sociological influence for Luhmann’s theory of trust 
came certainly from his teacher, Talcott Parsons. In 1960 Luhmann went to 
Harvard to study sociology with Parsons, discussing particularly the notion 
of function with him. During that time, system theoretical sociology was 
almost synonymous with Parsons’ (1966) structural functionalism. 
Structural functionalism was based on the assumption that social systems 
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could not function and maintain themselves without a normative 
foundation. Parsons treats the social system as a part of the primary 
subsystems of the human action system. The others are behavioural 
organism, individual personality and the cultural system. According to 
Parsons (1966, 5): “Action consists of the structures and processes by 
which human beings form meaningful intentions and implement them in 
concrete situations.” 
 
Every action system has its own functional category. Cultural systems are 
specialised in the function of pattern-maintenance. That is to say, they are 
concerned with the maintenance of the highest controlling patterns of the 
action system. Social systems, on the contrary, are specialised in the internal 
integration of acting units (of human individuals) of the system. Finally, 
personality systems are specialised in goal attainment in relation to systems 
environment and behavioural organisms in adaptation to the non-action, 
physical environment. (Parsons 1966, 7.) 
 
In Parsons’ theory, the social system is the integrative sub-system of action 
because it is made up of the interaction of human individuals. Each member 
is both an actor and an object of orientation both for other actors and for 
himself (Parsons 1977, 67). Therefore, because of this connection, each of 
the other three action systems (culture11, personality, behavioural organism) 
constitutes the environment of a social system. Society is the most self-
sufficient type of social systems. Furthermore, the entity that takes care of 
integration and norms – and acts as the core of a society – is the societal 
collectivity. 
 
The core of a society, as a system, is the patterned normative order through 
which the life of a population is collectively organized. As an order, it 
contains values and differentiated and particularized norms and rules, all of 
which require cultural references in order to be meaningful and legitimate. 
As a collectivity, it displays a patterned conception of membership which 
                                                 
11 As a matter of fact, a cultural system is not a ‘pure’ action system. Rather, it is “an 
abstract structure of symbolism and meaning, which proceeds from one generation to 
another” (Heiskala 1995, 94). 
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distinguishes between those individuals who do and do not belong. (Parsons 
1966, 10.)    
 
It seems, then, that a normative system is internally coherent and broadly 
shared by its members. The normative rules, which Parsons called 
structural imperatives, create the basis for the social processes which form 
the structure and activity of a society. These norms and values are 
institutionalised in society, or to be more precise, societal collectivity 
(Kangas 2001, 296-297). In this collectivity, human beings play their roles 
determined by the patterned normative order through which the life of a 
population is collectively organised. 
 
In addition to the structure of social processes, normative rules also create 
the foundation for social action and proper conduct of an individual, the 
socialisation of a human being. Two of the most important institutions 
behind socialisation are the family and the school (which are the 
subsystems of society). As well as socialising the present generation, they 
transmit the normative structure to future generations. That is to say, 
socialisation is the product of the cultural system. As Parsons (1966, 6) 
notes, no individual social system can create a cultural system. Norms and 
values hereby are the controlling part of action and systems today but 
socialisation is the part of the past which affects the present as well as the 
future. After all, norms and values need socialisation and vice versa. 
Parsons’ systems theory is totally bound on normative orientation. If the 
control of the norms is enough, is there then any need for trust in Parsons’ 
systems theory?  
 
To Parsons (1978, 45-46) the problem of trust emerges in relationships 
between professionals and lay persons. There is a “competence gap” 
between the expert and the layman. Because the layman cannot fully 
understand what the professional (for example, a scientist) is doing, there 
must be a basis of trusted validation of competence other than the typical 
layman’s personal competence to evaluate it. In order for trust to exist 
between these persons, they must have common values and common goals. 
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There must also be adequate symbolisation of both competence and 
integrity: 
 
Sharing values makes agreement on common goals easier, and ‘confidence’ 
in competence and integrity makes commitment to mutual involvement in 
such goals easier…All these considerations focus mutual trust in the 
conception or ‘feeling’ of the solidarity of collective groups. (Parsons 1978, 
46-47.) 
 
It thus seems that Parsons grasped trust as a feeling which can be activated 
only between the members of a collective group who share the same values 
and norms. This is to say that there can be trust only inside the societal 
collectivity. If norms and values – created by the societal collectivity – 
define the limits of its membership, they also define the limits of trust. In 
Parsons’ theory trust therefore emerges as a parallel concept to familiarity, 
and it is not rational to trust strangers or any people who do not share the 
same values, goals or even culture with us.  
 
Luhmann versus Parsons 
 
Although Parsons’ action theory and concept of trust affected Luhmann, he 
was not very convinced on their validity in examinating of the modern, 
complex society.12 The Parsonsian concept of trust seemed to be too simple 
                                                 
12 It should be mentioned that when Luhmann was in Harvard, Harold Garfinkel elaborated 
his view on trust from the grounds of Parsonsian influence. Garfinkel had also been 
Parsons’student, but he did not agree with his teacher’s normative systems theory, and 
consequently also conceptualised trust in a different manner. Although both Garfinkel and 
Luhmann were taught by Parsons and his writings on trust had an important effect for the 
work of both on the topic, Garfinkel’s influence on the development of Luhmann’s 
conception of trust was not very remarkable. In Vertrauen, for example, Luhmann cites 
Garfinkel’s texts only on three occasions.  
Garfinkel argues that people conceptualise events in everyday life on the presupposition 
that others see things as they do. A common-sense environment is one whose features are 
commonly known by social actors. The basis of our common-sense world is a kind of trust 
in how things work and what people think. What an event means or what an object is we 
cannot determine for ourselves. Understanding, reactions, intentions, and routines must be 
shared. The kind of trust presumed in games may also be applied to everyday decisions. 
(see Garfinkel 1963.) Deviating from Parsons, Garfinkel does not emphasise the meaning 
of norms, but co-ordinated action instead. To be able to co-ordinate their actions, people 
have to see the world in parallel ways. Garfinkel’s interest was in common assumptions 
about events and responses to them, assumptions that structure our everyday social world 
and our responses to it. “He used the notion of trust because of his interest in our confident 
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and norm-oriented13 for Luhmann. As Luhmann (1979, 27) notes, Parsons’ 
concept of trust (as well as distrust) “is an affective (non-neutral) and 
diffuse (non-specific) attitude, according to the way in which an object is 
presented, as particular (non-universal) and ascribed (not achieved)”. In 
conclusion, this means that trust cannot be neutral, because trust can only 
exist between familiar people (we do not trust strangers). Therefore, trust is 
also spread because of familiarity. We already know, or feel, the basics of 
trust, or the people who are – and who are not – reliable. Thus, in Parsons’ 
model, the only form of trust is particular, not general. It is also described 
because it functions as a crucial element of mutual interaction. The 
relationship of trust to an object is independent of specific individual 
interests and contexts of experience. I would say that in Parsons’ theory, 
trust is a feeling or attitude based on familiarity and common culture, but 
activated only by making decisions. Or, as Luhmann (1979, 27) puts it, trust 
is an attitude which is neither objective nor subjective; it is not transferable 
to other objects or to other people who trust. This kind of attitude or feeling 
only affects our mind. Or, saying it as Luhmann would, it is only an 
element of our internal systems.  
 
If trust is an attitude or element of internal systems, it has to be learned. 
Therefore, trust is also part of socialisation. As said before, socialisation 
does not occur by itself, but two of the most important institutions behind it 
are the family and the school. Luhmann also admits the connection between 
trust and the family, and also emphasises the continuity of the learning 
process. Despite Luhmann’s suspicion for the validity of Parsons’ concept 
of trust, we have here a clear connection between Parsons and Luhmann. At 
                                                                                                                                                        
expectations about what other people will do, and our mutual dependence. Such trust 
enables our social world to make sense.” (Govier 1997, 22.)  
13 If Luhmann was dissatisfied with Parsons’ normative orientation, Adam B. Seligman, in 
turn, thinks that trust conceived in a Luhmannian way is risky, because it is completely 
detached from normative definitions. According to Seligman (1997, 63): “[Luhmann’s] 
trust is not only a means of negotiating risk, it implies risk (by definition, if it is a means of 
negotiating that which is unknown). The risk implied is precisely that which is inherent in 
alter’s realization of agency: were all action circumscribed by role expectations and 
normative definitions there would be no risk, only confidence or lack thereof. Trust, by 
contrast, implies the risk that is incurred when we cannot expect a return or reciprocal 
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least, we can say that the family’s importance in the process of learning 
trust was one of Luhmann’s starting points for studying how trust functions 
in society.  
 
[Being a kind of attitude] trust has to be learned...New situations and new 
people are continually posing new problems of trust throughout life. The 
ways of preparing for relationships of love and friendship, or more 
generally for all kinds of personal ties and deepening acquaintanceship, can 
be interpreted as the testing and learning of relationships of trust. 
Differentiated and mobile social systems set a particularly high standard 
which can only be met if learning how to trust, and not just trust by itself, 
can be learned. This is part of the socialization function of the family. Nor 
would it be too misleading to assume that social systems have to learn trust 
as well. (Luhmann 1979, 27-28.)  
 
Furthermore, in Parsonsian language, it could be said that family is a 
subsystem of society through which human beings learn the ‘real’ character 
of trust. After all, because of common values and norms we know the limits 
of trust, but the subsystem through which we learn how and who to trust, is 
the family. The aim of trust, then, is to stabilise the changing condition in 
societal community. In brief, I would say that the boundaries of a system, 
its particular form and the family’s socialising role, were important 
milestones in Parsons’ theory of trust. For Luhmann, the boundaries of 
system were even more important than for Parsons, because already 
Luhmann’s ‘early’ systems theory in the 1960s is a closed systems theory in 
which the self-organisation and self-production of the system, and thus also 
its boundaries make up two leading principles of the theory. It can be said, 
then, that the boundaries of the system were also an important starting point 
for Luhmann’s concept of trust. Following Luhmann, there can thus be trust 
between personal systems and personal system can have confidence in 




                                                                                                                                                        
action on alter’s part (which we could, at least within certain boundaries, when interaction 
is defined solely by the reciprocally defined nature of role obligations and commitments)”. 
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Simmel: Trust as a Feeling and Moral Value 
 
In addition to Parsons, another sociologist who undoubtedly affected 
Luhmann was Georg Simmel. Although the contemporary discussion 
sometimes overlooks Simmel’s conception of trust, it is obvious that his 
work has had a great influence on the development of the sociological 
theory of trust. As Barbara Misztal (1996, 49-50) states: 
 
[Simmel’s] contribution to the sociological conceptualisation of this notion 
is significant. Many of his brilliant analyses of the nature of trust 
relationships were later adopted and developed by scholars such as 
Luhmann and Giddens. Simmel's theory of trust provides a theoretical 
framework for analysing personal as well as generalised (or impersonal) 
trust. 
 
Simmel wrote only three short passages on the subject of trust (one in 
Philosophie des Geldes [1900] and two in Soziologie [1908]), altogether no 
more than ten pages. Nevertheless, trust played a significant role in 
Simmel’s theory. As Simmel (1950, 318) notes, trust is “one of the most 
important synthetic forces within society”. Or, “without the general trust 
that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate” (Simmel 
1990, 178). Guido Möllering (2001, 405) crystallises Simmel’s concept of 
trust in the following manner: trust is a force that works for and through 
individuals and at the same time works for and through human association 
more generally. 
 
The first source on trust in Simmel’s work is found in his discussion of the 
constitution of secret societies. For Simmel, secrecy is a curiosity, a kind of 
a third form of ‘the social’, between knowing and not-knowing. In other 
words, despite the fact that we don’t possess full information about others, 
we establish some kind of estimation of them. Social interaction would be 
impossible without this ‘non-knowledge’, since absolute transparency 
would make us mad. (Noro 1991, 167.) For this reason, trust becomes an 
important notion in Simmel’s theory. In brief, where there is not enough 
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knowledge, we become desperate and call for trust to be able to 
communicate the ‘non-knowledge’.  
 
Simmel notes that the first internal relation typical of the secret society is 
the reciprocal confidence among its members. He attributes a high moral 
value to trust, which makes it a rather special medium of social exchange. 
We should also notice that trust is a kind of force that cannot be demanded 
by others, but only offered and accepted. This was one of Simmel’s most 
important observations and was later adopted by Luhmann, among others 
(see Luhmann 1979, 43). 
 
In the confidence of one man in another, lies as high a moral value, as in the 
fact that the trusted person shows himself worthy of it. Perhaps it is even 
more free and meritorious, since the trust we receive contains an almost 
compulsory power, and to betray it requires thoroughly positive meanness. 
By contrast, confidence is given; it cannot be requested in the same manner 
in which we are requested to honour it, once we are its recipients. (Simmel 
1950, 348.) 
 
We can call this kind of mutual confidential force trust. I would even say 
that Simmel’s concept of trust is quite close to his concept of fidelity or 
loyalty (die Treue). It is a secondary feeling – the social form of the 
relationship – which leads to the feeling of gratitude. (See Simmel 1900, 
581-582.)14 But there are also confidential relationships which are not 
bound to interpersonal and reciprocal ties. As Simmel (1950, 318) says, this 
means an “increasing objectification of our culture, whose phenomena 
consist more and more of impersonal elements and less and less absorb the 
subjective totality of the individual”. This objectification of culture has a 
bearing on the constitution of confidence in that less and less personal 
knowledge of the other is required for having confidence. In other words, 
                                                 
14 It should be noted here that most of the Simmel specialists – for example Birgitta 
Nedelmann and Arto Noro – emphasise that in Simmel’s theory trust is, above all, a feeling 
and does not have much to do with moral questions. It is a primary feeling, which can be 
paralleled by love, hatred or resentment (see Nedelmann 1983). It is Guido Möllering 
(2001, 407) – who goes further in his examination of Simmel’s theory of trust than most 
other sociologists – who stresses the role of moral obligation. I would say, following 
Möllering, that these moral features of trust somehow distinguish it from the other 
Simmelian primary feelings. 
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the traditions and institutions become so reliable that one has to know only 
certain external facts about the other person in order to have the confidence 
required for common action. For Simmel (1950, 318), confidence (unlike 
trust), is “an antecedent or subsequent form of knowledge”. He says that 
“confidence is intermediate between knowledge and ignorance about a 
man”, which is a logical consequence of the view that a complete 
knowledge or ignorance would eliminate the need for, or possibility of, 
trust (Simmel 1950, 318).  
 
Following Simmel, we can say that trust is a mutual relationship between 
individuals without which the group’s actions would be only fragmentary or 
radically episodic. Through the effects of trust, the relationships are 
expected to emerge as durable and continuous. Confidence, on the other 
hand, does not appear as an effect of mutuality, but is something that the 
group already has. It is based on representation. It is thus a moral or 
institutional (scientific, political etc.) value which assists in the 
development of confidential reciprocal relationships, or trust. 
 
It is now evident that if there is trust between individuals, however, there is 
also some kind of confidence which acts beyond the reciprocal 
relationships. What makes Simmel’s conception of trust complicated, is that 
he presumes a much weaker link between the identifiable bases of trust and 
the actual expectations that human beings have when they reach the state of 
trust. Simmel recognises a mysterious further element, a kind of faith, that 
is required for explaining trust and grasping its unique nature. This element 
is difficult to describe and is associated with a state of mind. It has nothing 
to do with knowledge, and is both less and more than knowledge. 
 
To ‘believe in someone’, without adding or even conceiving what it is that 
one believes about him, is to employ a very subtle and profound idiom. It 
expresses the feeling that there exists between our idea of a being and the 
being itself a definite connection and unity, a certain consistency in our 
conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the 
Ego to this conception, which may rest upon particular reasons, but is not 
explained by them. (Simmel 1990, 179.) 
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It can be noted that the character of this further element is nuanced. People 
believe in other human beings differently. The additional quasi-religious 
element thus varies in strength and importance. Without this further 
element it would be impossible to trust others, but we cannot explain its 
structure in epistemological terms. Or, as Simmel (1950, 318) puts it, the 
further element “goes back to the metaphysical sense of our relationships 
and is realised in a merely empirical, accidental, fragmentary manner by the 
conscious and particular reasons for confidence”. It is thus a primary 
feeling which does not require (the feeling of) reciprocity. This further 
element affects only that which is beyond trust and confidence. 
 
Luhmann versus Simmel 
 
At first glance, it seems that Simmel’s influence does not play an essential 
role on Luhmann’s trust research. This is because in Vertrauen, Luhmann 
uses only four brief citations from Simmel (Luhmann 1979, 26; 44; 63; 91) 
of which the fourth does not even concern trust as such. However, by 
examining the matter more closely, one can find some important 
connections between Simmel and Luhmann.15 
 
The first point of reference between Simmel and Luhmann concerns the 
problem of knowledge and ‘non-knowledge’. Luhmann adopts the notion of 
trust as a blending of knowledge and ignorance from Simmel’s Soziologie 
(1950, 318). When we do not have enough knowledge, trust seems to be 
                                                 
15 Simmel affected Luhmann in many ways. In many respects Simmel sets out a 
functionalist, anti-humanist critique of the core ideas of the Enlightenment which mark 
him out as one major sociological precursor of Luhmann. According to Michael King and 
Chris Thornhill (2003, 152): “Simmel (like Luhmann) attemps to account for society as a 
functionally differentiated reality in which each arena of operation detaches itself from all 
mono-focal and mono-causal substance, and so eventually also from the human being 
itself. Each arena of functional activity, he explains, generates and perpetuates itself by 
promulgating systems of value which no longer have any physical or objective origin in the 
human persons, but which create a reality of co-ordinated sense in which functional 
interactions can be correlated”. 
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one way to prevent desperation and strengthen self-respect. As Luhmann 
(1979, 26) notes: 
 
Trust always extrapolates from the available evidence; it is, as Simmel 
pointed out, a blending of knowledge and ignorance. Although the one who 
trusts is never at a loss for reasons and is quite capable of giving an account 
of why he shows trust in this or that case, the point of such reasons is really 
to uphold his self-respect and justify him socially. They prevent him from 
appearing to himself and others as a fool, as an inexperienced man ill-
adapted to life, in the event of his trust being abused. At most, they are 
brought into account for the placing of trust, but not for trust itself.  
 
Second, for Simmel, the renewal of trust was an important element in 
mutual relations. Luhmann also stresses this idea of mutuality and renewal 
of trust. As Luhmann (1979, 47) says: “Simmel very rightly points out that 
it is the continual problem of always having to renew trust which becomes a 
strong binding force”. Simmel disposed the problem of renewing trust by 
emphasising its moral force and compulsory features. Trust, as noted above, 
can be seen here as the social form of the mutual relationship, which in the 
case of fidelity leads to a feeling of gratitude and seems to be quite stabile 
and also appears to be the moral force behind the ‘secret society’. For 
Luhmann, trust is not a moral and stable element of society. It is not bound 
to feelings of gratitude. Rather, in the modern and complex society, mutual 
relations “are frequently short, involve different participants, are impersonal 
and unlikely to be repeated” (Luhmann 1979, 45). There must therefore be 
other ways to renew trust than that of moral force and gratitude. 
 
Third, Luhmann’s concept of trust was undoubtedly influenced by 
Simmel’s (1908, [1950]) classical writings about Der Fremde, the stranger. 
Unfortunately, Luhmann gives almost no consideration to the problems 
between trust and the stranger (a gap which I shall attempt to fill in chapter 
six). For Simmel (1950, 402), the stranger is “the potential wanderer”, “the 
person who comes today and stays tomorrow” who has not belonged to the 
group from the beginning, but imports qualities which do not and cannot 
stem from the group itself.  Luhmann (1979, 63) refers to Simmel’s theory 
of the stranger by noticing, that “it is no accident that sociology of previous 
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generations could see that the untrusted stranger enjoys more freedom and 
is able to behave with greater freedom.” Traditionally, sociology believed 
that to be trusted by others, a stranger must be around for some time to 
become known, and “thus entangle with his self-presentation in a web or 
norms which he himself has helped create, and from which he cannot 
withdraw without leaving parts of himself behind” (Luhmann 1979, 63).  
 
However, Luhmann emphasises that the function of trust is the reduction of 
complexity in the face of the freedom of another person. Therefore, norms 
as well as the (traditional) ‘strangeness’ of the other no longer play a vital 
role. Rather, the freedom of the other can be seen as a positive starting point 
for trust. As Luhmann (1979, 62) notes: “Only trust in the capacity for self-
presentation to be reflected contains a guarantee for suitable continuity of 
behaviour under difficult, changing conditions. Only this form of trust 
regards the other person truly as free – and not merely as a being with 
certain constant characteristics.” Therefore, “whoever wants to win trust 
must take part in social life and be in a position to build the expectations of 
others into his own self-presentation” (Luhmann 1979, 62).  
 
The Psychological and Philosophical Dimensions of Trust 
 
A majority of the psychological literature on trust is concerned with 
psychological correlates of trusting, or rather, of being a high truster as 
opposed to a low truster (see, for example, Rotter 1980). But perhaps a 
better known part of the psychological literature in this area deals directly 
with the development of a capacity or propensity to trust. The simplest 
psychological path for such development might merely be a learning model. 
Nonetheless, it should be mentioned here, that although trust has played an 
important role in psychology, the psychological account was not a 
remarkable influence for Luhmann. If anything – significantly from the 




In psychology (or psychoanalysis) the concept of trust was analysed by Erik 
Erikson. In Childhood and Society (1950), Erikson emphasises the crucial 
role in human development of what he called basic trust. Erikson’s work 
has influenced also some sociological writings16 – but not remarkably those 
of Luhmann. The best-known sociologist who has used Erikson’s concept 
of basic trust as a theoretical tool is Anthony Giddens. He emphasises that 
this type of basic trust can be grasped as one of elements that make up the 
origins of a person’s ontological security (see Giddens 1990). Erikson 
believed that babies developing normally in normal circumstances do so 
because they have a certain elementary or primitive trust in their parents, 
especially in the mother. The salient factor in the development of trust 
based on infantile experience was, for Erikson, the quality of the maternal 
relationship.  
 
The first demonstration of social trust in the baby is the ease of his feeding, 
the depth of his sleep,and the relaxation of his bowels…The infant’s first 
social achievement…is his willingness to let the mother out of sight without 
undue anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as 
an outer predictability. Such consistency, continuity, and sameness of 
experience provide a rudimentary sense of ego identity which depends, I 
think, on the recognition that there is an inner population of remembered 
and anticipated sensations and images which are firmly correlated with the 
outer population of familiar and predictable things and people. (Erikson 
1950, 219)   
 
The work of Erikson thus provides a major source of insights into the 
significance of trust in the context of early childhood development. Basic 
trust can be conceived of as a starting point for all forms of trust thereafter. 
The absence of basic trust can be seen in infantile schizophrenia, while its 
lack is also apparent in some severely disturbed adult personalities. 
However, Erikson’s concern was not with trust as such but with patterns of 
normal and abnormal human development. “He did not really try to define 
trust but seems to have thought of it as a kind of confidence in regularities” 
                                                 
16 Talcott Parsons was also familiar with Erikson’s theories. Erikson’s influence is evident 
in Parsons’ and Bales’ Family, Socialization and Interaction Process (1956) as well as in 
Social Structure and Personality (1964). Despite this, however, there does not seem to be 
very much common in Erikson’s and Parsons’ concepts of trust.  
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(Govier 1997, 10). Despite this, Erikson (1950, 220) prefers the word ‘trust’ 
because there is more naïveté and more mutuality to it. Moreover, as 
Giddens (1990, 94) cites Erikson, trust implies not only “that one has 
learned to rely on the sameness and continuity of the outer providers” but 
also “that one may trust oneself”.  
 
However, it cannot be said that Luhmann did not follow Erikson’s theory of 
trust at all. There can be found some points of convergence between 
Erikson and Luhmann when the latter considers the process of learning 
trust. Luhmann emphasises that the learning process is mediated by the 
experiences of the learner by himself and is controlled by the self-
developing (also learned) identity of the learner. Despite the fact that 
Luhmann takes social psychological accounts of trust with a grain of salt, 
he connects the learning process of trust with early childhood. Although he 
does not quote Erikson directly, the following citation from Vertrauen 
proves that Luhmann has absorbed Erikson’s idea of basic trust. 
 
If the child establishes his own self differentiating ‘I’ and ‘You’, the first 
thing he has to do is forget his first, practically unmotivated, act of trust and 
find a form of trust which takes account of this differentiation. The learning 
process will not force the separation of I and You into complete and 
absolute distinction. On the contrary, the You stays as ‘another I’. The 
learner reasons from himself to others and is thus in the position to 
generalize from his experiences with others. Because he feels he is prepared 
to honour the trust of some unknown person, he is also able to show trust to 
others. (Luhmann 1979, 28.) 
 
There are, of course, several other psychological studies of trust. But in 
contrast to Erikson, these studies (for example Rotter 1967; 1980; Pearce 
1974 ) have not had a remarkable influence in sociology. Nonetheless, one 
considerable work on trust in the context of psychology, which should be 
mentioned here because it has been the subject of Luhmann’s critique, has 
been linked to the Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Work on trust in this area 
was pioneered by Morton Deutsch. The term ‘trust’ was given simple 
behavioural interpretations in these studies. Trust was operationally defined 
as “making a co-operative choice in the game” (Deutsch 1960). If players 
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who do not know that their co-player will choose co-operatively, 
nevertheless choose co-operatively themselves, they are regarded to have 
made a trusting choice. The players do not know each other and do not 
necessarily communicate. According to Deutsch (1962, 303), “a trusting 
choice may be based upon ‘despair’, ‘conformity’, ‘impulsivity’, 
‘innocence’, ‘virtue’, ‘faith’, ‘masochism’, or ‘confidence’, although the 
notion of such multiplicity is rather unsophisticated.”  
 
Luhmann was very critical of the psychological approach to trust. He says 
that social psychology – referring particularly to Deutsch – in fact 
constantly attempts to reduce the social sphere (communication) to 
individual psychological variables (consciousness), which is why it is in no 
position to account for these facts very clearly. Therefore, “one of the first 
lessons of a theory of social systems is that very different personality 
systems can be functionally equivalent in social systems, so that social 
systems may to a certain extent be free form the personality processes of 
individuals” (Luhmann 1979, 9). Furthermore, Luhmann (1979, 30) was 
convinced that psychology made no distinction either between familiarity 
and trust, or between trust and confidence.  
 
Despite his critique against Deutsch, I would like to note that in Vertrauen 
there can be found some sentences, in where Luhmann seems to move at 
the same level of discussion with the Prisoner’s Dilemma games. That is, 
Luhmann says that trust is always contingent and it is only possible in a 
situation where the possible damage may be greater than the advantage you 
seek. Luhmann (1979, 24) illustrates the characteristics of this type of 
decision in a following way: 
 
If a mother leaves a child in the care of a babysitter, a number of hopes are 
associated with this: that nothing untoward will happen, that the girl will be 
kind to the baby, will not disturb its sleep by turning up the radio, and so 
on. Her trust only extends to eventualities which, if they occur, would cause 
her to regret her decision to go out at all and to leave her child in the care of 
anybody. Trust therefore always bears upon a critical alternative, in which 
the harm resulting from a breach of trust may be greater than the benefit to 
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be gained from the trust proving warranted. Hence one who trusts takes 
cognizanze of the possibility of excessive harm arising from the selectivity 
of others’ actions and adopts a position towards that possibility. 
  
What, then, can be said about the philosophical account on trust and its role 
in the development of Luhmann’s conception of the topic? From 
Luhmann’s most important work on trust, Vertrauen (1968), one can find 
but a few philosophical citations relating directly to the topic. The major 
explanation for this is the fact that most normative or moral philosophers 
have not written extensively about trust. The classical ethicists – Plato’s 
Socrates, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mill, Kant and Smith – 
hardly mention the term except occasionally as an aside or observation. As 
noted before, trust or at least its perception is indeed very modern. It is 
surely articulated in early modern political theory, both by proponents of 
modern natural law (Grotius, Puffendord, Locke) and by its detractors 
(Hume, Smith) (Seligman 1997, 31). The Encyclopedia of Ethics (1992) 
devotes less than 2 of its 600 pages to a discussion of trust, and cites only 
minor passages from Aristotle and Locke. There has thus been an almost 
complete silence on the subject of trust in the tradition of moral philosophy.  
 
Annette Baier – who has published several influential papers on trust 
combining Luhmann’s view with those of classical philosophers17 – is well-
                                                 
17 According to Baier’s (1986) general account, trust may be conscious or unconscious, 
wanted or unwanted, directed at an unspecified group of others or at some particular other. 
When one trusts, he depends on another’s good will and is necessarily vulnerable to the 
limits of good will. Trust is thus accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not 
expected ill will toward one. However, a slight oddity in Baier’s account is her belief that 
we trust others not to engage in or refrain from various actions but to care for various 
things. But this difference with regard to Luhmann’s theory is smaller than it appears 
because Baier understands ‘things’ to include such abstractions as one’s own health and 
life. On this model, trusting is a three-place relation: A trusts B with valued thing C. 
There are several interests Baier has in common with Luhmann. She discovered 
Luhmann’s analysis in preparing the article Trust and Antitrust (1986) and in many ways 
agreed with it. First important Luhmannian finding by Baier was the importance of tact in 
building trust relationships. Luhmann treats personal trust as a risky investment and looks 
at mechanisms for initiating and maintaining trust. Baier (1986, 238-239) stresses that “tact 
is said to play an important role in both. It enables trust-offering overtures to be rejected 
without hostility ensuing, and it enables those who make false moves in their attempts to 
maintain trust to recover their position without too much loss of face.” Baier thus seems to 
agree with Luhmann (1979, 84) who says that: “a social climate…institutionalizes tact and 
knows enough escape routes for self-presentation in difficult situations”. Baier (1986, 239) 
regards (on the basis of Luhmann’s work) tact as a virtue which needs to be added to the 
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known for addressing the ‘silence’ on trust in the tradition of moral 
philosophy and truly wonders at it. “Moral philosophers have always been 
interested in cooperation between people, and so it is surprising that they 
have not said more than they have about trust” (Baier 1986, 232).18 Baier 
recovers only few forms of trust to which the great philosophers have paid 
explicit attention.  
 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, and other Christian moralists, have extolled the 
virtue of faith and, more relevantly, of hope, and so have said something 
about trust in God. And in the modern period some of the great moral and 
political philosophers, in particular John Locke, looked at trust in 
governments and officials, and some have shown what might be called an 
obsessive trust in contracts and contractors, even if not, after Hobbes's good 
example here, an equal obsession with the grounds for such trust. (Baier 
1986, 233.)  
 
Western moral philosophy, until recently, has been almost exclusively 
theoretical, with few applied concepts. Trust, consequently, was pushed to 
the background of normative ethics; it remained a result of proper actions, 
not a part of proper actions. (Hosmer 1995, 394-395.) I would say that this 
is also one reason why Luhmann did not find classical philosophers 
important in his research on trust. For Luhmann, as I have shown, trust is 
not a result of proper action but a decision (to communicate in a way) 
which will reduce complexity. Furthermore, (at least the ‘later’) Luhmann 
was quite sceptically disposed towards the connections between sociology, 
                                                                                                                                                        
delicacy of discrimination in recognising what one is trusted with, good judgement in 
deciding who to trust with what, and a willingness to admit and forgive fault, which is 
something all functional virtues needed in those who would sustain trust.  
Second, the idea that confidence pairs with danger and institutions and trust with risk and 
people is originally constructed by Luhmann. Although Baier does not fundamentally 
follow Luhmann, she by and large agrees with this division. Baier does not draw so sharp a 
distinction between danger and risk, or between confidence in institutions and trust in 
people. She thinks that there is a continuum between our most and our least chosen 
vulnerabilities to others, so that Luhmann’s ‘danger’ and ‘risk’ will merge. Nor does she 
think that all our trusting and risk taking is directed towards individuals. From her point of 
view, we place our trust also in procedures. (Baier 1992, 150.) 
18 Baier claims that the religious ‘stamp’ on trust might be one reason why moral 
philosophy left the topic in the margin. “Religious traditions are places where we find it 
preached that trust in God, and in religious superiors who claim to speak on God’s behalf, 
are virtues. It is not so surprising that philosophers have tended to shy clear of talking 
much about trust, given its guilt by association with such suspect monkish virtues as 
obedience” (Baier 1992, 143). 
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moral and ethics. Sociology cannot be ethics and ethics cannot be 
sociology. This clearly is another reason why Luhmann does not examine 
trust in the context of normative and moral philosophy. 
 
A sociology of the moral will never become an ethical theory. It will never 
be able to claim for itself a moral quality, be it good or bad, be it nice and 
helpful or cynical. Moralists may feel free to evaluate sociological theories 
and sociologists may feel free to respond in moral terms; but sociologists, at 
least, should avoid mixing up roles, codes, systems. (Luhmann 1996, 32.) 
 
Although the concept has not been used directly, the interest in establishing 
nonascriptive bases for trust has been evidently a permanent theme in John 
Locke’s concern with “trustworthiness, fidelity, the keeping of agreements 
and promises and respect for oaths as a precondition for the existence of 
society, through the writings of Adam Smith on ‘natural sympathy’, and 
Edmund Burke’s writings on the ‘little platoons’ of society” (Seligman 
1997, 15-16.) Besides, according to Gerald Mara (2001), variations of the 
concept of trust, particularly political trust, have been a central subject of 
philosophical inquiry since classical political philosophy. Thucydides’ 
representation of the debate over the city of Mytilene in the War Between 
the Peleponnessians and the Athenians and Plato’s dialogue Protagoras are 
good examples of the classic philosophy of trust. These texts consider the 
question of why particular forms of trust are good for political 
communities, particularly those guided by democratic deliberation.  
 
The silence on trust may become more understandable when we consider 
the goals of Western moral philosophy. Despite the lack of explicit 
attention on trust, it is self-evident that some idea of trust in moral 
philosophy has to be included in the principles of ‘good society’. According 
to Larue Hosmer (1995, 394), the goal of moral philosophy “has been to 
find the ‘first principle’, or the ideal rule upon which all other rules could 
be based, that would lead to a ‘good’ society”. A ‘good’ society has been 
defined as one in which the members willingly cooperate for the ultimate 
benefit of all (see Rawls, 1967).  
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Furthermore, I would argue that the philosophical concern with trust has 
largely been bound to promise-keeping, which itself is an important element 
of ‘good societies’. In the early modern period the concern with promise-
keeping actualised in establishing social bonds of trust in a society 
increasingly defined by individual agents with interests and commitments 
of an increasingly personal nature. However, the breakdown of local, 
territorial and primordial ties that accompanied Europe’s entry into the 
modern era engendered a new concern with redefining the nature of society. 
In this type of society, where the promise is an act of will that invites trust 
among strangers (among those who share no ties of affinity, kinship, or 
even shared belief), new forms of generalised trust had to be established. 
Generalised trust came to fruition, as has been attested by many scholars 
(see Baier 1985, 174; Cupit 1994), as “a speech act whereby one alters the 
moral situation” by incurring new obligations. “The social ties predicated 
on these obligations and the moral force of one’s commitment to them thus 
serve as forging a new model of the political community – one based on 




Luhmann’s seemingly marginal and idiosyncratic concerns with trust in the 
early seventies have turned into a rich intellectual enterprise with a large 
and constantly growing number of contributions. Most sociological writings 
on trust follow the division put forward by Luhmann: trust is connected to 
persons, on the one hand, and to abstract systems, on the other.   
 
First, trust has been linked to personal relations. There is an emerging 
recognition of “the necessity for and the ubiquity of trust in human relations 
and the impossibility of building continuing social relations without some 
element of trust and common meaning” (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 16-
17). Sociologists have finally discovered “the clear and simple fact that, 
without trust, the everyday social life which we take for granted is simply 
not possible” (Good 1988, 32). Most would now agree that “the existence 
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of trust is an essential component of all enduring social relationships” 
(Seligman 1997, 13; Sztompka 1999, ix).  
 
Second, trust has been also connected to ‘abstract systems’ and 
organisations or institutions. It is seen as an “integrative mechanism that 
creates and sustains solidarity in social relationships and systems” (Barber 
1983, 21). Or, as Anthony Giddens (1991, 120) puts it: “With the 
development of abstract systems, trust in impersonal principles, as well as 
in anonymous others, becomes indispensable to social existence.” This 
means, that “trust in abstract systems provides for the security of day-to-day 
reliability, but by its very nature cannot supply either the mutuality or 
intimacy which personal trust relations offer” (Giddens 1990, 114). 
Trusting organisations or institutions also means something different from 
trusting another person. “It means knowing and recognizing as valid the 
values and form of life incorporated in an institution and deriving from this 
recognition the assumption that this idea makes sufficient sense to a 
sufficient number of people to motivate their ongoing active support for the 
institution and the compliance with its rules” (Offe 1999, 70). 
 
The growing interest in the concept of trust can be linked to the societal 
change which, in turn, is characterised by social differentiation, 
contingency, growing complexity, risks etc. In the traditional world where 
risks were natural – compared to the contingent risks of the modern world – 
control and socialisation were enough to guarantee the stability of the social 
reality. As Talcott Parsons stated, both norms and the familiar form of trust 
(which is based on the membership of societal collectivity and norms) were 
enough to guarantee integration as well as continuity of systems. In the 
traditional world trust was grasped as an attitude, based on beliefs and 
feelings and implying expectations and dispositions. For example, when 
one trusted a friend, he believed that the other is likely to act kindly and 
benevolently toward him, that the other is unlikely to harm him, that the 
other is well-disposed toward him. To trust a friend was to regard him as a 
person of integrity, one who is loyal and caring. In Parsonsian language, to 
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trust a friend was to regard him as a familiar person, or at least a person 
whose orientations towards us was keenly bound to norms by societal 
collectivity. Trusting in the traditional world thus concretised itself in the 
familiar world controlled and socialised by societal collectivity. 
 
As said above, in contemporary sociology of trust (see for example 
Gambetta 1988; Giddens 1990; 1991; Misztal 1996; Earle and Cvetkovich 
1995; Govier 1997; Sztompka 1999) – which has been greatly influenced 
by Luhmann – the concept has been particularly understood to be connected 
with risks and uncertainty. In other words, trusting becomes the crucial 
strategy for dealing with an uncertain and uncontrollable future. Trust thus 
understood is “a simplifying strategy that enables individuals to adapt to 
complex social environment, and thereby benefit from increased 
opportunities” (Earle and Cvetkovich 1995, 38). Or, as Diego Gambetta 
(1988, 218) notes: “Trust is particularly relevant in conditions of ignorance 
or uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of others”. 
Furthermore, as Trudy Govier (1997, 4) says: “Trusting another, we are 
willing to go ahead without a guarantee. We feel that we can rely or depend 
on the other, even though there is always some possibility that he or she 
will act in unexpected ways, or even betray us.” Therefore, though the word 
‘trust’ has a kind of warm and positive tone, it is not entirely a matter of 
familiarity, feeling and emotion (as it was in the traditional world). Trust 
presupposes beliefs, and often those beliefs are based on evidence. Trust in 
other people is made possible by our inductively extended beliefs, our 
responses to others, our sense of ourselves, our position in the world, and 
our values. Trust is “possible because we are not only knowing and 
believing creatures but valuing creatures who relate in a profound and 
profoundly natural way to others” (Govier 1997, 9). The risky and 
ambivalent character of social life appears to make the task of addressing 
the problem of trust and social control more pressing than ever. In general, 
following Luhmann, we need trust and confidence because norms, values 




The most functionalist (and thus most Luhmannian) contributions to the 
current sociological debate on trust are, perhaps, those by Anthony Giddens 
and Piotr Sztompka. It should be noted here that although influenced by 
Luhmann, these approaches do not examine the concept of trust in the 
context of advanced systems theory. They have appropriated some ideas of 
Luhmann but do not grasp trust – in the way that I do – as a systems-
theoretically oriented communicative decision aimed at reducing the 
complexity of society.  
 
Like Luhmann, Giddens and Sztompka also use the concept of trust in 
reference to something that has to do with risks. As with Luhmann, trust is 
required in the modern world because we know so little about the systems 
with which we have to deal. Giddens (1991, 244) defines trust as “the 
vesting of confidence in persons or in abstract systems, made on the basis 
of a ‘leap of faith’ which brackets ignorance or lack of information”. 
Sztompka’s concepts of trust and confidence seem to be quite near to those 
of Luhmann. “In situations when we have to act in spite of uncertainty and 
risk, the third orientation (in addition to hope and confidence) comes to the 
fore, that of trust. Trusting becomes the crucial strategy for dealing with an 
uncertain and uncontrollable future”. (Sztompka 1999, 25.)  
 
Giddens: Trust as a Commitment 
 
The starting point for Giddens’ (1984; 1990; 1991; Beck et al.1994) theory 
of trust comes from the (late) modernisation of society and the problems 
around it. Although modernisation of institutions and globalisation have 
enhanced individuals’ possibilities for achieving a safe life, these 
phenomena have also had a flipside. Following Giddens, the discussion on 
trust has to do with the fact that individuals’ everyday life has become more 
complex and risks have increased. In addition to risks, this discussion has 
also a clear connection to contingency and the changed relation between 
time and space. It is also acknowledged that most risks affect us all. 
 55
 
Trust is related to absence in time and in space. There would be no need to 
trust anyone whose thought processes were transparent, or to trust any 
system whose workings were wholly known and understood…Trust is 
basically bound up, not with risk, but with contingency. Trust always 
carries the connotation of reliability in the face of contingent outcomes, 
whether these concern on the actions of individuals or the operation of 
systems…Risk and trust intertwine. Risk is not just a matter of individual 
action. There are ‘environments of risk’ that collectively affect large masses 
of individuals. (Giddens 1990, 33-35) 
 
Giddens acknowledges the importance of Luhmann’s views on trust. He 
also examines the differences between trust and confidence as well as 
between risk and danger. Giddens follows in Luhmann’s footsteps by 
distinguishing trust in people and trust in abstract systems. Trust in persons 
“is built upon mutuality of response and involvement: faith in the integrity 
of another is a prime source of feeling of integrity and authenticity of the 
self. Trust in abstract systems provides for the security of day-to-day 
reliability, but by its very nature cannot supply either the mutuality or 
intimacy which personal trust relations offer”. (Giddens 1990, 144.) He 
admits that these concepts have differences, but in spite of that, are bound 
up with one another. Whereas Luhmann sees trust as bound to exact 
situations, according to Giddens it is continual. This continuity derives, in 
Giddens’ view, from the multiplication of risks, contingency and the 
changed relations between time and space.   
 
Luhmann’s approach is important and directs our attention to a number of 
conceptual discriminations that have to be made in understanding trust. Yet 
I do not think we can be content with the details of his conceptualisation. 
He is surely right to distinguish between trust and confidence, and between 
risk and danger, as well as to say that all of these are in some way closely 
bound up with one another. But it is unhelpful to connect the notion of trust 
to the specific circumstances in which individuals consciously contemplate 
alternative courses of action. Trust is usually much more of a continuous 
state than this implies. It is, I shall suggest, a particular type of confidence 
rather than distinct from it. (Giddens 1990, 32.) 
 
Giddens does not separate trust and confidence as radically as Luhmann. To 
him trust is a particular type of confidence or part of confidence rather than 
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something distinct from it. Similar observations apply to risk and danger. 
According to Giddens (1990, 32; 34), “danger exists in circumstances of 
risk and is actually relevant to defining what risk is… What risk presumes 
is precisely danger.” For Luhmann, the distinction between risk and danger 
presupposes that uncertainty exists in relation to future loss. In the case of 
risk, the potential loss is “regarded as a consequence of the decision, that is 
to say, it is attributed to the decision” (Luhmann 1993, 21-22). In the case 
of danger, “the possible loss is considered to have been caused externally, 
that is to say, it is attributed to the environment” (Luhmann 1993, 22). 
Furthermore, an analysis of decision making and affected involvement 
shows, that “the risks are attributed to decisions made, whereas dangers are 
attributed externally. The risks the decision maker takes and has to take 
become a danger for those affected.” (Luhmann 1993, 107.) This means, 
that risks have been turned into dangers by some decision-makers (for 
example politicians). Nevertheless, Giddens comes up with a similar 
division between trust and confidence as Luhmann when he describes the 
disembedding and re-embedding of the modern world.19 According to 
Giddens (1990, 80), there are two kinds of commitments in the modern 
world, which also have strong connection with the need and development of 
trust: facework commitments and faceless commitments. 
 
Facework commitments bind up the relationships, which are maintained 
and expressed by attendance. These commitments are based on the 
trustworthiness of the other and concern only those who know one another 
and are, therefore, better in touch with each other as well as with the whole 
society. “Trust in persons involves facework commitments, in which 
indicators of the integrity of others (within given arenas of action) are 
                                                 
19 Disembedding and re-embedding must be understood in the context of individualisation. 
Individualisation means, first, the disembedding and, second, the re-embedding of 
industrial society’s ways of life by new ones, in which the individuals must produce, stage 
and cobble together their biographies themselves. Disembedding and re-embedding do not 
occur by chance, nor individually, nor voluntarily, nor through diverse types of historical 
conditions, but rather (all at once and) under the general conditions of the welfare state in 
developed industrial labour society, as they have developed since the 1960s in many 
Western industrial countries. (Giddens 1994, 13.) 
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sought” (Giddens 1990, 88). In traditional societies trust was based on the 
familiarity of the local community and the continuous presence of others. In 
modern societies, too, the facework commitments are a firm part of 
personal trust. As Giddens (1990, 121) notes, these relationships are ties 
based upon trust where trust is not pre-given but worked upon, and where 
the work involved means a mutual process of self-disclosure. Giddens calls 
this type of relationships pure relationships, which can be viewed as 
prototypical of the new spheres of personal life. They are key environments 
for building the reflexive project of the self, since they both allow for and 
demand organised and continuous self-understanding – the means of 
securing a durable tie to the other (Giddens 1991, 186). 
 
A pure relationship is one in which external criteria have become dissolved: 
the relationship exists solely for whatever rewards that relationship as such 
can deliver. In the context of the pure relationship, trust can be mobilised 
only by a process of mutual disclosure. Trust, in other words, can by 
definition no longer be anchored in criteria outside the realitionship itself – 
such as criteria of kinship, social duty or traditional obligation…Pure 
relationships presuppose ‘commitment’, which is a particular species of 
trust. Commitment in turn has to be understood as a phenomenon of the 
internally referential system: it is a commitment to the relationship as such , 
as well as to the other person or persons involved. (Giddens 1991, 6.) 
 
Faceless commitments are a product of modernity. The core of these 
commitments are expert systems and new symbolic tokens. “It will be a 
basic part of my argument that the nature of modern institutions is deeply 
bound up with the mechanisms of trust in abstract systems, especially trust 
in expert systems” (Giddens 1990, 83). Following Beck, Giddens (1990; 
1991; Beck et al.1994) argues that the character of the modern is oriented 
by the future. The character of risks has changed; experts do not only 
foretell the future, but they create it. Also, because the character of 
expertise is global, no one can get out of its clutches. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that we are dependent on faceless commitments. We must have 
confidence in them because we cannot get rid of them. They oblige us to act 
in a certain way. Or, as Giddens (1990, 88) puts it: “Trust in systems takes 
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the form of faceless commitments, in which faith is sustained in the 
workings of knowledge of which the lay person is largely ignorant.” 
 
Although Giddens notes that in modern society confidence might be more 
important than personal trust, he does not completely reject the connections 
between them. Why then, do we have confidence in expert systems, 
although we cannot know all of their functions? Giddens (1990, 89) 
answers that it is ignorance which is behind the need of confidence. But 
ignorance has also its own Janus face. Ignorance always creates grounds for 
scepticism, or at least caution towards the experts. Popular representations 
of science and technical expertise typically bracket respect with attitudes of 
hostility or fear, as in the stereotypes of the ‘boffin’, a humourless 
technician with little understanding of ordinary people, or the mad scientist. 
The most problematic spheres of confidence are the situations where the 
ignorant person encounters the expertise system. These are starting points 
of growing confidence or sceptical attitude against systems. Giddens (1990, 
83) calls these situations access points. Following Giddens, I would say that 
it is exactly in these situations where the trust relationship between persons 
and the system is actualised. Access points have a lot of potential but they 
are also dangerous and open to misconceptions. 
 
Attitudes of trust, or lack of trust, toward specific abstract systems are liable 
to be strongly influenced by experiences at access points…The fact that 
access points are places of tension between lay scepticism and professional 
expertise makes them acknowledged sources of vulnerability for abstract 
systems. (Giddens 1990, 90-91.) 
 
The functionality of the access point can be outlined with an example of the 
relationship between doctor and patient. When the patient goes to the 
doctor, is he quite often ignorant of the disease he has. The doctor 
represents the expert system, in which the patient has confidence. When the 
doctor and the patient encounter one another, the doctor can, with his 
presence, either strengthen the patient’s confidence in the system or 
alternatively awake suspicions about his own abilities. Good treatment 
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often strengthens the patient’s confidence, but bad treatment strengthens 
only mistrust and suspicions.20 
 
In addition to trust and confidence, Giddens (1984; 1990) examines also the 
concept called basic trust. It deals with a person’s ontological security and 
is more emotional than a cognitive phenomenon. As stated above, the 
theoretical background of this concept lies in the social psychological 
examinations by Erik Erikson. Erikson examined the behaviour of children. 
According to Erikson, the first real social achievement of a child is being 
able to let go of the mother without the feelings of rage or fear. This 
happens because the child has achieved a certain amount of inner certainty 
about the external conditions. The child trusts other persons and feels 
himself trustworthy as well. (Erikson 1950, 219-221; Giddens 1984, 53.) 
With the assistance of basic trust, ontological security and trust in everyday 
life also grows. 
 
The ontological security refers to the confidence that most human beings 
have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the 
surrounding social and material environments of action. A sense of the 
reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of trust, is basic to 
feelings of ontological security; hence the two are psychologically related. 
(Giddens 1990, 92.) 
 
Giddens emphasises that the importance of trust, ontological security and 
continuity do not decrease when the human being grows. Rather, to the 
contrary, it is nearly impossible to think about meeting the everyday 
routines without basic trust. Without basic trust, the outcome “is persistent 
existential anxiety. In its most profound sense, the antithesis of trust is thus 
a state of mind which could best be summed up as existential angst of 
dread.” (Giddens 1990, 100.) Basic trust is connected also to pure 
                                                 
20 Although Giddens does not cite Parsons, the access points seem to be almost 
synonymous for Parsons’ concept of competence gap. They both refer to situations in 
where layman meets the expert. Because the patient does not fully understand what the 
nature of his disease is, he needs the doctor’s expertise. By going to the doctor, the patient 
shows his confidence in the system. In order for confidence to exist in these relations, 
persons must have common values and common goals. Here the goal is good treatment. 
Unlike Giddens, Parsons does not examine the negative side of this type of relations. 
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relationships. This is because pure relationships offer the opportunity for 
the development of trust based on voluntary commitments and an 
intensified intimacy. “Where achieved and relatively secure, such trust is 
psychologically stabilising, because of the strong connections between 
basic trust and the reliability of caretaking figures” (Giddens  1991, 186). 
Following Giddens, some type of basic trust thus has an effect beyond trust 
in persons as well as trust in abstract systems. Giddens (1991, 3) sums up 
his theory of trust in the following way: 
 
In circumstances of uncertainty and multiple choice, the notions of trust and 
risk have particular application. Trust, I argue, is a crucial generic 
phenomenon of personality development as well as having distinctive and 
specific relevance to a world of disembedding mechanisms and abstract 
systems. In its generic manifestations, trust is directly linked to achieving 
an early sense of ontological security. Trust established between an infant 
and its caretakers provides an ‘inoculation’ which screens off potential 
threats and dangers that even the most mundane activites of day-to-day life 
contain. Trust in this sense is basic to a ‘protective cocoon’ which stand 
guard over the self in its dealings with everyday reality. It ‘brackets out’ 
potential occurrences which, we the individual seriously to contemplate 
them, would produce a paralysis of the will, or feelings of engulfment. In 
it’s a more specific guise, trust is a medium of interaction with the abstract 
systems which both empty day-to-day life of its traditional content and set 
up globalising influences. Trust here generates that ‘leap into faith’which 
practical engagement demands.  
 
Sztompka: Trust as a ‘Bet’ 
 
Piotr Sztompka’s Trust: A Sociological Theory (1999) is a very ambitious 
work. It tries to disentangle the problematics of trust and apply the concept 
to the study of contemporary society. More specifically, it attempts to take 
stock of the evolving investigations of trust, particularly those with 
theoretical implications, and to explicate, clarify, systematise, but also to 
elaborate and synthesise their findings. As Sztompka (1999, x) himself 
phrases it:  
 
My main ambition is theoretical: to provide conceptual and typological 
clarifications and explications of the notion of trust, and then to propose an 
explanatory model of the emergence (or decay) of trust cultures. In due 
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course I shall also deal with the foundations and justifications of trust, 
functions and dysfunctions of trust, and the functional substitutes for trust. 
 
Being theoretically attuned, Sztompka has appropriated many of 
Luhmann’s ideas. I will concentrate here on Sztompka’s definition of trust 
and his analyses of the functions of trust. Sztompka begins by theorising 
connections between risk and trust. Trust is, in Sztompka’s view, intimately 
related to risk. Following Luhmann’s (1988, 95) statement, “trust is a 
solution for specific problems of risk”; Sztompka (1999, 25) specifies the 
meaning of trust with one sentence: “Trust is a bet about the future 
contingent actions of others.” This means that by acting in uncertain and 
uncontrollable conditions, we take risks, we gamble, we make bets about 
the future, uncertain, free actions of others. Trust as a ‘bet’ is a type of 
orientation with which we may face the human predicament of the 
uncertain and risky future. Other orientations are hope and confidence. The 
first is “a passive, vague, not rationally justified feeling that things will turn 
out to good (or to the bad)” (Sztompka 1999, 24). “I hope to be happily 
married someday” would be an example of a statement expressing hope. 
The latter “is still passive, but more focused and to some extent justified, 
faith that something good will happen (or not)” (Sztompka 1999, 24). For 
example, “reading reports of politics, I am confident that the future of the 
welfare state is stable” (Sztompka 1999, 24) is a statement expressing 
confidence.  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted here that Sztompka’s definition of risk is 
very close to that of Luhmann’s. Like Luhmann, Sztompka also views risk 
as “oriented toward future” and asserts that “one can never be certain of the 
outcomes that making the bet [Luhmann might say the decision] of trust 
will bring. Risk is always present”. (Sztompka 1999, 30.) Dangers, in turn, 
“are passively awaited and at most hoped to be averted or avoided” 
(Sztompka 1999, 30). For Sztompka, the notion of ‘risk’ is central to 
modern culture. He admits that “this relates to the growing significance of 
trust, as means of taming risks and countering uncertainties. The link was 
already perceived by Luhmann.” (Sztompka 1999, 40.)  
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According to Sztompka, the functions of trust occur in three different 
levels: personal, communal and systemic. First, at the personal level, 
endowing others with trust evokes positive actions toward those others. 
Trust liberates and mobilises human agency, releases creative, uninhibited, 
innovative, entrepreneurial activism toward other people. Sztompka (1999, 
103) notes that “the uncertainty and risk surrounding their actions is 
lowered”, and hence – he cites Luhmann (1979, 40) – “possibilities of 
action increase proportionally to the increase in trust”. Interactions with 
those who we endow with trust are liberated from anxiety, suspicion, and 
watchfulness, and allow for more spontaneity and openness. We are 
released from the necessity of monitoring and controlling every move made 
by others, of constantly ‘looking at their hands’. (Sztompka 1999, 103.) The 
positive consequences of trust do not influence only the givers of trust, but 
the recipients as well. It is important to trust, but it may be equally 
important to be trusted. Or, as Sztompka (1999, 104) says: “Being visibly 
trusted by some may be an argument for others to grant trust too. Thus 
receiving trust raises one’s trustworthiness in other transactions.” 
 
Second, in Sztompka’s analyses trust has an important function, not only 
for partners but also for wider communities (groups, associations, 
organisations, etc.) within which it prevails. Trust encourages sociability, 
participation with others in various forms of associations, and in this way 
enriches the network of interpersonal ties, enlarges the field of interactions, 
and allows for greater intimacy of interpersonal contacts. In other words, 
Sztompka (1999, 105) says that trust “increases what Durkheim called the 
‘moral density’, and what modern authors describe as ‘social capital’ (see 
also Putnam 1995), or ‘spontaneous sociability’ (see Fukuyama 1995, 27-
29)”. Trust favours also the spread of communication and improves 
spontaneous collective action.21  
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Furthermore, trust encourages tolerance, acceptance of strangers, and 
recognition of cultural or political differences as legitimate – because it 
allows them to be perceived in a non-threatening manner. In this way trust 
bridles expressions of inter-group hostility and xenophobia, and civilises 
disputes. The culture of trust strengthens the bond an individual has with 
the community, contributes to feelings of identity, and generates strong 
collective solidarities leading to cooperation, reciprocal help, and even the 
readiness for sacrifice on behalf of others. (Sztompka 1999, 105.) When the 
culture of trust is present, transaction costs are significantly lowered and 
chances for cooperation increased. Sztompka (1999, 105) ends his analyses 
of communal functions of trust in Luhmann’s (1979, 8) statement: “When 
there is trust there are increased possibilities for experience and action”. 
 
Third, Sztompka’s functional analyses of trust also extend to the systemic 
level.  This is because he attempts to move the discussion towards more 
complex ‘systems of trust’ and look into the functions or dysfunctions of 
combined networks of such relationships. Sztompka (1999, 110) again cites 
Luhmann (1979, 88), who emphasises that “without trust only very simple 
forms of human cooperation which can be transacted on the spot are 
possible…Trust is indispensable in order to increase a social system’s 
potential for action beyond these elementary forms.” However, although 
Sztompka admits that there is a need for some type of systemic trust, he 
does not view social systems as communicatively coded subsystems – like 
‘early’ Luhmann did in his systems theory – but rather as networks, which 
are functioning within the culture of trust, wherein “the routine of trusting 
and meeting trust turns into normative rule for both the trusters and the 
trustees” (Sztompka 1999, 111). These cultural ‘systems of trust’ or 
networks must then “include strong norms with positive sanctions, 
motivating trustworthiness, and strong taboos with negative sanctions 
prohibiting breaches of trust” (Sztompka 1999, 111-112). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 It should be noted here that although Sztompka mentions the importance of 
communication, he does not say anything about Luhmann’s advanced concept of 
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Finally, Sztompka (1999, 115) comes to the conclusion that trust “has 
generally beneficial consequences for the partners in social relationships, 
and the groups to which they belong, as well as for the peaceful, 
harmonious, and cohesive quality of wider social life.” Trust thus seems to 
be an all-encompassing concept, which automatically makes life more safe 
and unproblematic at the personal, communal and even systemic levels. I 
would even say that in the final analysis, Sztompka seems to forget the 
connection between trust and risk, and no longer characterises trust as a 
‘bet’ on the future contingent actions of others. 
 
From Parsons to Sztompka 
 
In this chapter I have analysed Parsons’ and Simmel’s concepts of trust 
which have had an important influence on Luhmann’s research on the topic. 
I have also considered the reason why some well-known psychological and 
philosophical accounts of trust did not play an explicit role in Luhmann’s 
trust research. Furthermore, I have also examined Giddens’ and Sztompka’s 
concepts of trust which, in turn, have been largely affected by Luhmann.  
 
Parsons grasped trust as a feeling and a parallel concept to familiarity. 
Norms and values, which are created by societal community, define the 
limits of trust. Therefore, it is not rational to trust strangers or any persons 
who do not belong to the same societal community. Simmel, for his part, 
grasped trust as a force that works for and through individuals. He attributes 
a high moral value to trust, which makes it a rather special medium of 
social exchange. Besides, he noted that trust, or confidence, is also a force 
that works for and through human association more generally. It is a moral 
or institutional force which assists in the development of confidential 
reciprocal relationships, or trust.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
communication, or its connections with the function of trust. 
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Luhmann appropriated many ideas from Parsons and some from Simmel’s 
writings on trust into his own research on the topic. The boundaries of 
system, its particular form and the family’s socialising role were important 
milestones in Parsons’ as well as Luhmann’s conceptions on trust. 
Although in Vertrauen Luhmann uses only four brief citations from 
Simmel, there are some apparent connections between them. Both of them 
coupled trust with the problem of knowledge and ‘non-knowledge’; how to 
renew trust was an important question for Simmel as well as for Luhmann; 
and finally, Simmel’s theory of the stranger also influenced Luhmann.  
 
The psychological and philosophical accounts of trust have had hardly any 
influence on the development of Luhmann’s theory of trust. If anything, 
Luhmann was critical of the psychological approach to trust. He notes that 
especially social psychology constantly attempts to reduce the social sphere 
to individual psychological variables, which is why it is in no position to 
account for these facts very clearly. Luhmann does not give very much 
attention to normative and moral philosophy because only a few classic 
philosophers have written extensively on trust. Luhmann was also disposed 
sceptically towards the connections between sociology, moral and ethics. 
Therefore, according to Luhmann, the normative and moral philosophical 
writings about trust did not fit well into an analysis of the sociological 
concept of trust. Furthermore, in Western moral philosophy, trust was 
mainly pushed to the background of normative ethics; it remained a result 
of proper actions.  
 
Like Luhmann, Giddens and Sztompka also emphasise that trust has 
something to do with risks. Giddens – following Luhmann – distinguishes 
trust in people and confidence in abstract systems. In his theory trust is 
connected to facework and faceless commitments. Trust in persons involves 
facework commitments and Giddens calls this type of relationships pure 
relationships. In modern world we are also dependent on faceless 
commitments, which oblige us to act in a certain way. These commitments, 
in turn, strengthen confidence in abstract systems. Giddens also lays 
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emphasis on the role of basic trust, which can be seen as a basis for 
personal trust as well as trust in abstract systems. 
 
Sztompka grasps trust as a bet about the contingent future actions of others. 
In his theory – like Luhmann’s – the connection between risk and trust 
plays a central role. Sztompka argues that the functions of trust occur on the 
personal, communal and systemic level. Although the personal level of trust 
is quite close to that of Luhmann’s concept of trust, the communal and 
systemic level deals more with the discussions of social capital and the 
cultural approach to trust than with Luhmann’s writings of the topic. In the 
end, it seems that Sztompka’s concept of trust is an all-encompassing entity 
that makes everyday life more safe and unproblematic.     
 
The connection between trust and complexity in Vertrauen has already been 
analysed, but a second question remains: how could this connection be 
grasped in the context of his advanced systems theory? As long ago as the 
early 1960s, Luhmann had become convinced that Parsons’ structural 
functionalism had run its course without fulfilling its theoretical promise; 
but also without exhausting the potential inherent in the prospect of a 
sociological functionalism. One of Luhmann’s most important ambitions 
was to create a theory whose aim was to reconstruct, not to eliminate, the 
complexity of system-environment relations. This was where his concept of 
trust came into play. An analysis of Luhmann’s concept of trust would be 
incomplete as long as it remains examined in itself. A more interesting level 
of analysis can be reached by fitting Luhmann’s concept of trust in the 
context of his advanced systems theory. But before going into the 
problematics of trust and confidence in the advanced systems theoretical 
context in greater depth, we need to look at the basic concepts of this 
theory: autopoiesis, meaning, double contingency, interpenetration or 
structural coupling, communication, evolution, and differentiation, as 




4. The Dynamics of Autopoietic Systems 
 
In his book Soziale Systeme (1984, English edition 1995), Luhmann 
provided us with what he himself later called the “introductory chapter” of 
a general theory22 of modern society. In this book, he presented an attempt 
“to reformulate the theory of social systems via the current state of the art in 
general systems theory” (Luhmann 1984, 11). Luhmann thought that the 
previous attempts to use systems theory in the social sciences applied 
cybernetic concepts too directly and suffered from the residual normative 
orientations of Durkheim and Parsons, which he, like the structuralists and 
post-structuralists, denounced as so much ‘Old-European humanism’. As a 
matter of fact, Luhmann never got tired of criticising and taunting 
contemporary sociology’s fascination for its founding fathers. In the preface 
to Soziale Systeme, for example, he bluntly asserts that sociology is stuck in 
a theory crisis. Raf Vanderstraeten (2002, 77) verbalises Luhmann’s 
thoughts felicitously: “The discipline offers old bottles into which the data 
of empirical research is poured.” Deviating from the founding fathers and 
contemporary mainstream sociology, the central aim of Soziale Systeme is 
to apply of the idea of autopoiesis to social systems. 
 
After this enormous presentation of society (the book has over 600 pages), 
Luhmann wrote several volumes (some of which have been published 
posthumously) on the different subsystems (economy, science, art, 
massmedia, religion, politics and education) of society: Die Wirtschaft der 
Gesellschaft (1988b), Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990b), Das 
Recht der Gesellschaft (1993b), Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (1995b), Die 
Realität des Massenmedien (1996b), Die Religion der Gesellschaft (2000), 
Die Politik der Gesellschaft (2000b) and Das Erziehungssystem der 
                                                 
 
22 According to Arto Noro (2000, 321), general theories in sociology become ‘general’ 
through asking how ‘the society’, ‘the social’ or ‘the culture’ are constituting themselves, 
and try then to answer what these elements are. Remarkable authors of general theories are 
the likes of Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Georg Simmel, Erving Goffman, Jürgen 
Habermas and Niklas Luhmann.   
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Gesellschaft (2002). Besides this, Luhmann made interventions into 
different spheres of society: trust (Vertrauen, 1968; English version 1979), 
power (Macht, 1975), love and intimacy (Liebe als Passion, 1983), the 
welfare state (Politische Theorie im Wohlfartsstaat, 1981), ecological 
sociology (Ökologische Kommunikation, 1986; English version 1989), 
decisions (Soziologie des Risikos, 1991) and modernity (Beobachtungen der 
Moderne, 1992). Luhmann’s presentation of society culminated in his two-
volume chef d’oeuvre Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997). Near the 
end of an amazingly productive career featuring over 400 articles and over 
60 books, this work raises expectations of being the magnum opus of 
possibly one of the great minds of twentieth-century sociology. That 
impression is only enhanced by the tragic fact that Luhmann passed away 
quite soon after its publication. 
 
In general, it can be said that Luhmann’s production can be divided into 
three different spheres (see Figure 2). The first and largest sphere of his 
production concerns the problematics of social systems. This sphere 
consists of Soziale Systeme, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft and the 
books on the different subsystems as well as his six-part Soziologische 
Aufklärung (1970; 1975b; 1981b; 1987; 1990c; 1995c). Another sphere 
consisting of the four-part Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik. Studien zur 
Wissenssoziologie der modernen Gesellschaft (1980; 1981c; 1989b; 1995d) 
concentrates on the semantic and historic analyses of society. The third 
sphere consists of various interventions into society: trust, power, love etc. 
In this work, I have examined the problematics of Luhmannian trust with 
particular emphasis on the production of social systems and on (some of) 
the interventions; I have consequently paid less attention to Luhmann’s 
semantic and historic analyses of society. This is because my main purpose 
is to examine how trust would function in the context of advanced systems 
theory and not to analyse its historical or semantic development. On the 
other hand, Luhmann’s semantic and historic thinking has affected the two 
other spheres and inspired other system theorists (e.g. Rudolf Stichweh and 
Risto Kangas) and thus indirectly this work as well.   
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Figure 2. The three main spheres of Luhmann’s production. 
 
It may surprise anybody looking at this list of titles that Luhmann did not 
primarily seek to a systematic catalogue containing almost everything of 
any importance within society. His aim was different. Evidently, he wanted 
to show that sociology has ability to cover everything that is social. Yet his 
most important objective was to show the value of theoretical work in 
sociology. For Luhmann, social differentiation and system formation are 
the basic characteristics of modern society. (Kangas 1995, 219-248.) This 
means that systems theory and the theory of society are mutually 
dependent. According to Luhmann’s systems theory, society consists of 
autopoietic social systems, and social systems consist of nothing but 
communication.  
 
For Luhmann, society is only one kind of social system; but it is the one 
that includes all other social possibilities. Interactions are a second type of 
social system, while organisations constitute a third type. It is important to 
                           Social Systems 
 
(Soziale Systeme, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft and 
the books on the different subsystems) 
      Semantics of Society 
Gesellschaftstruktur und 
Semantik. Vol I-IV. 
Different Interventions 
into Society 
(Trust, Power, Love, etc.) 
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note that society gurarantees the meaningfully self-referential closure of 
communicative events, and thus the capacity to begin, end, and form 
connections of the communications in each interaction. Although 
interaction is communication, it is also perception. Moreover, it should be 
noted that “perception is primarily a psychic acquisition of information, but 
it becomes a social phenomenon, that is, an articulation of double 
contingency, when one can perceive that one is perceived” (Luhmann 1995, 
412). “Society is not possible without interaction nor interaction without 
society, but the two types of system do not merge. Instead, they are 
indispensable for each other in their difference.” (Luhmann 1995, 417.) 
Although Luhmann makes the distinction between society, interactions, and 
organisations, he stresses the unity of all forms of social systems – the fact 
that they are carried by communication (see Luhmann 1997, 14).  
 
In contrast to most other chroniclers of modernity (e.g. Weber), Luhmann’s 
notion of society does not consist of collections of people. For him, the 
central form of relationship in the social world is not that between 
individual and society, but that between a social system and its 
environment. In the following, I shall examine the most important 
influences and basic concepts of Luhmann’s systems theory. The most 
important question is: How does Luhmann conceive the allocation of 
meaning (Sinn) for different things? This question leads us, then, to analyse 
the way trust would function in the context of advanced systems theory.  
 
The Influences and Basic Concepts of the Autopoietic 
Systems Theory 
 
There are four streams of thought in particular that influenced Luhmann’s 
autopoietic systems theory. First, the systems-theoretical influence 
originates from Luhmann’s time spent studying under Parsons at Harvard. 
As noted in chapter three, in Parsons’ (1966; 1971) theory of modernity – 
theory of action systems – differentiation of subsystems is accompanied by 
adaptive upgrading, inclusion and generalisation of the values that make up 
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the shared symbolic order. This is to say, Parsons’ action theory relates to 
human action, and to the way that the integration of shared normative 
structures reflecting people’s needs make social order possible. He is 
concerned with the integration of particular people into the society’s 
structure through norms and roles. Parsons’ importance becomes visible in 
the cybernetic influence on Luhmann’s work; first of all, by showing the 
social system as an ‘organic’ system, capable of self-regulation. Moreover, 
the notion of ‘symbolic’ plays a significant role in both theories. Hence 
Luhmann took up Parsons’ notion of symbolic media. (Arnoldi 2001, 3.) 
This means that Parsons regards societal rationalisation, and Luhmann 
societal differentiation, as a process through which distinct systems of 
action (Parsons) or communication (Luhmann) emerge and differentiate 
themselves, without individual or personal determination. Through this 
process, they both argue, the rationality which motivates and structures 
human life-forms exists independently of subjective-rational motivations, or 
of other types of consistently reflected self-interest, and each system 
develops its own internal value-patterns and its own symbolic media. (See 
King & Thornhill 2003, 161-162.)  
 
Despite his admiration for Parsons, Luhmann in many respects broke away 
from Parsons’ structural functionalism. Luhmann refused to accept Parsons’ 
optimistic and rather simplistic belief that the problems of subjective 
contingency had already been solved by the existing social system, or that 
they could ever be solved by any future social system (see Luhmann 1976). 
Parsons sees a social system as a component of a specific society, and he 
concludes that the actions which it incorporates can be organised by means 
of values, motivations, resources and legal norms, so that they contribute to 
the security of that society. In Luhmanns theory, norms and values play 
only a peripheric role (Kangas 2001, 76; 138). From Luhmann’s 
perspective, this means “that Parsons’ model of socio-systemic evolution is 
still founded in a rather simplistic construct of original human attributes and 
behavioural orientations which provide imperatives for systemic 
organization” (King & Thornhill 2003, 163). Furthermore, instead of 
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focusing his attention to action, like Parsons does, Luhmann concentrates 
on communication; for Luhmann, social systems are not systems of action, 
but of communication. Stichweh (2001, 9101) describes Luhmann’s and 
Parsons’ unusual intellectual relation with the following words: 
       
On the one hand Luhmann reconstructed point to point, often taking up 
minor theoretical distinctions hidden in the appendices of the essays on 
generalized media of exchange. On the other hand, the theory Luhmann 
built via this reconstructive effort is very different from the Parsonsian 
undertaking: an open, inductive list of function systems supplanting the 
decutive logic of AGIL; World Society supersedes the solidarity-based 
national communities Parsons postulates; neo-Darwinist evolutionary 
theory pushes away the Parsonsian thinking in developmental trends; a 
loose, heterachical arrangement of different theories is substituted for the 
hierachical structure of the Parsonsian paradigm. 
 
A second stream of influence can be derived from biology, from the work 
of Chilean neuroscientists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. They 
are often regarded as the founding fathers of the concept of autopoiesis 
(‘auto’ meaning ‘self’ and ‘poiesis’ meaning to ’create’). They developed 
the concept of autopoiesis to characterise living organisms; in other words, 
it emerged as a biological concept. Autopoietic systems are at the same 
time open and closed systems; open because they are influenced by their 
environment, but also closed because environment does not directly 
influence the structure and elementary processes of the systems. (Maturana 
& Varela 1980.) A key element of autopoiesis is that systems are not 
subject to environmental selection in a linear selection process, as 
prescribed by classic biological models derived from Darwinism. Systems, 
Maturana and Varela argue, interact with themselves. Besides which, 
systems interact recursively in the same network of reactions that produced 
them. This means that systems are not open to their environments, as 
perceived by traditional open systems theory (Parsons); on the contrary, 
they are closed, and this is what enables them to interact with themselves. 
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In the 1980s Luhmann adapted the idea of autopoiesis to sociology.23 
Luhmann’s theoretical innovation was to emphasise the way social systems 
arise. Much like living organisms, social systems emerge through 
autopoiesis, that is, they are generated and maintained exclusively by their 
own internal operations, and yet remain open to their environments. 
According to Luhmann (1984; 1995), all systems – social, psychic and 
organic – have their own elements, which reproduce themselves. The 
systems’ own reproduction is their highest priority and their respective 
environments have no direct influence on their internal operations. Social 
systems, in Luhmann’s sense, are operationally closed, but structurally 
open, which means that they can respond to all conditions and events in 
their environment. (Blühdorn 2000, 343.) Closure in this respect does not 
mean that such systems are not able to experience contact with their 
environments, but that the only mode of getting in contact is based on their 
own operations. Autopoietic systems are self-referencing. In order to exist 
over time they need to be able to reproduce themselves; thoughts must 
reproduce thoughts, just as actions must reproduce actions and 
communication must reproduce communication. (Kangas 1995, 242-248.) 
 
A third stream that stimulated Luhmann’s autopoietic theory comes from 
philosophy, notably from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. If we agree 
with Luhmann that autopoietic systems are self-referencing, this raises 
many major questions. One is how to understand or observe the world, to 
allocate meaning (Sinn) to different things. We have now arrived at the 
notion of an observer and a point of convergence for Luhmann and Husserl, 
who, according to Jacob Arnoldi (2003, 407) “is a major influence on 
Niklas Luhmann’s theory of sense making systems”. In phenomenology 
                                                 
23 It must be mentioned here that Maturana and Varela expressed their scepticism about 
applying autopoiesis to social systems. Nevertheless, Luhmann worked for many years to 
apply autopoiesis to social systems. However, Luhmann was not the only sociologist who 
was convinced that autopoiesis might have something to do with social systems. The social 
systems theorist Stafford Beer (1980) commented that autopoiesis has considerable 
potential for the study of social systems. At around the same time, Giddens arrived at a 
similar conclusion. He argued that although the functional analogies are so strongly 
represented in the history of sociology, few sociologists have concerned themselves with 
recursive or self-producing systems (Giddens 1979, 75). 
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(Husserl), the observer would be Ego; it would be the Ego that observes or 
experiences. In autopoietic systems theory this is impossible. Luhmann 
operates with two different observers. One is the Ego, a conscious or 
psychic system. The other type of observer is a social system. Social 
systems observe via communication, while conscious systems 
(consciousness or thoughts of a human being) observe via cognition. What 
happens, either through a cognitive act or a communicative event, is that 
something, through a distinction, is the centre of either cognitive or 
communicative attention. (Luhmann 1992, 98; Arnoldi 2001, 5.)  
 
A fourth stream of influence comes (surprisingly) from mathematics.The 
autopoietic event for a meaning-processing system is, for Luhmann, the act 
of drawing distinctions. Around this concept, Luhmann ‘meets’ both 
Husserl and the logician George Spencer-Brown. For Luhmann, who from 
the beginning was much inspired by Husserl, Spencer-Brown’s logic is a 
description of the most basic operation through which anything meaningful 
or intelligible manifests itself for the observer. Logic is concerned with 
distinctions.  
 
The very foundation of any observation, of any meaningful ‘experience’, is 
the drawing of a distinction between ‘this’ and ‘other’ or ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’. Through this basic operation ‘something’ becomes distinct from 
‘other’ and thus intelligible – as it now is distinct. This notion of 
distinction-form is the core of Luhmann’s notion of meaning. Before the 
distinction there is only void but through the event in which a distinction is 
constituted there is form, there is meaning. (Arnoldi 2001, 4.) 
 
Through observing we are conceiving meanings in different things and 
concepts but observing must be active so that we are able to draw 
distinctions.24 This type of autopoietic operation is temporal, which means 
that new operations are constantly required in order to secure the 
continuation of autopoiesis. Despite this, meaning can be used also 
                                                 
24 For Luhmann concepts are distinctions, although distinctions need not be concepts. Only 
‘Sinnsysteme’, that is, psychic and social systems, use distinctions that are concepts. 
Concepts need not be linguistically articulated, although ‘Sinnsysteme’ often use language 
to express their thoughts or articulate their communications. (Christis 2001, 328.)  
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recursively (Luhmann 1995, 95). This is because meaning can be stored in 
symbolic generalisations, mostly in language and habits, and can thus be 
used again.  
 
The Two Meaning-Processing Systems 
 
It is easy to agree with Luhmann that consciousness can produce meanings, 
but it might sound counter-intuitive that communication systems are also 
able to produce meanings. Here we must notice that although Husserl is a 
major influence on Luhmann, he “abandons the notion of lifeworld, of 
shared meanings, and instead develops a theory of social systems as 
communicative systems” (Arnoldi 2003, 407). Such systems operate 
through processes of sense making similar to that of cognitive systems. 
However, both meaning-processing system types – communicative and 
cognitive – are autopoietic and the difference lies in the mode of 
autopoiesis. Communicative systems produce, as their temporal elements, 
communication, while psychic systems produce cognitive operations. 
Following this theory, it becomes clear that there cannot be intersubjectivity 
(see Luhmann 1986b). Communication is not a direct transmission of 
meaning or information between persons. As Jakob Arnoldi (2001, 6) notes: 
“Communication forms a closed system in relation to which the persons 
‘communicating’ belong to the environment.” In other words, this 
‘communicating’ takes place between at least two Egos who cannot know 
one another’s real thoughts. This encounter is always double contingent.25 
Double contingency means that participants are opaque and incalculable to 
                                                 
25 The concept of double contingency is originally sketched out by Talcott Parsons. For 
him the concept is an important element of the problem of social order. According to 
Parsons (1977), double contingency refers to the indeterminate situation arising from the 
general interdependence among interacting actors. In a simplified, dyadic model of 
interaction between ego and alter, ego’s action is not only oriented to his expectation of 
that of alter, but also to ego’s expectation of his own action. The same applies to alter. A 
problem of complementarity of expectations thus results (Parsons and Shils 1951, 15-16). 
Double contingency is, then, the indeterminacy of action that arises as “each actor is both 
an acting agent and object of orientation both to himself and to the others” (Parsons 1977, 
167). Without resolving this elemental indeterminacy, social interaction could never occur 
and the constitution of social order could never be possible (see Chen 2004). 
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one another. 26  Hence, one can also talk of ego and alter as black boxes. 
“The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes, 
by whatever accident, come to have dealings with one another” (Luhmann 
1995, 109). These boxes cannot really understand each other, but they can 
create sufficient transparency or ‘whiteness’ for dealing with one another 
(Vanderstraeten 2002, 85).  
 
However, it would be incorrect to say that communicative and cognitive 
observations would be totally independent of one another. Our thoughts 
obviously affect our communication and vice versa. Luhmann developed 
the concept of interpenetration27 to describe the relationship between these 
systems. In other words, interpenetration deals with the way psychic and 
social systems depend on each other to produce themselves. It does not 
refer to a comprehensive system of coordination or to an operative process 
of exchange (something that would require the ability to talk about inputs 
and outputs in this sense). Interpenetration can only mean: the unity and 
complexity of the one is given a function within the system of the other. 
“The way in which this occurs can be demonstrated only in the structures 
and operation of each individual system; it could not occur otherwise. 
Interpenetration therefore takes a different form in systems of the mind than 
in systems of communication.” (Luhmann 2002b, 182.) Interpeneration 
makes it easier to understand why the concept of meaning must be 
employed on such a high theoretical level. 
 
                                                 
26 For Luhmann, the concept of contingency describes “something given (something 
experienced, expected, remembered, fantasized) in the light of its possibly being otherwise; 
it describes objects within the horizon of possible variations” (Luhmann 1995c, 106). This 
means that ego’s action is not contingent while it depends on another actor, but while it 
presupposes a selection from a range of alternative options. Reason for this is that self-
referential systems do not involve a selection of pre-constituted elements that eventually 
enter into a relationship with each other; rather, it is only through the constitution of the 
system as a whole that its elements are produced. For Luhmann, then, the double 
contingent character of social interaction is mutatis mutandis, a consequence not of the 
mutual dependency of ego and alter, but of the confrontation of at least two autonomous 
systems that make their own selection in relation to one another (Vanderstraeten 2002, 84).  
27 In his later ’autopoietic’ writings Luhmann mostly uses the concept of structural 
coupling that became the byword for interpenetration.  
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Meaning enables the psychic and social system formations to interpenetrate, 
while protecting their autopoiesis; meaning simultaneously enables 
consciousness to understand itself and continue to affect itself in 
communication, and enables communication to be referred back to the 
consciousness of the participants. Therefore the concept of meaning 
supersedes the concept of the animal sociale. (Luhmann 1995, 219.)  
 
To conclude, autopoietic systems are self-referencing; they have their own 
elements which re-produce themselves. Luhmann operates with two 
different observers and meaning-processing systems, psychic and social 
(see Figure 3). Psychic systems operate via cognition, while social systems 
operate via communication. Furthermore, for being able to operate further, 
systems must make distinctions. They are not completely independent of 
one another, but because of interpenetration, consciousness indirectly 
affects communication and vice versa.28  
 
 
Figure 3. Two Meaning-Processing systems: psychic and social. 
 
                                                 
28 According to Paul Stenner (2004, 167), inter(re)ference by structural coupling [or 
interpenetration] is necessarily indirect, since each operative level functions only as 
environment to the others. Nevertheless, consciousness, for instance, can irritate or 
otherwise indirectly stimulate the system of communication that is its environment. 
Likewise, organic activity can irritate consciousness. In any given act of communication, 
consciousness is already fully present. Despite this, “they pass each other by like ships in 
the night, silently altering their mutual courses by way of the waves their movements cause 
in the shared medium of the ocean. Each operative level is distinct (only consciousness is 
conscious, only communication communicates), but without consciousness, there can be 
no communication, and without brain biochemistry, there can be no consciousness.” 
(Stenner 2004, 167.)  
 







These observations about Luhmann’s systems theory raise several 
intriguing questions with regard to the main objective of this book, namely, 
the examination of trust in the context of advanced systems theory. First, if 
we agree that there are two autopoietic, self-referential observers – the 
psychic and social systems – there must also be two different meanings for 
trust. How is the meaning-processing of trust by psychic systems different 
from that of social systems? Second, if communicative and cognitive 
observations are not completely independent of one another, due to their 
interpenetration, how do the different meanings of trust (psychic and social) 
affect one another? Third, living under the conditions of double 
contingency, how does one decide how and whom to trust?  
 
However, these questions have to do with the meaning-related problems of 
trust within psychic (consciousness) and social (communication) systems. 
Communication and cognition are not enough to explain larger problems of 
meaning and trust because observation is highly temporal. In addition, the 
meaning-processing systems of the present moment are affected by their 
history, environment and future. Therefore, a further analysis of Luhmann’s 
conceptions of communication, evolution and functional differentiation is 
necessary before we turn to an advanced concept of trust.      
 
Three Dimensions of Meaning 
 
A comprehensive conception of meaning can be found in the core chapters 
of Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997), where Luhmann presents three 
principal components of his general theory: communication, evolution, and 
differentiation. Every social system, he asserts, engages in autopoiesis to 
make meaningful distinctions in three separate dimensions: the social, 
temporal, and factual (Sozial, Zeit-, and Sachdimensionen) (Luhmann 1997, 
1136-1138). Autopoiesis refers to the system’s ability to create itself in 
opposition to its environment. Everything that is used as a unit by the 
systems is produced by the system itself. This applies to elements, 
processes, boundaries, and other structures, and last but not least, to the 
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unity of the system itself. Autopoietic systems are thus sovereign with 
respect to the constitution of identities and differences. (Luhmann 1995, 34-
36.) But as mentioned above, meaning-processing systems are observing 
systems and make distinctions. Meaning-processing takes place within all 
three dimensions.  
 
Luhmann argues that the three dimensions of meaning cannot be 
interchanged, and that each dimension is meaningful only in combination 
with the other two. These dimensions are thus interpenetrative, affecting 
each other indirectly. In the following sections I shall consider the functions 
of these dimensions more closely, but in the way of generalisation, it can be 
said that the social dimension produces the difference between the Ego and 
Alter, the temporal dimension produces the difference between past and 
future, and the factual dimension produces the difference between system 
and environment. Luhmann provides the following delineation to illustrate 
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The Characteristics of Communication 
   
In sociology, theorists have opted for different concepts such as action, 
exchange, power or force to represent the basic unit of social reality. 
Differing from these theories, Luhmann considers communication to be the 
constitutive element of social reality. Luhmann’s writings seem to draw the 
consequences from a number of post-war developments, which were 
primarily initiated by the new technologies of information processing. “It 
was Luhmann, in choosing communication theory over action theory, who 
took on the role of the first major sociological communication theorist, a 
role which had to be taken by someone anyway” (Stichweh 2000, 9.) The 
wide-ranging implication of Luhmann’s view of communication can 
already be seen in his essays from the late 1960s and 1970s, in which he 
presented the foundations of his version of social systems theory for the 
first time. It should be noted that during this period, Luhmann also wrote 
his essay on Trust (Vertrauen, 1968). As discussed above, communication 
plays an important role already in Vertrauen. However, the theory of 
communication came increasingly to the fore since the publication of the 
‘introductory chapter’ of Luhmann's theory of society, i.e. Soziale Systeme 
(1984). 
 
Communication is the constitutive element of self-referential social systems 
which use it as their particular model of autopoietic reproduction. I would 
even argue that the conception of communication is the foundation of 
Luhmann’s systems theory. The significance of communication is 
emphasised because it is one of the two meaning-processing systems and 
societies are thus impossible without communication. As Luhmann (1990d, 
145-146) notes: 
 
Societies are a special case of self-referential systems. They presuppose a 
network of communications, previous communications and further 
communications and also communications that happen elsewhere. 
Communications are possible only within a system of communication and 
this system cannot escape the form of recursive circularity. Its basic events, 
the single units of communication, are units only by reference to other units 
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within the same system. In consequence, only the structure of this system 
and not its environment can specify the meaning of communications. 
 
 According to this view, communications do not establish a connection with 
external reality, but recursively construct communications networks. A 
communication thus necessitates a new communication. Each 
communication “is an element only as an element of a process, however 
minimal or ephemeral that process may be” (Luhmann 1995, 144.). 
Communications conclude preceding communications and allow them to be 
connected. These elements of social systems organise their own renewal; 
they operate autopoietically. However, Luhmann’s view of communication 
differs considerably from the traditional sender-receiver model which can 
be sketched in the following way: 
 
Customarily, communication is described by means of a metaphor of 
‘transmission’. Communication is the transmission of messages or 
information form one place (the sender) to another place (the receiver) by 
means of medium. It includes processes of encoding by the sender in order 
to get the message through the medium, and the processes of decoding by 
the receiver in order to get at the meaning of the encoded message. 
(Vanderstraeten 2000, 585-6.) 
 
The development of society has not been as causal as this model assumes. 
Furthermore, as Vanderstraten (2000, 586) notes, “the transmission 
metaphor prematurely assumes an identity of what is transmitted.” Only 
very seldom is the information that has been sent the same for the sender 
and the receiver. A more usual situation – which can be seen as a situation 
of double contingency – is that information might mean something very 
different for the two persons involved. The content of the information 
cannot guarantee its identity. 
 
Luhmann focuses on communication as an occurrence or event which 
emerges from the processing of three independent selections: information, 
utterance and understanding (see Kangas 1995, 238-242). The logic of 
Luhmannian communication can be explained in the following way: “In 
information it is a matter of what we utter, in utterance how we utter it and 
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in understanding the separation of uttered information from the way we 
utter it. Understanding consists of the communicative actions through 
which the receiver reacts to the message.” (Jalava 2003, 179.) In its 
simplest terms, communication is thus an emergent, three-part unity and a 
way of processing information (see Figure 5, which has been modified by 
the original idea of Detlef Krause [2001, 35] ).  
 
                                                            Social System 












                        
Figure 5. The process of communication. 
 
 
For Luhmann, information (or data) is selected from numerous possibilities. 
This selected information should be provided in a form which the sender 
and the addressee are able to understand. Therefore, communication also 
requires an adequate standardisation of the utterance that expresses the 
information. This utterance can occur intentionally or unintentionally, but it 
must always be interpretable as selection, and not just appear as a sign of 
something else. (Vanderstraeten 2003, 135.) As Luhmann (1995, 151) says, 
“In this sense, rushing about can be observed as a sign of urgency, just like 
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demonstration of urgency, or of being busy, or of having no time to stop 
and talk, and so on.” This difference between the two interpretations also 
stresses the importance of the last selection of communication, i.e. 
understanding. What is important with regard to understanding is the fact 
that this third selection can be based on a distinction, namely the distinction 
between information and its utterance. Understanding is more than mere 
observation of the message.29 It only takes place, as noted above, if the 
receiver construes the information from the utterance. This does not mean 
that the receiver understands the information as it was intended by the 
sender. On the contrary, the information might mean something very 
different for both participants. Communication is always double 
contingent.30 Therefore, “understanding for Luhmann is not a psychic 
reality, but a part of the three-selection-process of communication, in which 
communication itself has understood if and how the next communication 
connects. This does not foreclose psychic understanding, but only 
communication can understand what has been communicated.” (Nassehi 
2005, 5.) 
 
Since, as we have seen, society consists of the totality of all meaningful 
communications, it follows that no communications can exist outside 
society, so society cannot communicate with its environment or, as 
Luhmann (1988c, 18) says “it can find no addresses outside itself to which 
it can communicate anything”. Consciousness cannot communicate and 
does not, therefore, belong to the society. As noted above, Luhmann refers 
to consciousness and society (communication) as being ‘interpenetrated’ in 
the sense that each constructs the other within its environment and their 
                                                 
 
29 Observation is simply the psychic system’s ability to make distinctions. We all make 
distinctions and thus understand information in a different way. This deviant understanding 
increases complexity. Complexity itself is limited understanding. It is the absence of 
information that makes full comprehension of a system impossible. (Luhmann 1995, 27-
28.)  
30 Here I consider only the three basic components of communication. However, I would 
like to note that the acceptance or rejection of a communication can be identified as the 
fourth component of communicative event, but it is already a part of the next 
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operations assume the existence of the other, but each remains separate and 
distinct with no direct communication between them being possible. 
 
Wherein, then, lies the uniqueness of this concept of communication? First 
of all, the distinction among the three components (information, utterance 
and understanding) is new. One finds a similar distinction in Karl Bühler, 
made from the point of view of different functions of linguistic 
communication. Anglo-American thinkers like Austin and Searle have 
augmented and rigified this into a theory of types of acts or speech acts. 
Furthermore, Jürgen Habermas (whose critique against Luhmann I examine 
later) has presented a typology of validity claims implicit in 
communication. But as Luhmann (2002b, 159-160) says, “all of this still 
proceeds from an action-theoretical understanding of communication and 
therefore sees the procedure of communication as a successful or 
unsuccessful transference of news, information, or suppositions of 
agreement.” Second, contrary to action-theoretical understanding, a 
systems-theoretical approach emphasises the emergence of communication 
itself. Nothing is transferred.  
 
Evolution and ‘Disappearance’ of the Individual 
 
By now it seems obvious that the traditional sender-receiver model does not 
conform to Luhmann’s model of communication. Furthermore, although all 
dimensions are meaningful only in combination with the other two, it is 
clear that the social dimension, wherein the difference between Ego and 
Alter constructs itself through communication, appears to be the central 
one. From the society’s point of view, evolution and differentiation of the 
systems are possible only if there is communication first. 
 
The importance of the three-part concept of communication, as well as the 
problems of trust, can be understood better if we consider the role of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
communication, thereby securing the sequential unity of a communication (see Stichweh 
2001, 9098). 
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individual in society. Namely, Luhmann rejects the ‘Old-European’ notion 
that individuals participate in a naturally ordered society as whole beings. 
One reason for Luhmann’s rejection of ‘the individual’ as the unit of 
sociological analysis concerns his historical account of social evolution. 
Those individualising theories which may once have been accepted as 
adequate sociological accounts of the way that traditional societies 
understood themselves can today offer only partial, incomplete and limited 
explanations of the complexities of modern society. Luhmann (1986c, 318) 
writes that “in stratified societies the human individual was regularly placed 
in only one social system. Social status (condition, qualité, état) was the 
most stable characteristic of an individual’s personality”. This is no longer 
possible in modern society, which – as will be explained in more detail later 
– Luhmann considers as differentiated into social function systems that 
provide a firm definition of a person’s social standing or status. In 
functionally differentiated society, “nobody can live in only one of these 
[functional] systems” (Luhmann 1986c, 318).  
 
Furthermore, autopoietic systems preclude humanism. There is no 
autopoietic unity of all the autopoietic systems that compose the human 
being. “Certainly mind and brain never will build one closed, circular, self-
referential autopoietic system, because thoughts, as elements of the mind, 
cannot be identified with single neurophysiologic events, as elements of the 
brain” (Luhmann 1986c, 323). Therefore, Luhmann suggests, the 
fundamental unit of society is communication, not the individual. 
 
Individuals, seen as separate entities, are socially meaningless. One does 
not locate society inside individuals but between them. Society exists only 
when individuals communicate. Until they begin to communicate, 
individuals are not in society. And when they do communicate - when they 
do participate in society - individuals do so to a very limited extent, never 
as “whole persons”. The limits of society are established by the limits of 
communication. All that is not communicated remains outside of society. 
(Lee 2000, 322; see also Luhmann 1997, 26.) 
 
Social systems are, thus, not made up of people, but consist only of 
communication as the synthesis of the differentiation among information, 
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utterance and understanding. Therefore – as I will show in chapter five – 
also the advanced Luhmannian problematics of trust is primarily connected 
with communication and not (only) with people. What, then, is the status of 
the individual person in Luhmannian social systems? Or, as Luhmann 
(1986c, 318) asks: “If the individual cannot live in ‘his’ social system, 
where else can he live?” Luhmann’s answer is to see the individual as an 
observer of society, without an existence within society.  
 
The individual leaves the world in order to look at it. I interpret this 
extramundane position of the transcendental subject as a symbol for the 
new position of the empirical individual in relation to a system of functional 
subsystems. He does not belong to any of them in particular, but depends 
on their interdependence. (Luhmann 1986b, 319).  
 
Luhmann views individuals as self-referring systems, but not as social 
systems. Persons, in Luhmann’s scheme, exist both as biological or living 
systems and as psychic systems. Living systems exist within and perform 
their operations directly upon media that exist in the natural world, such as 
temperature, pressure, viruses, bacteria and other living organisms. For 
psychic systems the medium is consciousness. This consists of all thought 
as well as feelings and emotions in so far as the individual being system is 
able to give them meaning and significance. (King & Thornhill 2003, 4.) 
 
This does not mean that individuals do not have any role in producing and 
reproducing communication (and thus, also trust). But they cannot 
communicate continually. As Kangas (2001, 286) notes: “In a functionally 
differentiated society people participate in the functions of the different 
subsystems only sporadically”. They can be seen as “carriers of 
communication” forming a common ground for the operations of different 
systems, and suppliers of the basis for inter-systemic communication (see 
Hagen 2000, 34). This means, for example, that one individual can properly 
assume something about the other psychic system’s experience on the basis 
of what has been communicated. The actions of psychic systems (thoughts 
of an individual) are thus more or less influenced – or in Luhmann’s 
terminology interpenetrated – by the ‘carried’ communication. We can 
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observe the essential nature of the other and listen to his communication, 
but we could not know his real thoughts, his inner being. This explains, 
why “a person cannot communicate, only communication can 
communicate…There is no communication between this consciousness and 
that consciousness that is no social…Only a consciousness can think, and 
only society can communicate.” (Luhmann 1997, 105.)  
 
Communication between people thus helps to speed up the process of 
gathering and sorting out information about one’s environment. From an 
evolutionary point of view, it is important to note that people need different 
types of forms and media for co-operation. As noted above, Luhmann takes 
his account of the way in which systems in general ‘perceive’ and 
‘understand’ through differentiation and self-reference from Spencer-
Brow’s logic. The more complex aspect of communications that Luhmann 
identifies, concerns their central role in what he describes as “a difference-
theoretical theory of form” (Luhmann 2000c, 28). In his view, 
communications require ‘articulated forms’. They require these, first of all, 
“to serve as a condition for the cooperation of disparate psychic systems 
(people) that perceive words or signs as differences” and so ensure “the 
connectivity of communications” (Luhmann 2000c, 18). Secondly, 
communication also needs articulated forms because “they must have 
recourse to past and future communications, that is, it must be able to 
identify something as repeatable” (Luhmann 2000c, 18). This is not simply 
a matter of situating the communication in time; communications must also 
be able to refer back to previous communications and the possibility of 
future communications of the same kind. They provide the form with an 
identity and continuity. (King & Thornhill 2003, 13.) 
 
Media are specific forms of social co-ordination; they are the most constant 
dynamics of social co-ordination present in modern societies. 
Evolutionarily, Luhmann theorises three kinds of media: oral language, 
mass or diffusion media (writing and printing) and generalised symbolic 
media of communication. Luhmann (1995, 157-163) says that there is one 
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type of medium linked to each stage of social evolution: oral languages 
correspond to segmented societies; mass diffusion media 
(Verbreitungsmedien) to stratified societies, and generalised symbolic 
media to functionally differentiated societies. However, this does not mean 
that the generalised media (money, power, law, etc.) would not have existed 
in segmented or stratified societies at all, but the form of these media was 
different than in functionally differentiated societies. Therefore, it cannot be 
said that there is only one type of medium linked to each stage of social 
evolution. 
 
Forms and media are bound to time. Luhmann (1976b, 135) defines time as 
“the interpretation of reality with regard to the difference between past and 
future”. But all this takes place against a background of time passing. In 
this manner, “two kinds of present always exist simultaneously and it is 
only the difference between them that creates the impression of the flow of 
time” (Luhmann 1995, 78). One “occurs in a regular manner”, indicates 
through, for example, “the hand of a watch, sounds, movements, the 
crashing of waves that something is always changing irreversibly” 
(Luhmann 1995, 78). Because the world changes frequently enough, this 
first kind of ‘present’ is symbolised as the inevitability of the flow of time. 
The second kind of present, “the standardized scheme of movement and of 
time”, takes place in the system’s environment (Luhmann 1976b, 135). 
Time is constructed by systems to make sense of, or give meaning to, their 
own operations (for example decisions), all of which take place in the 
present. This second kind of present is, according to Luhmann (1976b, 135; 
King&Thornhill 2003, 27), “the space of time between past and future in 
which an event becomes irreversible…The present lasts as long as it takes 
for something to become irreversible”.  
 
The evolution31 of forms and the three media (oral language, mass or 
diffusion media and generalised symbolic media) has followed the logic of 
                                                 
31 It must be mentioned that here I do not speak about biological evolution but cultural 
historical evolution. 
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time. Evolution has been irreversible. Yet this does not mean that the forms 
and the media or societies are results of a factual sequence of events, 
according to which the present is understood as the effect of past causes or 
as the cause of future events – i.e. what the events meant within the context 
of past societies or will mean in the context of future societies. For 
Luhmann (1995, 79-80), “history operates as a release from sequence”. It 
“is always present past or present future, always an abstention from pure 
sequence, and always a reduction of the freedom of immediate access to all 
that is past and all that is future” (Luhmann 1995, 79-80). The evolution of 
the form, the media and societies is thus bound to the relevance of time. 
This means that all societies have had different capacities for mediating the 
relations between past and future in a present.      
 
Because of the evolution of the society, people need each other, although 
they cannot fully know the thoughts of others. They have an even lesser 
capacity for knowing the information and functions of mass media and 
functionally differentiated media (such as money, power and law). This of 
course increases risks and uncertainty. The development or evolution of 
communication has increased complexity and contingency. Luhmann 
rejects the optimistic notion of evolutionary progress and dismisses the idea 
that complex systems are better than simple ones. Rather, the more complex 
a system, the more things can go wrong, and the more there is 
unfamiliarity.32 Within the dimension of time, societal systems coevolve by 
heaping communication upon communication, one bit after another. There 
are no natural laws that determine how meanings must be combined. 
Autopoiesis, functioning in the present, produces structures that, 
recursively, produce future structures. 
 
                                                 
32 Nonetheless, Luhmann does not see complexity and contingency in as alarming terms as 
for example Jürgen Habermas (1992, 138). According to Luhmann, the distinction 
complexity/simplicity no longer holds because in the modern world the search for an 
underlying simplicity has become futile. As a matter of fact, complexity guarantees 




Differentiation and Structural Coupling 
 
Thus far we have concentrated on ‘persons’ or observers as psychic and 
social systems. We have seen how they construct their meaning-processing 
through communication which enables the difference between Ego and 
Alter, between two ‘black boxes’. We have also seen how communication 
(or a way of using of communication media) affects the observer’s 
evolution. How can we then perceive the third dimension of systems, the 
factual one? “One can speak of the fact dimension in relation to all objects 
of meaningful intentions (in psychic systems) or themes of meaningful 
communication (in social systems). The fact dimension is constituted in that 
meaning divides the reference structure of what is meant into ‘this’ and 
‘something else’” (Luhmann 1995, 76). Factual communication – to which 
the present work especially concentrates – is largely affected by the 
differentiation of society.    
 
Society, for Luhmann, is a world society. This means that, society consists 
of communication and represents the boundaries and the limits of all that is 
recognised as societal communications and transmittable as such. However, 
precisely what is meant by ‘world society’ will vary both historically and 
culturally in the sense that organisations of communication subsystems will 
provide different versions of what that world comprises of. Michael King 
and Chris Thornhill (2003, 8) outline some examples of the Luhmannian 
‘world society’: 
 
If, for example, communication subsystems are organised feudally in a 
hierarchical manner according to rank or status, reinforced by a belief that 
this organization reflects a divine ordering of humanity, what is understood 
by ‘the world will appear very different from modern society…Society’s 
environment will also differ, for both ‘nature’ and ‘consciousness’ will be 
understood in different ways. An example of a society where 
communications are organized in a relatively simple manner would be a 
completely isolated tribe in the Borneo jungle. Yet, even here, the society 
of the tribe is a ‘world society’ in that it does not know or understand 
anything outside the boundaries of its own knowledge, and the environment 




In a world society the difference between centre and periphery loses 
meaning due to assimilation and globalisation, and differentiation in society 
becomes functional.33 Functionally differentiated society lacks overall 
integration, and it operates without a top and without a centre (Luhmann 
1997, 803). For Luhmann, the evolution of society’s subsystems did not 
happen in any purposeful or rational way, but through a process in which 
information was selected and given meaning as communication. The world 
society consists of functionally differentiated autopoietic subsystems, such 
as the economy, family, religion, law, politics, science, education, art, mass 
media, the medical system etc. In their production of communications these 
systems transform information into meaning, and without their operations 
meaning, and hence the society, could not exist. Each of these systems is 
specialised, fulfilling one and only one function for the society. (Luhmann 
1997; Hagen 2000, 28-29.) For example, the economy responds to and 
regulates scarcity for society via payments and so removes anxiety 
regarding the future satisfaction of needs (Luhmann 1988b); politics 
provides society with the means of making collectively binding decisions 
(Luhmann 1981); law stabilises normative expectations in the face of 
actions that contradict such expectations (Luhmann 1993b); and science 
provides a way of distinguishing between what is true or likely to be true 
and what is not (Luhmann 1990b).  
 
The subsystems became functional as soon as other communicative systems 
began to rely upon their communications. Thus systems are functional in so 
far as they are able to organise communications and disseminate them in 
ways which enable them and other communicative systems to make use of 
them. In other words, functional systems can observe other systems within 
                                                 
33 According to this evolutionary scheme, the structural change that occurred no later than 
the end of the eighteenth century is best described not as the emergence of bourgeois 
capitalist society but rather as the shift from social stratification, in which the unity of 
society is represented by a unity at the ‘top’ (court), to a plurality of functionally 
differentiated social systems, with no one system able to represent the unity of the whole, 
and certainly with no ‘life-world’ serving as watchtower overseeing and disciplining the 
individual function systems. (Luhmann 1982, 229-254; 1997, 707-706; Rasch 2000.) 
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their environment and are able to refer to the communication of other 
systems in their own communication. However, because of autopoiesis and 
operational closure34 systems can only indirectly affect each other. This is 
possible, for example, through interpenetration (or structural coupling). It 
can also be said that system differentiation is important for the continuity of 
society. Although differentiation increases complexity, it also enables new 
forms for reducing complexity. As Luhmann (1995, 192) puts it: 
 
Every subsystem takes on, so to speak, a part of the overall complexity in 
that it simultaneously orients itself only to its own system/environment 
difference, yet with this reconstructs the overall system for itself. The 
subsystem relieves the strain on itself by assuming that many of the 
reproductive requirements needed in the overall system are fulfilled 
elsewhere by other subsystems. Doing so it doubles the subsystem’s 
dependence on the overall system: it is itself a part of the overall system, 
and it is at the same time dependent on the internal environment and thus 
once again, but in another way, on the overall system.     
 
Each societal system is autopoietic, has its own environment, and operates 
according to its own form, medium, code and programmes. For being able 
to make distinctions and ‘understand’ their environment, functional 
subsystems need articulated forms in which their media function. This is 
where the binary codes come to the fore. The notion that systems 
distinguish themselves and make sense of their environments through their 
own particular binary code can be traced back to Parsons’ symbolically 
generalised media, which Luhmann refers to as the symbolically 
generalised media of communication. According to this model, each sphere 
of social activity sees the world in its own terms. 
 
However, “it was only after Luhmann’s adoption and adaptation for social 
theory of the biological notion of autopoiesis that he came to see codes and 
programmes as central to the operation of systems” (King & Thornhill 
                                                 
34 Operational closure means that systems are unable to communicate directly with one 
another, for each system uses different criteria of validity, different forms of authority and 
different codes for deriving meaning from and assessing the value of information. They see 
things differently and there is no possibility of one system being able to internalise the 
world-view of another. (King & Thornhill 2003, 27.) 
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2003, 23). The function systems have evolved over centuries and, as noted 
above, one of their basic evolutionary conditions is the creation of 
symbolically generalised media. Symbolically generalised media are 
general in the sense that everything can be communicated in terms of one 
media. 
 
For example, everything can be communicated in terms of money. 
Everything can be priced. Symbolically generalised media are symbolic in 
the sense that they are condensed coins, bank notes, and today also credit 
cards. The symbolically generalised establish all communicative codes that 
demarcate communication on the fact dimension. (Andersen 2003, 155.)  
 
Codes need to be understood as special types of distinction that exist only 
within the system and can only be operated by the systems. “The code, the 
unity of this specific difference, is sufficient to determine which operations 
belong to the system and which operations (coded differently or not coded 
at all) are going on in the environment of the system” (Luhmann 2000d, 
17). Codes are the abstract and universally applicable distinctions between 
positive and negative values – for example government/opposition 
(politics), lawful/unlawful (law), true/false (science), and information/non-
information (mass media) – which allow systems to give meaning to their 
environment. The fact that the code is binary also means that they divided 
the world in two halves. The whole world is comprehensible through the 
code. Therefore, when the communication links up with a symbolically 
generalised medium, it can only link itself to either the positive side or the 
negative side in the code. There is no third value. (Luhmann 1986d; 2000d.) 
For Luhmann (1993b, 78), the system’s code represents “the form with 
which the system distinguishes itself from the environment and organizes 
its own operative closure.” 
 
If codes exist only within the system and can only be operated by the 
system, programmes, for their part, are a necessary filter for this operation. 
Without them, the application of codes would appear as crude attempts to 
reduce everything in the world to simplistic binary propositions. 
“Programming complements coding, filling it with content” (Luhmann 
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1993b, 190; King & Thornhill 2003, 23). Through abstract codes systems 
give meaning to their environment, but their operation is always mediated 
by the system’s programmes. The essential difference between programmes 
and codes is that “programmes can be modified or replaced, but the code 
remains identical throughout and identifies the system itself” (Luhmann 
1986d, 195; King & Thornhill 2003, 24). Programmes can be thought of as 
the explicit forms of codes. Government platforms, for example, are visible 
programs through which the government uses its media of power. These 
platforms follow the binary codes government/governed and, in democratic 
societies, government/opposition. Although the platform would be replaced 
by the change of government, the codes still remain the same. Despite the 
visible character of programmes, codes are always more important.  
 
Programmes do not determine the nature of the coding; rather, it is the code 
which generates the programmes and gives them their appearance of 
continuity and rationality. While the code itself may be described as rigid 
and invariant, programmes provide a flexibility, a plasticity which allows 
them to be moulded into whatever has been pre-formulated  (through the 
system’s coding) as an issue for politics or law. (King & Thornhill 2003, 
25-26.)  
 
Each autonomous system directs its activities via communication, which is 
to say, via binary coding. Science, for example, operates according to the 
true/false distinction, economics by the distinction of 
profitability/unprofitability and democratic politics by the distinction of 
government/opposition, and so on, for the other differentiated systems and 
subsystems of society. Functional systems as well as individuals-as-Egos 
can only ‘understand’ or use their own distinctions. The more complex a 
modern society becomes, the more it depends on a high level of efficiency 
and specialisation achieved in each system. With greater differentiation, 
there is more communication, binary codes and programmes. The more 
communication, the larger the society becomes. This also means that 
‘people’ are more dependent on different subsystems all the time but also 
on other ‘people’ (mostly as social and psychic systems, but sometimes also 
as organic systems) in their environment. We are meeting new and strange 
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‘people’ every day and many subsystems of society (law, politics, economy 
etc.) are affecting us almost constantly.  
 
However, although all systems are autopoietic and do not have direct 
contact with each other, systems can ‘irritate’ one another, possibly leading 
to the creation of operational and structural couplings (the term can be here 
seen as synonymous for interpenetration) between systems. “The concept of 
structural coupling is meant to explain how a system can be both 
operationally closed and dependent on the environment. The environment is 
not part of the system, but is still significant for the operations of the 
system.” (Hagen 2000, 32.) Structural coupling, therefore, relates to the co-
evolution of different systems whereby each includes the other in its 
environment, interpreting the outputs of the other in its own terms on a 
continuous basis.35 Each subsystem has structural couplings to many others. 
For example, the structural coupling of law and politics is regulated by the 
constitution, that of law and economics through property and contract. 
Universities couple science and education, while experts make science 
available to politics. But, as Hagen (2000, 32) notes, “structural couplings 
are nothing by themselves. They are external observations of system-to-
system causalities explained as the outcome of evolution.” After all, 
without structural couplings, systems would be unable to refer to other 
systems’ communication in their own communication.They need structural 






                                                 
35 Following Paul Stenner’s (2004, 167) peculiar reading, the irritation posed by structural 
coupling is always parasitical. “Such parasitical irritations are constantly occurring at the 
invisible thresholds between discrete operative levels, and serve to mutually structure these 
levels through incessant provocation.” In abstract terms, a system can produce parasitic 
noise, but can also appear, in Stenner’s words, as a parasite that by digesting noise renders 
it operable as a material for the ongoing renewal of the system.  
 96
Meaning in Autopoietic Thinking 
 
In autopoietic thinking an observer builds his understanding or meanings of 
the world through his own communicational and cognitive distinctions. 
Because of their autopoietic character, communication and cognition are 
separate, self-referential and closed systems, but due to interpenetration 
they are able to indirectly affect one another. An observer’s meaning-
processing occurs communicatively and cognitively in social, temporal and 
factual dimensions. Social systems are not made up of people, but consist of 
communication as the synthesis of the differentiation among information, 
utterance and understanding. Media are specific forms of social co-
ordination – without them the evolution of communication would have been 
impossible. Because form and media are bound to time, only one type of 
medium primarily (but not exclusively) linkd with each stage of social 
evolution: oral languages correspond to segmented societies; mass media to 
stratified societies, and generalised symbolic media to functionally 
differentiated societies. 
 
For Luhmann, modern society is a world society. It consists of functionally 
differentiated autopoietic subsystems, which are specialised, fulfilling one 
and only one function for society. The more complex a modern society 
becomes, the more it depends on a high level of efficiency and 
specialisation achieved in each system. The subsystems operate according 
to their own form, medium, code and programmes. For example, the 
medium of politics is power and for economy it is money. Codes are the 
abstract and universally applicable distinctions between positive and 
negative values – for example government/opposition (politics) and 
have/not have (money) – which allow systems to give meaning to their 
environment.  Programmes are systems’ operations, which are based on 
systems’ coded meaning to the environment (for example a government 
platform).   
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The development of advanced systems theory must also have some 
influence on the Luhmannian concepts of trust and confidence. We can no 
longer be satisfied with Luhmann’s division between confidence in the 
system and trust in persons, which he saw as different attitudes with respect 
to alternatives but which, despite this, may influence each other. From the 
perspective of advanced systems theory, these ‘early-Luhmannian’ concepts 
of trust and confidence seem to be too simplistic. However, before turning 
in greater depth to the advanced concepts of trust and confidence, I shall 
make an excursion into some of the critical debates on Luhmann’s 
advanced systems theory. This is because Luhmann’s peculiar theory has 
not always received a warm reception but has been accused of eclecticism 
and conservatism.  
 
Debates on Systems Theory: An Excursion 
 
In the course of the years there have been many critical debates on 
Luhmann’s systems theory. The purpose of this chapter is not so much to 
defend Luhmann against his critics. Rather, I will overview some basic 
themes and well-known representatives of the critical debate on Luhmann’s 
general systems theory. Most of these debates refer to the following themes 
or their variations (see King & Thornhill 2003, 203-220):  
1. Luhmanns eclecticism and multi-conceptual nature of his theory. 
2. Luhmann’s failure to demonstrate empirically that his theory 
contributes to the sociological analysis of contemporary society. 
3. Luhmann’s failure to account for human agency in directing change 
through society. 
4. The failure of Luhmann’s ideas to offer anything more than a new brand 
of conservatism. 
 
There are also other types of debates, but these four themes (especially the 
two latter ones) are extensively exercised by Jürgen Habermas. As a matter 
of fact, the condemnation that Luhmann’s theory fails to address 
intersubjective ethical issues came originally from Habermas. He invited 
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Luhmann to discuss ‘social technology’ and ‘theory of society’ with him. 
As a result of this invitation, Habermas and Luhmann held a joint seminar 
at the beginning of the 1970s at the Max Planck Institut in Starnberng. This 
resulted in a co-authored book, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtehcnologie: Was leistet die Systemforschung? (1971), which can be 
regarded as a starting point for their life-long scientific debate. Habermas 
has argued that the deficiency of Luhmann’s theory effectively disqualifies 
autopoiesis from consideration as a social theory capable of making general 
statements about meaning and validity and, therefore, renders it of limited 
value and applicability (Habermas 1987).  
 
Some of the most typical recent critical debates on Luhmann’s theory are 
the writings of Ulrich Beck (1988; Beck et al. 1994) and John Mingers’ 
article Can Social Systems be autopoietic? Assessing Luhmann's social 
theory (2002). Beck is extremely critical of Luhmann. For example, he 
describes Luhmann’s thought as an “extreme counter-position” to the 
“challenges of democracy” (Beck 1988, 166). Mingers in turn carries on 
Habermas’ work, in a way, because his critique also culminates to 
condemning social autopoiesis for failing to give sufficient importance to 
the role played by ‘human activity’ and thereby offering “an incredibly 
abstract and reductive view of the social world” (Mingers 2002, 292). I 
shall consider Habermas’, Beck’s and Mingers’ critiques each in turn. 
 
Different Communications and Deviant Political Preferences 
 
One good example of the disagreements between Luhmann and Habermas 
concerns communication. It has a prominent position in both theorists’ 
work but is conceived of in a totally different way. Moreover, where 
Habermas’ work sees universal principles, Luhmann’s theory only sees 
principles that are self-referential, that is, principles that are, paradoxically, 
based on themselves (Arnoldi 2001, 2). There is no question that most of 
this dispute was highly political. It is obvious that Luhmann’s work is very 
far from being the type of critical theory developed by Habermas. 
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Luhmann’s work has rather been described as conservative. Rather than 
explicating further the political influences of and differences between 
Habermas and Luhmann, however, the purposes of this work are better 
served by concentrating on the differences between their concepts of 
communication.  
 
In Habermas’ theory of communication, individuals as ‘full’ persons 
communicate within a horizon of a ‘lifeworld’36 of shared beliefs and 
meanings. Therefore, it stands to reason that Habermas does not ‘swallow’ 
Luhmann’s separation between consciousness and communication. The 
isolation of the individual identity is central to Habermas’s philosophical 
critique. As Habermas (1987, 387) formulates: 
 
The flow of official documents among administrative authorities and the 
monadically encapsulated consciousness of a Robinson Crusoe provide the 
guiding images for the conceptual uncoupling of the social and psychic 
systems, according to which the one is supposedly based solely on 
communication and the other solely on consciousness. In this abstract 
separation of psychic and social systems, a legacy of the philosophy of the 
subject makes itself felt: The system-environment relationship affords just 
as little conceptual connection with the genuinely linguistic 
intersubjectivity proper to agreement and communicatively shared meaning 
as did the subject-object relationship. 
 
For Habermas, language offers a solution for the problem of the contact 
between consciousness and communication. He proposes language as the 
                                                 
36 It must be noted here that in The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 1 and 2 (1984; 
1987b), Habermas combined the theoretical resources of action theory and systems theory 
in a dual-perspective conception of society as both lifeworld and system. ‘Lifeworld’ is 
constituted by communicative action in the medium of ordinary language, and ‘systems’are 
steered by ‘special codes’ such as money and power. Persons act as communicators and 
systems exist as anonymous entities “which obey only the logic of efficience and 
instrumental reason” (Flynn 2004, 438). While The Theory of Communicative Action 
focused on aspects of the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ by the systems, Habermas’ later 
book, Between Facts and Norms (1996), depicts a way in which the normative resources of 
the lifeworld, through the medium of law, can be marshalled to effectively contend with 
money and power. According to Habermas, law acts as a ‘transformer’, taking the 
normative messages of ordinary language and translating them into the ‘complex legal 
code’ which, while open to normative reasons, can also communicate with the functional 
steering media of money and power. While Habermas had earlier claimed that the most we 
could hope for was a democratic dam against the colonising encroachment of system 
imperatives on areas of the lifeworld, in Between Facts and Norms the function of law 
goes beyond that. (See Habermas 1996; Flynn 2004.) 
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medium of communication that allows us to relate human individuation and 
inter-human socialisation specifically and systemically. Luhmann, as noted 
above, also defines language as a medium of communication but underlines 
the hypothesis that the individual and his/her ‘uncommunicated’ life are left 
outside the social system. In contrast to Luhmann, Habermas argues that 
language has a suprasubjective status as prior to subjects, and thus it cannot 
be grasped as a consciousness-separated medium. 
 
Suprasubjective linguistic structures would entwine society and individual 
too tightly with one another. An intersubjectivity of mutual understanding 
among agents and criticizable validity claims would be too strong a tie 
between psychic and social systems as well as between different psychic 
systems. (Habermas 1987, 379.) 
 
Habermas thus assumes that because of suprasubjective linguistic 
structures, common language is a ‘given’. It can be divided into 1) the 
‘natural’, which provides the mediation between nature and culture, and 2) 
the ‘cultural’ which is rooted in community life. Common language can be 
seen as the integrating operation of the social system. (See Leydesdorff 
2000.) In other words, common language is the element through which 
consciousness and communication combine with one another as well as 
with society. 
 
To put it briefly, the first mainline of Habermas’ critique thus concentrates 
on the disappearance of the individual and Luhmann’s communication 
theory. He says that Luhmann has replaced subject-centred reason by 
systems rationality, and his theory is not sociological in its real essence. 
Systems theory penetrates into the lifeworld and tries to – using 
Habermasian language – encroach to the domain of the lifeworld as well as 
erode its communicative solidarity and competence. As Habermas (1987, 
383-384) puts it: 
 
[Contrary to the self-understanding of Luhmann], this systems theory is not 
suited to the comparatively modest format of a theory that is ‘universal’ 
only in the specialized sense of being tailored to one discipline. It is not 
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really sociology, but more like those metatheoretical projects that fill the 
function of world views. 
 
The second mainline of Habermas’ critique is closely connected to his 
political opinions. Theoretical relations between Habermas and Luhmann 
became publicly strained in the 1970s and 1980s, when Habermas turned on 
Luhmann, vaguely accusing him of direct complicity with the 
neoconservative movements gaining influence in Germany during the time 
(see Habermas 1985, 181). Luhmann responded in kind by ridiculing the 
theoretical naivety of Habermas’ state-society model and by rejecting his 
consensual, radical-democratic interpretation of political legitimacy 
(Luhmann 1996c, 71; see also King & Thornhill 2003, 165).  
 
The reciprocal ‘taunting’ between these two lasted in one form or another 
until Luhmann’s death. It was Luhmann’s firm belief that Habermas’ 
critical theory was a nostalgic, morally motivated rhetorical stance, an 
ethos, rather than a well-thought-out theory adequate to the task of 
understanding modern society. When asked where the answers to 
modernity’s most perplexing questions were to be found, Luhmann’s 
answer was an emphatic: “Not in Frankfurt” (Luhmann 2002b, 193; see 
also Rasch 2002, 30).  
 
Luhmann as ‘the Warden of a Castle’ 
 
The most outspoken, even furious, recent critique against Luhmann is 
presented by Ulrich Beck. In his book Gegengifte: Die organisierte 
Unverantwortlichkeit (1988), Beck attacks Luhmann’s theory of evolution 
and systems rationality in particular. Beck (1988, 167) compares 
Luhmann’s systems theory to a ‘castle’ which is empty of people. In such a 
castle there no longer is any complaining, suspicion, causes of contention, 
death, hatred, love or accusations. Such a castle brings out its own 
perfection. “Through voice of the only living warden of this castle 
(Schlossverwalter) – Niklas Luhmann – people become aware of, how 
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frighteningly unnecessary and unreal they have become from the system’s 
point of view” (Beck 1988, 167). 
 
Beck also does not agree with Luhmann’s concept of danger. Beck 
interprets that in Luhmann’s theory of society, dangers can be perceived 
only selectively and they can hardly be handled at all. Therefore, there are 
no dangers in the societal sense. Following Beck’s interpretation, speaking 
of general dangers (for example ecological danger) is, for Luhmann, only a 
rhetoric of fear (Angst-Rhetorik). It is moralising, which is morally 
rejectable because moralising belongs to the Old-European thinking. (Beck 
1988, 169-170.) 
 
According to Beck (1988, 171), Luhmann ought to give up the idea of 
systems rationality. He should not paint a harmonic picture of a functionally 
differentiated society. By doing so, Luhmann is on the side of the 
establishment. Luhmann also puts aside the fact that dangerous situations 
demonstrate the mixture of nature and society in which nature has become 
dependent of society and vice versa. 
 
Luhmann’s books Ökologische Kommunikation (1986) and Soziologie des 
Risikos (1991) were clearly reactions to Beck’s Risikogesellschaft (1986) 
and Gegengifte (1988). In the latter, Luhmann widely theoretised the 
differences between risk and danger – most likely in part because of Beck’s 
critique. The influence of Beck seems to have had the effect of dragging 
Luhmann down from the systems-theoretical ‘castle’ and motivating him to 
confront head-on current social issues. Nonetheless, Luhmann does not 
relinguish his systems-theoretical thinking. Nor does he share Beck’s 
dystopian vision of the destructive effects of scientific and technological 
rationality, and the domination of politics by technological considerations. 
Furthermore, Beck’s seeming faith in the Green movement and mass 
participation in decisions concerning the future of the society contrasts 
markedly with Luhmann’s total scepticism concerning social movements, 
protest and the politics of participation. Luhmann regards Beck’s visions as 
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over-idealistic or utopic solutions to the problems of world society. From 
Beck’s perspective, it can be said that Luhmann holds his position on the 
side of the establishment and still remains the only living warden in the 
‘castle’.37     
 
Communication cannot be Autopoietic 
 
Luhmann’s systems theory has also been under fire of criticism during the 
last couple of years. John Mingers’ critique primarily seeks “to evaluate the 
possibility that social systems could be autopoietic” (Mingers 2002, 276). 
However, Mingers is not as radical in his critique as Beck. He describes the 
original biological theory of autopoiesis which postulates a circular system 
of production recursively reproducing its own elements from its own 
elements and he considers in general terms the problems of translating this 
meaningfully into sociological categories. Mingers (2002, 283) comes to 
the conclusion that: “Overall, it seems difficult to sustain the idea that 
social systems are autopoietic, at least in strict accordance with the formal 
definition”. Mingers thus bases his objection to the sociological use of 
autopoiesis. He claims that only physical systems are truly able to 
                                                 
37 Somehow it seems that in his recent writings Beck has appropriated many Luhmannian 
ideas. At least, he does not take an equally negative stance against Luhmann as in the 
1980s. Let me give some examples. If Luhmann insisted that there can be only one society, 
the world society, Beck, in turn, speaks of a world risk society (1996; 1999) or the 
cosmopolitan society (1996; 2000). Furthermore, Beck’s concept of subpolitics – which 
can be conceptualised as a form of politics “outside and beyond the representative 
institutions of the political system of nation-states” (Beck 1996, 18) – can be argued to 
certain extent to have similar characteristics with Luhmann’s idea of the differentiation of 
functional subsystems. If Luhmann speaks about the differentiation of political system, 
Beck associates the rise of subpolitics with a loss of functionality in the political system. 
This implies that functions hitherto associated with politics are now taken over – not by 
other subsystems – but by other agencies such as NGOs, corporations or science (see Beck 
1986, 307, see also Holzer and Sörensen 2003, 79-102). Beck’s concept of subject has also 
been complemented with some Luhmannian elements. What Beck often omits is that an 
individual must choose fast, must – as by reflex – make quick decisions. Luhmann also 
stresses the importance of selections and decisions (especially in the communication 
process). Following Beck, individuals are forced to live in an atmosphere of risk in which 
knowledge and life-chances are precarious. This type of “subject is so constantly in motion 
that it makes little sense to talk about a subject-position” (Beck et al. 2003, 23.) This type 
of individual can no longer be conceived of as a stable and unchangeable subject, but 
rather as a ‘quasi-subject’, the result as well as the producer of its networks, situation, 
location and form. Following this conclusion, it seems that Beck is already very close to 
Luhmann, who insists that we can never be in the society ‘as whole persons’.  
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reproduce themselves as elements of themselves, and consequently that the 
term ‘autopoiesis’ is misused when applied, for instance by social theories, 
to non-physical entities. From Mingers’ point of view, communication 
cannot be autopoietic because it is a non-physical entity. 
 
King and Thornhill (2003b, 278) have argued that Mingers’ account is 
“misleading in certain key respects and, as a consequence, his subsequent 
critical evaluation involves a misunderstanding of Luhmann’s sociology 
and a failure to appreciate the overriding objective that Luhmann set 
himself in his theoretical work.” King and Thornhill want to remind us that 
Luhmann did not attempt a simple transfer of autopoiesis from nature to 
abstract systems, from the biological to the social. Luhmann had already set 
out in considerable detail a theory of closed social systems well before he 
became acquainted with the concept of autopoiesis and, moreover, the main 
components of this theory remained virtually unchanged in his post-
autopoiesis works. Mingers is thus also wrong in saying that Luhmann’s 
failure to give sufficient importance to human agency is related in any way 
to his alleged misuse of the concept of autopoiesis, since Luhmann’s denial 
of the central place of the individual was already an important feature of his 
earlier, pre-autopoiesis theoretical scheme (see Luhmann1976; 1977).  
 
Mingers (2002, 288-290) suggests that ‘persons’ “can trigger…society and 
society may then generate a communication” and “a communication opens 
up possibilities through its meaning to people whose selections then 
generate new communications.” Mingers thus suggests that for society and 
its subsystems, ‘persons’ exist outside communications.  From a 
Luhmannian point of view, this sounds irrational. ‘Persons’ do exist in the 
form of ‘the public’, ‘individuals’, ‘reasonable men’, and ‘rational beings’, 
the subjects of experiments, clients or patients, or as a part of the 
environment for social subsystems, such as politics, science or economics, 
but always as constructions of the system that communicates about them. 
(King & Thornhill 2003b, 280.) As said before, ‘persons’ have a role in 
producing and reproducing communications. They can be seen as ‘carriers 
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of communication’, forming a common ground for the operations of 
different systems, and suppliers of the basis for inter-systemic 
communication.  
 
Mingers evidently continues Habermas’ critique against Luhmann. Namely 
Mingers, appears to import the Habermasian concepts of ‘lifeworld’ and 
‘the general communications of the lifeworld’ into Luhmann’s theory, to 
which these concepts are almost totally foreign. Moreover, Luhmann’s 
writings contain several ironic references to Habermas and his idealistic 
view that society exists beyond the boundaries of its own subsystems. 
Luhmann separates the concepts of subsystemic communication and simple 
interaction, from which the latter can be regarded inherent to a model of 
‘the lifeworld’ and, in this type of situation, is not yet recognised by 
subsystemic communications systems. 
 
Informal exchanges between ‘people’ may well exist, but Luhmann regards 
these exchanges as products of the social system of interaction and labels 
this type of interaction systems simple social systems. These systems are 
undifferentiated (contrary to subsystems) and do not enfurther internal 
system formation: for example, interaction systems with face-to-face 
contact. As Luhmann (1995, 193) notes: 
 
Internal differentiation is not a requirement of system formation. In fact, 
there are completely undifferentiated systems that do not admit further 
internal system formation: for example, interaction systems with face-to-
face contact. We will term them simple social systems. Not all, but many 
interaction systems with face-to-face contact are simple social systems in 
this sense. 
 
 However, as soon as interaction systems are recognised by societal 
subsystems as having the quality of internally differentiated communication 
(Luhmann 1987b, 114), they become parts of society such as economics (in 
the form of payments), politics (in the form of public opinion) or law (in the 
form of evidence). This is not a matter of course but “interaction systems 
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can consolidate enduring subsystems internally only with great effort” 
(Luhmann 1995, 193).  
 
To conclude, Habermas, Mingers and especially Beck cannot accept 
Luhmann’s way of theorising society as an autopoietic social system. These 
debates employ different conceptions of society, communication, the role of 
individual, language, interaction and the use of autopoiesis from those of 
Luhmann. Habermas, Beck and Mingers are not of course alone with their 
critical opinions about Luhmann’s theory. Frederic Vanderberghe (1999) 
has complained that Luhmann’s theory is pitched at such a high level of 
abstraction and reflexivity that it is often hard to see its relevance, even to 
those who are used to more metaphysical bedtime reading. Parallel to 
Vanderberghe, Hans-Herbert Kögler (1997, 271) has noted that 
“Luhmann’s ‘flight above the clouds’ is in conceptual abstraction 
comparable to Spinoza's Ethics, Hegel's Logic or Foucault's Archeology of 
Knowledge”. Moreover, Hans Joas (1996, 213) dismissively compares 
Luhmann’s work to the “theatre of the absurd” or to “romantic irony”. 
 
As noted above, in autopoietic thinking an observer builds his 
understanding or meanings of the world through his own communicational 
and cognitive distinctions. An observer’s meaning-process occurs 
communicatively and cognitively in social, temporal and factual 
dimensions. In his advanced systems theory, Luhmann also emphasises the 
role of media, which are specific forms of social co-ordination, without 
which the evolution of communication would have been impossible. 
Moreover, he argues that we are affected by functionally differentiated 
autopoietic subsystems, which operate according to theiry own form, 
medium, code and programmes. Considering, then, the problematics of trust 
from the point of view of autopoietic systems theory, I would like to 
conclude that the character of the Luhmannian trust might also have been 
changed during the evolution of the media and differentiation of autopoietic 
subsystems. In other words, in the next chapters I will discuss the concepts 
of trust and confidence – in a way that Luhmann himself did not do – in the 
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context of advanced systems theory. Are there any familiar forms of trust 
left, which can be traced back to former societies? If society does not 
consist of people but of communication, it is not relevant to follow Parsons 
and Simmel whose main question with regard to trust was who to trust. Nor 
is it fruitful to be satisfied with Luhmann’s ‘early’ division between trust in 
persons and confidence in systems. Rather, we should ask how the ideas of 
autopoiesis, interpenetration and three-part communication, evolution and 
differentiation have affected the problematics of trust in modern society. 
How can we trust different subsystems and their codes and programmes? 



















5. Familiarity, Trust and Confidence in the Context 
of Advanced Systems Theory 
 
In the 1960s when Luhmann wrote Vertrauen, he had not yet developed his 
threefold concept of communication, which later became one of the most 
important starting points for his advanced (autopoietic) systems theory. In 
those days Luhmann still followed the ‘Old-European’ notion that 
individuals participate in a society as whole human beings. In the case of 
trust, at least, systems function only as ‘allies’ of individuals. As Luhmann 
(1979, 93) puts it: 
 
Systems are rational to the extent that they can encompass and reduce 
complexity, and this they can only do if they possess understanding of how 
to make use of trust and distrust without placing too heavy demands on the 
person who finally shows trust or distrust: the individual. 
 
At this point Luhmann has neither adopted the idea of autopoiesis nor 
problematised the self-referential character of psychic (thoughts) and social 
(communication) systems and the possible intepenetrations between them. 
Nevertheless, already in Vertrauen Luhmann was convinced that there must 
be some difference between personal and social systems. This difference 
also has to do with trust. 
 
Trust rests on illusion. In actuality, there is less information available than 
would be required to give assurance of success. The actor willingly 
surmounts this deficit information…Problematical aspects are partially 
shifted from the outside to the inside, and dealt with through internal 
modalities of learning and of symbolic control. This ways of 
conceptualizing the matter can be rendered in abstract terms by making use 
of general systems theory, which claims to be valid both for personal and 
social action systems. (Luhmann 1979, 32.) 
 
In the context of advanced systems theory, trust can no longer work in this 
way. Because of autopoiesis, problematic aspects cannot be directly shifted 
from the outside (environment) to the inside (system) or vice versa. As we 
have seen, Luhmann separates psychic and social systems. Social systems 
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observe via communication, while conscious systems (consciousness or the 
thoughts of a human being) observe via cognition. There is some 
interpenetration between these systems, but as said before, only thoughts 
reproduce thougths and communication reproduces communication. This is 
important when we examine the problems of trust in the context of 
advanced systems theory. Trust is not identical in the social and psychic 
systems. Because they are autopoietic, there must also be two meanings for 
trust; a cognitive one and a communicative one.  
 
Familiarity as Part of Simple Interaction 
 
Before addressing in greater depth problematics of the advanced 
Luhmannian concepts of trust and confidence, it is necessary to consider the 
role of familiarity in the context of advanced systems theory. It can indeed 
be said that familiarity can still be seen as a precondition for trust and 
confidence. It is also true that living in a completely familiar world is no 
longer possible and, thus, trust and confidence are the decisive issues. 
Considering, then, familiarity from the point of view of advanced systems 
theory, it can be said that all that is familiar for people can be seen as parts 
of their lifeworlds. Luhmann himself also mentions en passant about the 
connection between familiarity and lifeworld in Familiarity, Confidence 
and Trust (1988, 95): “We can live within a familiar world because we can, 
using symbols, reintroduce the unfamiliar into the familiar. We never have 
to leave the familiar world. It remains our lifeworld.”  
 
Viewing this from the perspective of advanced systems theory, lifeworld 
consists of interaction. Many systems of interactions, for Luhmann, are 
confined to exchanges between people who are present (face-to-face 
contact). According to Luhmann (1995, 193), these types of interaction 
systems are simple social systems. This type of interaction consists of 
informal exchange between people, whether concerning the weather, the 
performance of politicians or last night’s television programmes. However, 
in Luhmannian terms such exchange is the type of communication which is 
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not (as of yet) recognised at the level of communicative subsystems 
(Luhmann 1995, 416-417). It seems obvious that this kind of familiar 
interaction is not connected to complexity and risks. Familiarity does not 
contain any other possibilities; complexity is reduced at the outset. In the 
familiar world we use only the familiar distinctions between the familiar 
and the unfamiliar (Luhmann 1988, 96). Commitment to familiarity can 
simplify the world and render it harmless. “One can assume that the 
familiar will remain, that the trustworthy will stand the test once more and 
that the familiar world will continue into the future” (Luhmann 1979, 20). 
In short, in the context of advanced systems theory, familiarity can be 




Figure 6. Familiarity and interaction in lifeworld. 
 
Familiarity has not disappeared anywhere. We still use familiar symbols, 
norms and habits, and live in a familiar world (see Figure 6). On the other 
hand, we cannot live in a fully familiar world because we meet new things 
and people every day. From Luhmann’s evolutionary point of view, it was 
the invention of writing, literacy, and in particular the printing press (later 
also the mass media and internet) that changed the conditions of familiarity. 
Familiarity survives today primarily in a purely private milieu. This is 
because “technicalization forgets the ‘lifeworld’” (Luhmann 2002b, 68). 
However, familiarity has a function; it functions as a precondition for trust 
and confidence. Familiarity belongs to simple interaction systems but can 
                                Lifeworld 
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be said to play only a minor role in the functional subsystems. Following 
advanced systems theory, there is (a double contingent) interaction between 
(at least) two ‘persons’ or psychic systems. Simple interaction between 
psychic systems also consists of three-part communication (i.e. information, 
utterance and understanding), but it can be said that there is less need for 
selections in this type of communication than in the type of communication 
within the area of functional subsystems. Therefore, this type of 
communication within the system of simple interaction is not necessarily 
very complex and does not yet have any linkage with risks. 
 
Trust as Communication 
 
From an advanced systems-theoretical point of view, it is still the growing 
complexity of society what makes trust so necessary to us. Trust is also still 
a risky investment. To trust is to take a risk. However, deviating from the 
‘early’ Luhmannian theory of trust, it cannot be said human beings would 
be capable of directing complexity. If society consists only of 
communication, it is thus communication that is capable of directing 
complexity. Furthermore, because individuals can be seen as ‘carriers of 
communication’, it is not enough to say – like Luhmann did – that trust is 
needed primarily in interpersonal relations. In the context of advanced 
systems theory, trust has to do with communication and not necessarily 
with ‘full persons’ because ‘persons’, in Luhmann’s scheme, exist both as 
biological or living systems and as psychic systems, but in the context of 
social systems they can be seen as communicative constructions. Trust must 
be expressed in some way. In the context of advanced systems theory, it can 
be expressed only via communication. 
 
Trust can still be seen as a decision. Deviating from ‘early’ Luhmann, the 
advanced concept of decision cannot be connected to psychic or internal 
systems. “Decision is not understood as a psychological mechanism, but as 
a matter of communication, not as a psychological event in the form of an 
internally conscious definition of the self, but as a social event” (Luhmann 
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2003, 32). In short, the advanced decision is communication. Decision-
making is a form of communication that limits contingency. If one decides 
to trust, he is also able to reduce or reconstruct complexity, but he cannot 
eliminate it. If we follow ’early’ Luhmann in understanding trust as a 
decision, and apply this to the context of advanced systems theory, where 
decisions are communications, it follows that trust must be communication, 
and thus an element of social systems or programs, interaction and 
organisations. 
 
As said above, familiarity is a precondition for trust in the advanced 
systems-theoretical approach as well. But deviating from the familiar type 
of interaction, trust is, in this context, needed on the level of subsystemic 
communication.  I would argue that by trusting (or distrusting) we are 
moving from the communicative level of simple interaction (life-world or 
simple social system) to the communicative level of functional subsystems 
(world of risks and complex systems). Therefore, it can be said that trust 
requires subsystemic interaction wherein codes play a major role. If trust 
concretises itself socially in communication, it is then a decision that 
reduces the complexity of the subsystems. Yet trust is not a medium of the 
subsystems and, for this reason, it does not have a binary code. It can be 
seen as a program which complements subsystems’ coding, filling it with 
content. This means that a truster communicates with some media (money, 
power, law etc.) and must take a risk. He is incapable of avoiding risks in 
terms of money or power, but has to trust. The decision to trust becomes 
evident as a program which builds on the four conditions: mutuality, the 
rule of situation, trust can only be offered and accepted, and it has to be 
earned. In any event, trust as a program does not determine the nature of the 
coding; rather, it is the code which generates the program of trust and gives 
it an appearance of rationality. It can be said that trust as a program is only 
part of the coded program, which realises and complements the subsystems’ 
coding. The code is rigid and invariant, but trust as a program is flexible 
and has to be renewed. Therefore, neither trust nor distrust is feasible as a 
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universal attitude. Only codes are universal. This non-universal character of 
trust was already noticed by ‘early’ Luhmann (1979, 72): 
 
[Universality of trust or distrust] would be either too risky or too great 
burden. Both positions presuppose that one is conscious of the possible 
behaviour of others as a specific problem. One trusts if one assumes that 
this behaviour of others as a specific problem; one distrusts if one reckons 
that this will not be the case. 
 
These types of trust relations do not follow directly from previous 
prescriptions, but are always future-oriented, and thus cannot only be part 
of familiarity or a system of simple interaction. The decision to trust is thus 
closely connected with time, especially with the future. This is because in 
the modern world, “present time” is “pregnant with future” (Luhmann 
2002, 92). Furthermore, what really cannot be demanded but only offered, 
must also be something that exists beyond normative or moral definitions. 
Communicative trust always presupposes a situation of risk because it is 
possible for others to abuse the offered trust. This is tightly connected to the 
fact that in reflexive and complex societies morality plays only a peripheral 
role, and is itself a problematic concept (see more Luhmann 1996), as well 
as the fact that we cannot know the thoughts of the other. As Luhmann 
(1995, 2) puts it: 
 
For societies that are becoming more complex, a global programming of the 
social dimension in the form of morality becomes increasingly inadequate: 
in part because morality’s zones of tolerance must be overextended, in part 
because everything excluded must be morally discredited – and practically 
because both occur together and morality is thereby pluralized. 
 
Trust is necessary in modern society. Conceived in a systems theoretical 
way, its central features are contingency and double contingency. 
“Contingency leads to modalised horizon rules which again means that 
more possibilities are expected, or perhaps that even the unexpected is 
expected” (Arnoldi 2003, 407). Participants are living in conditions of 
double contingency; they are opaque and incalculable to one another. Risk, 
of course, is a consequence of contingency and double contingency, or of 
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not knowing what to expect, especially in terms of causation. Contingency 
and double contingency are tied closely to the fact that the decision to trust 
is a choice between two alternatives; he who chooses to trust could always 
have preferred not to do so. If there were any secure knowledge about how 
to decide, there would not be a situation of choice, or a need for trust. “To 
have the choice means not to know what to do” (Nassehi 2005, 10). From 
these standpoints, we might even say that trust seems to be a necessary 
element with which it is at least possible to begin solving the problems of 
contingency, double contingency, choice and causation.38   
 
To conclude, trust is possible in the advanced systems-theoretical context 
only via communication. The interest that has effect beyond this kind of 
communication is in the reduction of the complexity of society. 
Communicative trust, then, is only formed where it is needed. ‘Persons’ 
have to decide that they need to trust in order to be able to manage the risks. 
They have to be open and mutually oriented, and also stay clear of 
disagreements and conflicts, but not of risks.  
 
Confidence as a Part of Psychic Systems 
 
If trust is a part of communication, where, then, does confidence (which, is 
a cognitive, rather than communicative process) belong in advanced 
systems theory? Confidence is not mutual but is placed in the functions of 
                                                 
38 Jacob Arnoldi examines the problem of causation in the Luhmannian context. After 
reading his article Making Sense of Causation (2003), I became convinced that there must 
be some link between the modern problems of causation and trust. Arnoldi’s conclusion 
about the future is quite shocking: The recent changes “are part of a more general cultural 
development in common sense representations of the world…That development is a 
development towards more modalized expectations, with fewer taken for granted causal 
relations, with more awareness of contingency and side effects, and with less belief in 
human mastery and regulation of causal processes.” (Arnoldi 2003, 425.) If the future 
seems modal as described above, the role of trust is essential. If there are only few matter-
of-fact causal relations and increased awareness of contingency and side effects, the 
amount of risk and uncertainty grows as well, as does, most importantly, the need for trust. 
However, it must be noted that if we follow Arnoldi’s thinking, there is a danger that we 
forget the importance of familiarity and simple interaction, which – although the future 
would be modal as described above – will function as preconditions for trust.   
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systems. It can be said, following Luhmann, that confidence still depends 
on inherent danger but not always risk. Where trust involves 
communication between (at least) two communicative actors, who are 
observers of social systems, then confidence, in turn, is an element of 
psychic systems. Confidence builds up largely on the level of thoughts. It 
lives in our minds and does not travel in our communication like trust. That 
is to say, only observers of psychic systems, not observers of 
communicative systems (i.e. communicative actors), could have or build 
confidence. 
 
For example, you may meet something dangerous in the streets and you 
decide to take a weapon with you next time you leave the house. In this 
case, you do not have enough confidence in the police. What happens is 
that your attitude to police and street violence has changed and you have 
reacted to this psychically as well as externally (you are now carrying the 
weapon). This has directly nothing to do with trust and communication; it is 
a psychic process of adaptation, a change in the state of confidence in a 
psychic system.  
 
Confidence can be seen as a by-product of socialisation and the history of a 
person. It seems that the advanced concept of confidence has many of the 
same qualities as Parsons’ concept of trust. What Parsons calls trust, and 
what I, following advanced systems theory have, called confidence, is 
something that has to be learned? As a matter of fact, it seems that there is 
not much difference between confidence and familiarity. If anything, 
confidence emerges in the situations characterised by contingency and 
danger, but familiarity always ‘stays’ in the familiar lifeworld. 
In addition to being an element of psychic systems, confidence also has to 
act as a kind of background ‘noise’ for social systems or trust. Therefore, 
confidence also affects, or interpenetrates, indirectly the actor’s abilities to 




However, confidence cannot be only an element of psychic systems or 
some kind of background ‘noise’of trust. The confidence we have in the 
functions (or coded communication) of systems or organisations has to be 
expressed some way. In other words, there can be general confidence in the 
educational system, the validity of the sanctions of the legal system or the 
power relations of the political system. For example, our confidence in the 
function of politics might increase or decrease. Despite this, we do not 
necessarily have a direct contact with politicians to whom we can tell this. 
Nonetheless, confidence can be socialised, for example through the media 
of subsystems (power, money, law etc.), mass media, opinion polls and 
elections. Therefore, although confidence can, on the one hand, be 
connected to consciousness, it is not, on the other hand, an element of 
psychic systems alone. It can be socialised and thus also become general in 
many ways. There can be confidence, which is an element of psychic 
systems but, in addition to this, there has to be another type of confidence, 
which can be called socialised confidence.   
 
It must be noted that because this type of confidence takes effect on the 
level of thoughts, it is difficult to control socially. This fact is also noticed 
by ‘early’ Luhmann (1979, 50) when he stresses the fact that system trust is 
more difficult to control but easier to learn than personal trust. However, 
during that time Luhmann did not yet operate with the advanced concepts 
of psychic and social systems. In the context of advanced theory this means 
that we cannot control other actors’ confidence because we are unable to 
know the real thoughts of the other. Human beings and their thoughts are 
freer than communication and trust because communication is perceivable. 
Confidence might remain invisible and it is exactly this invisibility that 
makes it so difficult to control. However, the situation is different if 
confidence is socialised in the forms of opinion polls or elections; 
confidence becomes visible and controllable after it has been socialised in 




Connections between Trust and Confidence 
 
As said above, confidence is not only some kind of background ‘noise’ of 
social systems or trust; there can also be other connections between trust 
and confidence. It looks quite evident that in autopoietic thinking, 
confidence no longer needs trust as an input condition like Luhmann (1988, 
103) insisted in Familiarity, Confidence and Trust. Because of their 
autopoietic character, they cannot have any direct contact. Moreover, 
Luhmann’s (1988, 102) argument, which stresses that “trust remains vital in 
interpersonal relations, but participation in functional systems like the  
economy or politics…requires confidence”, is no longer relevant in the 
advanced systems-theoretical context. If we want to stress the 
‘interpersonal’ relations, in advanced systems theoretical language it means 
that we emphasise communication. Therefore, from society’s point of view 
trust is still important, because it is trust that can be in society, because trust 
is communication and observable. Participation in functional subsystems 
might require confidence. This type of confidence is directed to the 
functions and representatives of the systems, and concretises itself – or 
makes itself observable –  through the media of subsystems (power, money, 
law etc.) or some other ways, like through mass media, opionion polls and 
elections (which I will study more specifically in chapter seven). As said 
before, confidence is part of our thoughts and as such remains 
unobservable. However, after it has been socialised, it becomes visible and 
part of communication. 
 
The importance of confidence, thus, has not disappeared. Because of 
socialised confidence, it can also be said that confidence might be part of 
communication. Confidence can be expressed communicatively through 
opinion polls or mass media, and thus it indirectly affects our willingness to 
trust. Therefore, unlike ‘early’ Luhmann, I would say that confidence (or 
system trust) can become an open matter for public discussion. As noted 
above, behind confidence, there functions a tactical and supportive 
perspective, and it could also bring some relief to the situation of trust. 
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Without these qualities of confidence, then, it would be impossible to trust 
anybody. We also have to remember that trust is part of communication 
(social systems) and confidence is part of thoughts (psychic systems). Thus, 
there must be a temporal connection and congruence between them. 
Because trust is a decision which socialises itself in social systems 
(communication) and confidence is part of psychic systems (thoughts), it is 
obvious that confidence affects the ways we construct trust. Similarly, the 
offered trust affects our confidential thinking. Trust therefore needs 
confidence and confidence also needs trust, but there cannot be a direct 
contact between them. In other words, there is interpenetration between 
confidence and trust. Through interpenetration it is also easier to understand 
how trust and confidence depend on each other to produce themselves, as 
well as why the meanings of trust and confidence must be employed on 




Figure 7. The logic of the functional operations of trust and confidence. 
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In Figure 7 I have illustrated the functional operations of trust and 
confidence in the context of advanced systems theory. Familiarity can be 
seen as a precondition for confidence as well as trust. It is a part of simple 
interaction, but does not have a remarkable importance on the level of more 
complex communication. Confidence is a part of psychic systems, which, 
because of interpenetration, affects the decision to trust. The decision to 
trust, however, socialises itself in communication (which consists of three 
selections: information, utterance and understanding). Trust is not a 
medium of subsystems and it does not have a code. Rather, it is a program 
via which risk-taking in different subsystems is possible. This program has 
to follow the four bases of trust: mutuality, the rule of situation, the fact that 
trust can only be offered and accepted, and finally, that it has to be earned. 
The functions of trust are connected to risks, complexity and these four 
bases. 
  
However, once confidence has been socialised, it is also a part of 
communication and might become general. Here it indirectly affects the 
decision to trust. Socialised and communicatively expressed confidence, 
just like trust, might also indirectly affect our confidential consciousness.  
 
Having analysed Luhmann’s concept of trust in the context of his advanced 
systems theory, I will next move on to examine Giddens’ and Sztompka’s 
sociological approaches on trust from the advanced Luhmannian point of 
view. As pointed out above, these approaches have been influenced by 
Luhmann but at this point it becomes clear that it can be said that Giddens 
and Sztompka were influenced only by ‘early’ Luhmann. But if the insights 
of advanced systems theory are taken seriously, Giddens’ and Sztompka’s 
theories of trust become somewhat problematic. Therefore, in the following 
I will analyse the way these approaches deviate from the advanced 
Luhmannian theory of trust and why they, in consequence, do not benefit 
my further systems-theoretical analyses of trust. In the context of the 
problems of Sztompka’s approach, I also touch upon some problems of the 
discussion on social capital.   
 120
Giddens from the Advanced Luhmannian Perspective 
 
There are several common interests in ‘early’ Luhmann’s and Giddens’ 
conceptions of trust. First, Luhmann and Giddens both aim to show that 
trust is conscious action. Second, it is obvious to both that trust also is 
based on mutuality. Luhmann talks about mutual commitment, whereas 
Giddens emphasises facework commitments. These commitments may be 
the most important elements in cases where one wants to build a trust 
relationship with another person. There are not any ready-made bonds but 
one must work to build them. These bonds are commitments and they are 
not created or preserved automatically. Third, trust only exists in relation to 
future and risks. According to Luhmann, we do not need trust in the 
familiar world, because it is the world of routines. Giddens talks about 
gradual detraditionalisation (see Giddens 1994). Well-known facts are 
disappearing or at least their nature is changing. People are bound to 
choose, become more individualised and, therefore, orient themselves 
towards the future and risks. 
 
However, when Luhmann’s conception of trust is placed in the context of 
advanced systems theory, these similarities seem problematic. Namely, we 
must remember that whilst communication is the motor of society in 
Luhmann’s systems theory, for Giddens it is human agency. This is the 
primary reason why the advanced Luhmannian and Giddensian conceptions 
of trust in persons and trust in systems cannot be said to be similar or 
synonymous. The first difference between Giddens and Luhmann is the fact 
that Giddens does not extensively analyse the concept of familiarity. It 
seems that familiarity, for Giddens, is only an element of premodern 
societies. As Giddens (1994, 82) notes:  
 
In premodern societies, the extension of trust to newly encountered 
strangers normally takes the form of an extension of the ‘familiar’, either 
through ritual encounters or through the uncovering of kin connections. A 
person may be trusted, at least provisionally, if some kind of kin relation, 
even very remote, is identified.  
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Hence, it seems that for Giddens the concept of familiarity in a (late) 
modern or reflexive society is included in trust. From the advanced 
Luhmannian point of view, this leads to some contradictions. Giddens 
admits that there is no need to trust anyone whose thoughts are transparent, 
but at the same time, he emphasises mutuality and intimacy in personal 
trust relations. Personal trust is bound to facework commitments, which are 
mutual and intimate. 
 
From the advanced Luhmannian perspective, it is self-evident that thoughts 
cannot be transparent or observable to the observer. Therefore, ‘fictional 
transparent thoughts’ do not entail the disappeareance of the need for trust. 
On the contrary, since thoughts are unobservable, the role of double 
contingency, and thus the need for trust, is emphasised. Furthermore, 
mutuality characterised by integrity and intimacy belongs not only to the 
sphere of trust but also of familiarity. These types of relations sometimes 
belong to the system of simple interaction and not necessarily to more 
complex systems of communication. Therefore, they cannot be systems-
theoretically analysed only in terms of trust but must also be approached in 
terms of familiarity. From the advanced Luhmannian perspective, then, 
facework commitments cannot always be seen as part of personal trust. 
They can also be familiar relations, which can be analysed in terms of 
systems of simple interaction. Nonetheless, we must admit that they affect 
our willingness to trust other persons, and have confidence in abstract 
systems. Thus, it seems to follow that if trust cannot be connected to 
faceless commitments, it is a ‘homeless’ concept in Giddens’ theory. This is 
due to the fact that following advanced Luhmannian theory of trust, there 
can be also familiarity in the sphere of facework commitments. From the 
advanced Luhmannian perspective, Giddens does not thus analyse the 
differences between familiarity and trust extensively enough. 
 
Second, Giddens stresses the role of faceless commitments in the modern 
world. In faceless commitments confidence is sustained in the workings of 
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abstract systems or the knowledge of experts. It is evident that we must 
have some type of confidence in abstract systems. Yet these commitments 
cannot only be linked to the confidence we have in abstract systems or their 
representatives (experts, organisation, institutions etc.). In personal trust 
relations, too, we must be oriented by the future and affected by double 
contingency. If we meet risks and decide to trust, following the decision 
everyone can be seen as an expert for the truster. This is because we cannot 
know the thoughts of the other (due to double contingency), and are thus 
always ‘faceless’ to one another. This analysis makes Giddens’ concept of 
trust theoretically even more ‘homeless’. Somehow Giddens seems to admit 
this himself by emphasising the importance of confidence in modern 
society. Trust as part of confidence – in Giddens’ theory – is nothing more 
but a test of confidence through access points (situations where the ignorant 
person encounters the expertise system). Perceived in advanced 
Luhmannian terms, this has nothing to do with communication and risks. 
 
Third, the homelessness of trust is emphasised if we take a closer look at 
the relationship between trust and continuity. For Giddens, trust is a 
continuous state which does not have to be renewed. It is only confidence 
that must be renewed. Systems-theoretically this means that there is no trust 
in society, because it does not have to be renewed or re-produced. In other 
words, there are no communicational forms of trust. Trust, in Giddens’ 
approach, can be perceived as tied to basic trust, the building of which is 
started right after we are born, and the trustworthiness and trustfulness of a 
child has an effect throughout a person’s life. By characterising trust 
through social psychological elements, Giddens makes the basic mistake 
Luhmann warns us against: he tries to reduce the social sphere 
(communication) to individual psychological variables (consciousness). 
 
Fourth, Giddens rightly points out that we need trust because of risks, 
which are situated in the environment. However, Giddens is here caught up 
in the same problem with open systems theory, namely that of the 
interaction between a system and its environment. Although risks might 
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affect large masses of individuals, the perceptions of risks always remain 
different. There is no direct interaction between environmental risk and the 
individual (psychic system), but there are as many meanings for risk as 
there are observers. Therefore, ‘persons’ must trust and be oriented towards 
risks if they want to reduce complexity. It is not our confidence in abstract 
systems only that gives us the possibility of reducing complexity and 
managing risks. Risks might be produced by abstract systems (function 
systems), but if trust comes to play, then the media of systems alone are 
unable to manage the risks they have produced. As a consequence, this can 
reduce our confidence in the functions of these systems and their media. 
 
From the advanced Luhmannian perspective an acceptance of Giddens’ 
views on trust equals no trust at all. From this perspective, trust cannot be 
part of facework commitments because trust relations are not only 
indicators of the integrity or intimacy of others. Trust relations are always 
faceless because we cannot know the thoughts of the other, and to trust is to 
take a risk, because the trustee can always abuse our trust. Following 
Giddens, it seems that in order to able to reduce complexity we must only 
have confidence in abstract systems, because risk management is their 
‘privilege’. They produce risks, so they have to deal with them. ‘Persons’ 
are thus unable to take risks and also to trust. They have to have faith in the 
goodwill of others in the sphere of facework commitments. Abstract 
systems (which Giddens grasps as organisations or institutions rather than 
systems) and experts will handle the risks. As Giddens (1990, 89) says: 
“Trust is only demanded where there is ignorance.” Ignorance is 
concretised via access points, which are “points of connection between lay 
individuals or collectivities and the representatives of abstract systems. 
They are places of vulnerability for abstract systems, but also junctions at 
which trust can be maintained or built up.” (Giddens 1990, 88.) Access 
points are Giddensian ‘places’ for trust. In other words, they are the 
systems’ testing ‘places’ for psychologically developed trust which, in 
advanced Luhmannian language, comes closer to confidence than trust. In 
the end, there seem to be only familiar facework commitments and faceless 
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commitments, which rely upon confidence. There is no real trust. Therefore, 
Giddens’ approach does not give us enough ingredients for studying the 
functions of trust in a modern or functionally differentiated society. Rather, 
it gives too simplistic a view of the logic of trust and confidence by 
emphasising the importance of abstract systems.  
 
Sztompka from the Advanced Luhmannian Perspective 
 
If we examine Sztompka’s definition of trust and the functions of trust from 
an ‘early’ Luhmannian point of view, there appear to be several theoretical 
similarities. Sztompka follows Luhmann in his definition, because trust, in 
his initial definition, is intensively connected with risk. Furthermore, 
Sztompka’s idea of ‘endowed trust’ agrees with Luhmann’s four bases of 
personal trust. ‘Endowed trust’ necessitates mutual commitment and ‘the 
rule of situation’. Furthermore, endowing others with trust also follows the 
rule that it is not possible to demand the trust of others; trust can only be 
offered and accepted; trust has to be earned. To put it briefly, on a personal 
level the functions of trust – both in Sztompka’s and Luhmann’s analysis – 
are aimed at managing risks or reducing complexity. 
 
But when we take the advanced systems-theoretical point of view, the logic 
of Sztompka’s analyses of trust withers away when he extends it to the 
communal and systemic levels. It appears that trust has several functions, or 
trust is needed everywhere. It encourages sociability, enlarges the field of 
interactions, improves spontaneous collective action, encourages tolerance 
and the acceptance of strangers. Sztompka argues that there is even some 
kind of a of culture of trust, which develops the trustworthiness of different 
networks. Sztompka (like Giddens) connects trust to human agency, not 
communication. For Sztompka, trust has reached its cultural model through 
“social becoming” (Sztompka 1991). There are four assumptions central to 
the model of this social becoming. 
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First, the driving force of social processes is human agency, that is 
individual and collective actions, decisions, and choices taken by 
specifically endowed actors, within the framework of opportunities 
provided by existing structures. Second, the ongoing events making up the 
social praxis are always complex products of some traits of actors 
combined with some traits of structures, or to put it otherwise they result 
from the exploration of existing structural opportunities by willing and 
competent actors. Third, the structural context itself and the opportunities it 
provides are shaped and reshaped by ongoing praxis; they are the 
accumulated, lasting outcomes, of the unintended, of the multiplicity of 
earlier actions. Fourth, the structural effects of past praxis, crystallized as 
structural tradition, become the initial conditions for future praxis, and are 
explored as structural resources, and this cycle proceeds interminably 
making all processes contingent and open-ended. (Sztompka 1999, 120.) 
 
Following the model of ‘social becoming’, the relevant praxis consists of 
individual and collective actions in which people deploy trust. Looking 
backward, we shall see that with regard to trust, people act within some 
received tradition; that is, the prevailing cultural climate of trust, or the 
reverse, the culture of distrust. Positive experiences of confirmed trust will 
generate a culture of trust; negative experiences of breached trust will 
generate a culture of distrust. In this way the normative climate for future 
bets of trust will be created, the tradition of trust or distrust will be passed 
on, and the process will continue interminably.  
 
Sztompka’s culturally oriented approach does not fit in with Luhmann’s 
autopoietic systems-theoretical thinking, the driving force of which is not 
human agency but communication. The advanced Luhmannian 
communicative trust – which must always be renewed – cannot have any 
cultural or normative elements. In general, Sztompka does not even talk 
about (advanced Luhmannian) trust (or confidence) as if it were oriented 
towards risks in the context of a communal or systemic level. If anything, 
his conception seems to be closer to Parsons’ structural functionalism, in 
wherein trust can be regarded as a feeling which is based on norms and 
values, an approach whose problems I have already indicated. The ‘social 
becoming of trust’ or ‘culture of trust’ ought to be left to the sphere of 
cultural research, or regarded as an ethnographical account of trust.  
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Furthermore, Sztompka (1996; 1998; 1999) has used a particularly 
ethnographical approach in his empirical studies of trust, which concern the 
recent history of Poland. According to Sztompka (1999, xi): “The 
vicissitudes and fluctuations of trust and distrust during the last fifty years 
of Polish history, as well as the condition of trust in the present turbulent 
period of postcommunist transformations have proven to be an excellent 
‘strategic research site’, a kind of useful laboratory for applying and testing 
the viability of theoretical concepts and models.” Sztompka has not used 
even ‘early’ Luhmann’s ideas in this research, even though he had the 
chance and capabilities for making history by being the first sociologist to 
widely us Luhmann's theoretical ideas of trust for empirical purposes. It 
may be that Sztompka found testing Luhmann’s theoretical ideas through 
empirical research difficult, even impossible. Sztompka (1998) also claims 
that institutionalising and implementing democratic institutions are 
important structural and contextual conditions of society, without which 
encouraging a culture of trust would be impossible. “For the sake of raising 
generalized trust, or fighting historically ingrained distrust, the most 
conducive policy is building democratic institutions and safeguarding their 
consistent” (Sztompka 1998, 31.) All in all, since Sztompka’s theory of 
trust as a whole does not follow in the footsteps of Luhmann’s autopoietic 
systems theory, and he has dispensed of even ‘early’ Luhmann’s theoretical 
influence in his empirical writings on trust, Sztompka’s analyses of trust 
are, in the end, not very fruitful with regard to my following systems-
theoretical elaborations of trust and confidence. 
     
Finally, I would like to comment on one communal form of trust that 
Sztompka also mentions. This recent popular scientific debate has linked 
trust to social capital. This discussion is largely based on economic 
semantics. In addition, it also has ethnographic characteristics. In his study 
of the economic backwardness of Southern Italy, Robert Putnam (1993) 
suggested the idea of social capital, by which he referred to those “features 
of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives…Social capital, in 
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short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust” 
(Putnam 1995, 664-665). This concept was also crucial for the argument of 
Francis Fukuyama (1995), who saw in it the secret of economic 
development in South-East Asia. 
 
According to this discussion (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993; 1995; 
Fukuyama 1995, Ilmonen 2000), trust matters because it is perhaps the 
most essential part of social capital. Putnam (1993; 1995), following James 
Coleman (1990, 300), argues that social capital refers to features of social 
organisation, such as core values and norms (including social trust) and 
networks, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
“The theory of social capital presumes that, generally speaking, the more 
we connect with other people, the more we trust them, and vice versa” 
(Putnam 1995, 665). For Fukuyama (1995, 26), “trust is the expectation that 
arises within a community of regular, honest, cooperative behaviour, based 
on communally shared norms, on the part of other members of that 
community”. Like Sztompka, trust is primarily cultural in nature for 
Putnam and Fukuyama, too. As a matter of fact, Fukuayma (1995, 336) 
says that trust is inherited form “preexisting communities of shared moral 
norms or values”.  
 
I do not wish to discuss at length the theories of social capital in this work, 
because their proponents have not generally used Luhmann as their 
theoretical background. Yet I would like to note that a couple of sentences 
can be found in Luhmann’s writings in which he at least linguistically 
moves on the same level with the discussion of social capital. In these 
instances, Luhmann uses capital as a metaphor of trust. 
 
The possibilities for action increase proportionately to the increase in trust – 
trust in one’s own self-presentation and in other people’s interpretation of 
it. When such trust has been established, new ways of behaving become 
possible; jokes, unconventional initiatives, bluntness, verbal short cuts, 
well-timed silences, the choice of delicate subjects etc. When trust is tested 




The authors discussing social capital conceptualise trust as a given “moral 
resource of the community” (Putnam 1993, 169), a conception which seems 
to maintain Parsonsian ideas of a community, that, from a Luhmannian 
perspective appear outdated. Moreover, Fukuyama’s faith in inherited 
cultural dispositions is related to the fact that he defines trust without 
reference to risk. According to Warren (1999, 322), “one reason Fukuyama 
misses the link between trust and risk is that he confuses trust with 
something more like familiarity, a way of interacting with others that 
depends upon projecting knowledge of the past onto future interactions. 
This backward-looking confidence is the key element of Fukuyama’s 
location of trust in inherited expectations sanctioned by communities.”  
 
Furthermore, the discussion on social capital is economically oriented and 
also has some ethnographic elements. It would be more adequate to study it 
further in the context of Sztompka’s theory of ‘social becoming’ or ‘culture 
of trust’ than to explicate its relevance from the point of view of closed 
systems theory. Even from Sztompka’s perspective, the discussion of social 
capital might be regarded as too simplistic a view of the problematics of 
trust. As Sztompka (1999, 197) notes: Putnam’s intuition of the link 
between trust and networks is right, “but in my interpretation the link is not 
definitional, but empirical, causal, operating through the mechanism of 
providing backup insurance for trust”. 
 
To conclude, Giddens and Sztompka do not follow Luhmann’s advanced 
systems theory but only make citations of his works on trust. Therefore, 
their conceptions of trust are very different from that which I have 
developed. It seems unnecessary to continue with Giddens’ and Sztompka’s 
approaches (due to their ‘un-systems-theoretical’ character) in adapting the 
advanced Luhmannian conceptions of trust and confidence for today’s 
personal relations (through strangers) and systemic functions (through the 
system of the welfare state and system of care). The classical texts on trust 
by Simmel are more useful in this context, since they affected Luhmann’s 
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own writings on the topic and thus have also indirectly affected the 
advanced concepts of trust and confidence analysed in this work.  
 
Thus far I have emphasised several times Parsons’ influence on the ‘early’ 
Luhmannian conception of trust, paying less attention to Simmel’s role in 
this respect. However, as noted above, Luhmann’s concept of trust was 
influenced by Simmel’s classical writings about the stranger. Unfortunately, 
Luhmann does not consider the problems between trust and the stranger to 
any great extent. In the next chapter I examine the problems of and 
connections between strangers and trust. Particularly, I shall aim to show 
how the expansion of the market economy universalised Simmel’s 
traditional stranger (the ‘Jew’) and affected the usefulness of Simmel’s 
concept of trust in explaining the relations between ‘universal strangers’. 
To grasp the trust problems concerning today’s universal strangers I shall 
examine the connection between the advanced systems-theoretical concept 
of trust and the ‘indifferent stranger’ by Rudolf Stichweh. I also analyse 
certain relative weaknesses in Stichweh’s concept of the ‘indifferent 














6. Strangers in Our Midst - 
The Problem of Trust from ‘Potential Wanderer’ to 
‘Indifferent Stranger’ 
 
Georg Simmel is often regarded as the founding father of the concept of 
stranger in sociology, and the literature on ‘the stranger’ usually recognises 
his authority in formulating a sociology of strangerhood. Occasionally, this 
literature provides us with a reformulation of the concept of stranger 
through specific types of actors. For example, the Simmelian stranger has 
been the basis for Park’s ‘marginal man’ (1928), Wood’s ‘the newcomer’ 
(1934) and Siu’s ‘the sojourner’ (1952). As noted above, Simmel can also 
be considered the founding father of the concept of trust in sociology. His 
work on trust has influenced key authors in the field, such as Niklas 
Luhmann, Anthony Giddens, Barbara Misztal and Piotr Sztompka (see 
Möllering 2001). The basic features of Simmel’s concept of trust have 
already been explicated in chapter two. I will next analyse Simmel’s 
classical conception of the stranger, especially the basic characteristics and 
some particularities of the Simmelian ‘potential wanderer’. I especially 
consider the way Simmelian trust functions between traditional strangers 





Simmel wrote about Der Fremde, the stranger, in a brief excursion within 
his Soziologie (1908). There he introduced the famous, compelling image of 
the ‘potential wanderer’.   
 
The stranger is thus being discussed here, not in the sense often touched 
upon in the past, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but 
rather as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to 
speak, the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not 
quite overcome the freedom of coming and going. He is fixed within a 
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particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to 
spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is determined, essentially, 
by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports 
qualities to, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself. (Simmel 
1950, 402.) 
 
Simmel’s stranger thus comes to one place from another and may or may 
not leave. For Simmel, the community is fixed to place. Coming and going 
is equated with entering and exiting. If a man enters a new place or 
community he automatically becomes a stranger for the locals of that 
community. It is also typical for Simmel’s stranger that the degree of his 
orientation towards membership is very flexible: the stranger does not 
orientate himself towards joining the group, nor does the group encourage 
him to join. Furthermore, it is assumed that the stranger does belong 
somewhere else, that there is a home or point of origin which has shaped 
his history. Strangers are, therefore, neighbours who are not like us. By 
category, strangers are a double provocation: they are locals, and yet they 
do not assume the stereotypical behaviour that locals develop and maintain 
for themselves. Simmel’s stranger is close to those he does not know or 
who are socially distant, and far from those to whom he feels most close. 
Or, as Simmel (1950, 402) puts it: 
 
The unity of nearness and remoteness involved in every human relation is 
organized, in the phenomenon of the stranger…distance means that he, who 
is close by, is far, and strangeness means that he, who also is far, is actually 
near. 
 
Moreover, Simmel identifies objectivity as one of the key characteristics of 
the stranger. This objectivity is “a particular structure composed of distance 
and nearness, indifference and involvement” (Simmel, 1950, 403). That is 
to say, a stranger is someone who is not without experience in life, and is 
thus able to maintain some distance from the immediate situation and see 
human matters in a perspective different from others. I would say that 
Simmel’s figure of the stranger is a freer (practically and theoretically) and 
therefore also a more complex character than the other people in the 
community. Simmel concludes with the general claim that individuality 
 132
itself is universally estranging. He contends that what humans have in 
common is what makes us familiar, and what we do not have in common is 
what makes us strange (see Harman 1988, 18). This non-common element 
is nothing individual, but merely the strangeness of origin, which is or 
could be common to many strangers. For this reason, strangers are not 
really conceived as individuals, but as strangers of a particular type. For 
Simmel, the Jews were a special case of such strangers. 
 
It can be concluded that Simmel’s stranger is an element of the group itself, 
an element whose membership within the group involves being outside it 
and confronting it. The stranger is thus capable of communicating, but is 
incapable of thinking the same way as the other members of the group. 
Because he has come from elsewhere, he does not share the same values, 
norms and history. Through communication at the latest, the structural 
difference of the stranger becomes visible to the group. The stranger 
interprets reality differently, and because of these nonconforming 
interpretations, is less involved with the group or community. But this is 
precisely what makes the stranger irreplaceable for the group. As Lesley 
Harman (1988, 18) notes, “because he is not involved enough to affect the 
outcome of anything he is told, he does not pose a threat; yet he is a 
compelling listener by virtue of his perceived objective stance”. The 
stranger is an objective neighbour for the group, not a participating member 
of the family.  
 
Looking more closely at Simmel’s concept of the stranger, it is easy to find 
some obvious particularities. First, Simmel’s strength was to show that 
there is a real place for the stranger in a society. The stranger was an 
element of the group although he was outside of it. Second, Simmel’s 
stranger did not necessarily look for a home. He is just a wanderer who 
comes today and stays tomorrow. Third, Simmel’s stranger is self-
contained, objective and self-referential, and therefore not necessarily 
membership-oriented. In Simmel’s case, the stranger becomes and remains 
an important element, yet not an essential part of the group, though he at the 
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same time changes, or at least affects, its consistence and structure. 
Strangers are locals, fixed within a certain spatial circle but they do not 
share the local stereotypes. 
 
Generalisation and Universalisation of the Stranger 
 
For Simmel, the traditional stranger (‘potential wanderer’) appears as a 
trader (the Jew). However, the group does not need a trader for as long as 
its economy is essentially self-sufficient, or the exchange of products is 
limited to the group. A trader is only required for products that originate 
from outside the group. Insofar as members do not leave the circle in order 
to buy these necessities – in which case they become the ‘strange’ 
merchants in that outside territory – the trader must be a stranger. (Simmel 
1950, 402.) 
 
The expansion of market economy and the growing status of money have 
also affected the concept of stranger. During the course of its evolution, 
money has increasingly lost its function as useful or valuable material in 
itself, gradually turning into a mere symbolisation of other values. In both 
The Philosophy of Money and ‘The Stranger’, Simmel portrays the effect of 
money using the same terms that he employs for the stranger. As mentioned 
above, the stranger is characterised by the fact that he is at one time both 
distant and close, a part of the group and indifferent to it. In precisely the 
same way, money signifies the object’s value while remaining indifferent to 
it. Both facilitate and augment the atomisation of society and the individual. 
As a matter of fact, money completely changed the stranger’s mode of 
being. Amos Morris-Reich (2003, 135) encapsulates this change with a 
quite powerful choice of words: 
 
Money alienates one from fellow men and from objects. As a powerful 
force of social differentiation, it produces universal alienation. Universal 
alienation is accounted for in terms of distance, detachment and 
indifference, precisely those terms that characterize the position of the 
stranger. Money, therefore, universalizes the stranger’s mode of being. 
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The homology between the stranger (particularly the Jew) and money ends 
when money universalises a particular situation previously associated with 
the stranger. The universalisation of the stranger dialectically brings about 
the concrete stranger. As Simmel (1990, 227) notes: “The contrast that 
existed between the native and the stranger has been eliminated, because 
the money of transactions has now been taken up by the whole economic 
community.” Money changes the nature of society, generalises the 
stranger’s position, and makes the concretised stranger superfluous. Thus 
the stranger’s mode of being becomes universalised. (Morris-Reich, 2003, 
135.)  
 
In Simmel’s theory, there are at least two kinds of strangers. First, there is 
the stranger who is characterised by an origin that is different from the 
original group. Such strangers are positive because they can offer products, 
ideas, knowledge, etc., which the group itself does not have, but which it 
needs. In Simmel’s theory, this type of ‘stranger’ is the Jew or ‘potential 
wanderer’. Second, the very nature of the stranger changed, or became 
universalised, because of the universal alienation caused by money. This, of 
course, affected reciprocal relationships and made life more complex and 
uncertain. Both the Jew, as the ‘classic example’ of the stranger, and money 
are powerful agents and catalysts of differentiation. They are the 
‘indifferent third’, the stable reference point for and the symbol of a world 
in continuous flux of interactive reality, which in turn cannot function 
without trust.  
 
Furthermore, because ‘strangers’ are not familiar to us, we might have 
problems in trusting them. The universal alienation, caused by money, 
further emphasises the problems between trust and ‘strangers’ because it 
multiplies the number of ‘strangers’ as the modern society and its money 
economy develop. In this context, the possibility of trusting ‘strangers’ 





Simmel made a distinction between trust and confidence. He regarded trust, 
first of all, as a force that works for and through individuals. Simmel 
attributes a high moral value to trust, which makes it a rather special 
medium of social exchange. Reciprocal trust is one of the most important 
internal relations between the members of a society.  Second, Simmel noted 
that trust, or confidence, is a force that works for and through human 
association more generally. It is a moral or institutional value which assists 
in the development of confidential reciprocal relationships, or trust. Third, 
Simmel recognised a religious further element, a kind of faith, which is 
required for explaining trust and for understanding its unique nature.  This 
further element is a primary feeling which does not require reciprocity. This 
is to say, it affects only what is beyond trust and confidence. 
 
Regarding, then, the classic stranger, it would be easy to say that it was 
almost impossible for him to be a trustworthy person, because he was not 
an original member of the group. But this is not so in Simmel’s theory of 
the stranger; for Simmel, the stranger nevertheless is a permanent element 
of the group. Yet because he is not involved enough to affect the outcome 
of anything he is told, he does not pose a threat. Therefore, I would insist 
that the ‘potential wanderers’ were genuine recipients of trust because they 
could not substantially abuse it.39  
 
If anything, the native group was forced to trust strangers in order to able to 
receive products or knowledge that originate outside it. Trusting was an 
excellent way for a native group to communicate about the needed non-
knowledge with strangers. They were the genuine source of trust. Trusting 
                                                 
39 Giddens makes a similar observation concerning the problem of Simmel’s stranger and 
trust. He says that as Simmel pointed out, the meaning of the term ‘stranger’ changes with 
the coming of modernity. In pre-modern cultures the ‘stranger’ refers to a ‘whole person’ – 
someone who comes from the outside and who is potentially suspect. There may be many 
respects in which a person moving into a small community form elsewhere fails to receive 
the trust of the insiders, even perhaps after having lived in that community for many years. 
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strangers implies taking some sort of a risk. Nonetheless, without trust, the 
natives would have lived in a familiar world. Or as Simmel would say, they 
would have then lived in a world of complete knowledge where there is no 
need to trust (or for) strangers.  
 
Strangers opened new perspectives; they challenged the fixed boundaries 
and extended them socially and symbolically. As a matter of fact, if the 
classic stranger, or the Jew, was the ‘indifferent third’, trust can be seen as 
the type of third form of ‘the social’ through which he became the 
‘interested third’ for the native group. Or, in other words, trust was a 
resource which could add nearness between natives and strangers. 
 
However, Simmel’s concepts of trust and confidence are tightly bound to 
morals and community. Confidence is here seen as a moral value of a group 
and it assists the development of everyday trust of its members. (Simmel 
1990, 178-179.) Concerning, then, the arguments that money universalises 
the stranger’s mode of being and eliminates the contrast between the native 
and the stranger, we have problems to situate the universal strangers in the 
context of Simmel’s conception of trust. In the age of universal strangers 
there can no longer be largely accepted homogenous moral values which 
steer groups’ confidential behaviour and everyday trust practices toward 
strangers. I would say that we must talk about stranger-stranger-relations 
rather than native-stranger-relationships. But, using Simmel's conception of 
trust, this is impossible. Therefore, we must seek answers for the trust 
problems between the universal strangers from the viewpoint of an 
advanced Luhmannian theory of trust, which especially focuses on trust 
relationships between ‘persons’ – as well as the functions of trust and 




                                                                                                                                                        
(See Giddens 1990, 80.) In modern societies people do not characteristically interact with 
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The ‘Indifferent Strangers’ and the Problem of Inclusion 
 
As noted before, the advanced Luhmannian concept of trust is tightly bound 
to risks, not morals. A decision to trust always presupposes a situation of 
risk, because it is possible for other to abuse the offered trust. This is tightly 
connected with the fact that in complex societies, morality plays only a 
peripheral role. The peripheral role of morals is also one reason that makes 
the advanced Luhmannian conception of trust more adequate for the society 
of ‘universal strangers’ than Simmel’s. Following the advanced 
Luhmannian theory, it is quite evident that we decide to trust only strangers 
who we think share the same interests and orientations with. But it should 
be noted that Luhmann cannot, and probably would not even want to, 
provide a comprehensive answer to the problem of trustworthy or 
untrustworthy strangers. As a matter of fact, he does not directly theorise 
the problem of the stranger at all. Due to the lack of satisfactory theorising 
of the stranger by Luhmann, I will seek answers for trust problems 
concerning ‘universal strangers’ in a systems-theoretical context from 
Rudolf Stichweh’s writings on strangers. Stichweh is one of the very few 
sociologists who have dealt with the concept of strangers from the point of 
view of advanced Luhmannian systems theory. 
 
In his seminal article The Stranger: On the Sociology of Indifference 
(1997), Stichweh focuses on the stranger as a social category, not on 
strangeness as a quality of experience. He approaches the problem of the 
stranger especially within the social dimension of meaning by emphasising 
the communicative acts through which somebody is identified as a stranger 
in a social context. Stichweh (1997, 1-5) concludes that the classical 
sociological approach to the stranger (Simmel) presupposes that the social 
system (communication) classifying others as strangers describes itself as 
being based on membership. Here, strangers are first of all non-members. 
Those who do not conform to the communicational values and the world 
                                                                                                                                                        
strangers in the same way; if anything, we need them and are forced to trust them. 
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view of the host society are automatically classified as strangers. As noted 
above, it is through communication that the difference of the stranger 
becomes visible for the natives. 
 
However, Stichweh suggests that in an urban, functionally differentiated 
setting, strangers become either invisible or omnipresent. In this milieu, the 
category of the stranger loses its possible function of indicating a distinct 
social figure. Modern individuals, according to Stichweh, relate to each 
other neither as friend nor as enemy. From this premise, Stichweh 
postulates that strangerhood has become universalised because the 
dominant attitude among individuals in an urbanised environment is one of 
indifference. As Stichweh (1997, 9) says: 
 
This results in a decomposition of the Other which does not allow his 
compact strangeness to be a basis of experience and action any longer. 
Instead, it is decomposed into functional segments which are more easily 
handled. One aspect which has often been emphasized is the temporal. 
There are progressively more interactions of short duration. Therefore the 
interaction partners remain strangers towards one another. The compactness 
of a person in all its disturbing aspects is placed beyond the interaction 
process. 
 
In this systems-theoretical approach, it is important to note that late 
modernity is understood as a highly differentiated social modality wherein 
difference becomes something that constitutes the very basis of society, 
rather than being confined to the margins (Marotta 2000, 129). Following 
Luhmann (1986; 1997), this type of functionally differentiated society 
consists of autopoietic subsystems such as the economy, religion, law, 
politics, science, education etc., each of these systems being specialised, 
fulfilling one and only one function for the society. However, we are 
dealing with these systems every day, and thus meet also many unknown 
representatives of these systems. From a systems theoretical point of view, 
these ‘persons’ cannot be grasped neither as friends nor as enemies, they 
have a kind of ‘third status’. As Stichweh (1997, 11) puts it. “Our dominant 
attitude towards them is one of indifference, and that means, for instance, 
that whenever we are together with a great number of them, our 
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consciousness does not register them as individual persons.”  The 
universalisation of the stranger, then, means that in modern social life 
(urban environments, for example) social intercourse mostly involves 
interacting with people whom we might refer to as strangers. However, this 
implies that the strangeness of the other comes to be seen as a normal 
everyday occurrence, whereby it loses its irritating, disturbing character. An 
alternative interpretation speaks of the disappearance of the stranger or of 
his invisibility. (Stichweh 2002, 3.) 
 
I would like to argue that the Simmelian ‘indifferent third’ (the stranger) 
can, in systems-theoretical thinking, be replaced by symbolically coded 
communication. ‘Persons’ who communicate can be seen only as ‘carriers’ 
of coded communication with whom we mostly have impersonal 
relationships. Moreover, our contacts with these ‘persons’ are temporally 
quite short, and we are not always spatially connected with them (like in 
Simmel’s case). Almost everyone can be seen as an ‘indifferent stranger’, 
and strangerhood has thus been universalised.40   
 
Stichweh also argues that there are several techniques which contribute to 
the mechanisms of indifference. For example, the pretence of non-presence 
can be an important technique. It is employed “in situations in which 
differences and conflict potential are acute, and where the pretended 
absence of the other neutralizes any considerable conflict potential. Such 
pretences are reinforced by the art of avoidance.” (Stichweh 2002, 8.) In 
practice, one increases one’s pace, crosses to the other side of the street and 
avoids any eye contact, for example. Another technique is non-
communication despite the indisputable reciprocity of perception, which 
surely is one of the most incredible accomplishments of modernity 
(Stichweh 2002, 8). People can look at one another in a train, bus or 
aeroplane for hours without speaking to each other and without advertising 
                                                 
40 It must be mentioned that in his essay Die Grossdtädte und das Geistesleben, Simmel 
himself also sketched out a universally indifferent personality type. This personality type is 
affected by a positive (liberal) freedom and can be seen as a product of the metropolis and 
modern life (Noro 1996, 242). 
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this fact as communication. On the positive side of this very same 
interaction, Stichweh finds institutions for a minimal acceptance of the 
other. “When people encounter and greet one another, even if they are 
complete strangers, one of them smiles without the other having to do 
anything to deserve it” (Stichweh 2002, 8). This smile, however, seems to 
be culturally specific and not a universal institution. In Finland, for 
example, instead of smiling, it is apparently still quite normal for a person 
to present only a glimpse and then turn his eyes away thereby making it 
clear to the other that he is a stranger and has to behave accordingly for the 
time being. 
 
In another article, Strangers, Inclusions, and Identities (2002b), Stichweh 
has examined the disappearance of the stranger through the modern 
inclusion and exclusion processes. By including and excluding strangers, 
social systems – with clear membership criteria and social closure – define 
at the same time what for them is normally and legitimately understood as 
their collective identity. In the modern world the situation is different. As 
Stichweh (2002b, 106-107) puts it: 
 
It is wholly different with the modern world of inclusions and exclusions. It 
is not that the concept of identity disappears, but that the concept itself loses 
its clear-cut identity. It migrates into multiple contexts of its application and 
usage. A first feature is that identity is particularized - or better - atomized. 
 
Stichweh thus does not see today’s stranger as a compact social object who 
has a deviant identity from the collective one. Rather, a person’s identity 
and possible inclusion are formed through the communication processes of 
systems. Namely, “identities obviously are inclusion identities; they refer to 
the multiple inclusions processes which are characteristic of modern 
society” (Stichweh 2002b, 107). Systems-theoretically, this means that 
societal inclusion is possible only through communications, because society 
consists only of communications. Modern society is characterised by the 
complete inclusion of ‘persons’. This means that all members of a society 
have to have access to the economy, the legal system, the political system, 
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religion, scientific knowledge, and to mass media. Therefore, froma 
systems-theoretical point of view, the reason behind the disappearance or 
universalisation of the stranger was not only the universalising role of 
money, but the gradual development of functional differentiation of society 
and its affections to inclusion processes. Overcoming strangeness is no 
longer a strategic problem for modern society. Rather, the strategic 
problems deal more with fluidity of functional communications and the 




The advanced Luhmannian theory of trust and Stichweh’s theory of 
stranger sit well with a late modern society where native groups (tribe, race, 
nation etc.) no longer play a crucial role in creating common confidential 
values. Since Luhmann posits that all systems are autopoietic (they produce 
and reproduce themselves through their own elements), it is no longer 
important to separate human beings into different groups. Rather, all are 
autopoietic individuals who partake of society only when they 
communicate.   
 
It is always up to the individual whether he decides to trust the other or not. 
In other words, ‘people’ have to share some interests if they want to trust. It 
can be said that the social world (the world of communication) is largely 
reconstructed in terms of special interests. As Luhmann (1988, 101) puts it: 
“Now, one may try to calculate and outwit these interests; one may see 
ways to use the interests of others, which are reliable precisely because they 
are interests”. The advanced Luhmannian concept of trust is primarily a 
communicative and functional one, the main task of which is to reduce, not 
eliminate, complexity. I would say that we decide to trust only those 
strangers who might have the same interests with us. Here “trust should be 
understood only from the point of view of its function” (Misztal 1996, 95).  
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Moreover, comparing Simmel’s and Stichweh’s concepts of the stranger, 
and especially taking note of the role of trust in the context of the stranger, 
some obvious similarities can be found. Namely, both in the case of 
Simmel’s classic stranger and Stichweh’s functional communicative actor, 
trust is a possible bond through which the stranger becomes an important 
person for the natives (in the traditional setting) or a communicative actor 
for other strangers (in the modern setting). Reciprocal trust transforms the 
classic stranger (the Jew) from ‘indifferent third’ into ‘interested third’. 
This type of stranger is a wanderer who comes today and stays tomorrow. 
Because he stays, he is important to natives and thus will be accepted as a 
trustworthy person. 
 
In functionally differentiated modern society, we encounter more of these 
‘potential wanderers’. If we follow Stichweh’s conception of the stranger, 
everyone is a wanderer for one another, or there are no longer any strangers 
at all. Strangers are either invisible or omnipresent. All are like Stichweh 
would say, indifferent for each other. However, we cannot live in the 
differentiated society without contacts with these ‘indifferent strangers’. 
Rather, we have more contacts with unknown ‘persons’ than before. It can 
even be said that the ‘indifferent strangeness’ is a requirement of 
subsystemic communication.   
 
Here, again, the role of trust becomes essential. But it is certain that through 
accepting or providing trust, the ‘indifferent stranger’ becomes important to 
us. As stated above, we quite often trust the strangers whom we assume to 
share our interests. Trust is away to transform the ‘indifferent stranger’ into 
an interested one in differentiated society, too. In other words, through 
perception we can choose certain strangers with whom we start to 
communicate, and whom we possibly trust. Quite often (but not always) we 
communicate with someone because of our interests.  Furthermore, what 
makes trust more important for a systems-theoretical approach to the 
stranger than to Simmel’s is the fact that trust always presupposes a 
situation of risk and usually does not have a direct bearing on morals. We 
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may not have many other options than to trust strangers. As we have seen, 
living in a completely familiar world has become almost impossible. Of 
course, we can live in a familiar world, but that is the world of simple 
interactions. Living in a functionally differentiated society presumes more 
than communications on the level of simple interaction. Living in a modern 
society is also full of risks, and hence presumes a problematisation of trust.  
 
Some Problems of the Thesis Concerning the Disappearance 
of the Stranger 
 
Stichweh’s conclusion about the disappearance of the stranger might sound 
appropriate in the context of advanced systems theory. However, it is also 
possible to find the kinds of ‘indifferent strangers’, using Stichweh’s 
terminology, whom we cannot trust and, above all, who do not share our 
functional interests. These features characterise at least the Brasilian favelas 
and Zygmunt Bauman’s postmodern type of stranger, the ‘new poor’. 
According to Luhmann (1996d), in favelas people live in ‘absolute’ 
exclusion from the function systems and from all forms of communication 
that demand more complex capabilities. By this type of exclusion people 
are, so to speak, reduced to sheer bodies – and these orders of 
inclusion/exclusion are perhaps in the process of becoming a primary form 
of differentiation in the world society. Furthermore, if we follow recent 
tragic events of the world (the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
bombings of March 2004 in Madrid and of July 2005 in London), 
Stichweh’s conclusion that late modern individual would not relate to each 
other as friend nor enemy, but indifferent, also becomes problematic. 
 
The ‘New Poor’ as Strangers 
 
Zygmunt Bauman sees the ‘new poor’ as untrustworthy ‘strangers’ in the 
sphere of economy. For him, ‘the flawed consumers’ or ‘the new poor’ are 
the embodiments of postmodern strangers (Stichweh might prefer the term 
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‘late modern strangers’). According to Bauman (1997, 25; see also Marotta 
2000, 122), these ‘flawed consumers’ or ‘the new poor’ are postmodern 
strangers because they are the by-products of the “never concluding process 
of identity building”. They are the products of the consumer market: the 
unemployable (both young and old), single mothers, welfare recipients, the 
unskilled and inflexible workers. The ‘new poor’, argues Bauman, are 
bureaucratically controlled and administered, and the sole purpose of 
welfare legislation and practice is to disempower the poor. (Marotta 2000, 
124.)  
 
The postmodern stranger is also captured in the category of the vagabond. 
Vagabonds wander, not out of desire but because they are pushed out. 
Bauman (1998, 92) notes that “vagabonds are the waste of the world which 
has dedicated itself to the tourist service”. Both the tourist and the 
vagabond are consumers, but the vagabond represents the ‘new poor’ 
(Bauman 1998, 96). They are strangers to the tourists. They are what the 
tourist may become, and so it is in the tourist’s vested interest to render the 
alternative as dreadful and as repulsive as possible (Bauman 1998, 98). 
These flawed consumers “are the waste-product of the game” (Bauman 
1998b, 75), and instead of “meriting care and assistance [and thus also 
trust], [they] deserve hate and condemnation” (Bauman 1997, 43).  
 
The majority of people do not have need to trust the ‘new poor’ because 
they do not have similar functional interests. Are the ‘new poor’ forced to 
live or communicate in the margin, or in the state of exclusion, by means of 
politics (power) and jurisprudence (law)? They may not have reached the 
communicational inclusion identity within these systems. As Vince Marotta 
(2000, 130) says, although difference may constitute the very basis of a 
postmodern society, marginalisation, exploitation and exclusionary 
practices are still intrinsically connected to the way contemporary society 
relates to Otherness41. Bauman’s example clearly shows that these 
                                                 
41 It seems that Marotta does not distinguish strangeness from otherness. The otherness of 
another human being is an incontrovertible and hence universal social experience. It is the 
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postmodern strangers cannot be conceived of in a positive way like 
Simmel’s stranger. Rather, they are seen as a threat by the majority. 
Bauman’s perspective on the stranger is pessimistic and somewhat 
deterministic. According to him, strangers are victims of forces they cannot 
control. (See Järvinen 2003). Furthermore, the ‘new poor’ (or the Brasilian 
favelas) cannot be sketched out as Stichwehian indifferent persons because 
they are neither invisible nor omnipresent. Because of their inadequate 
capability to communicate in the system of economy (with the medium of 
money), they are functionally irrelevant for the majority and become more 
visible and present, more like strangers.  
 
Through Bauman’s conception of the ‘new poor’ and Luhmann’s favelas, 
we easily realise that Stichweh’s argument on the disappearance of the 
stranger in the late or postmodern society cannot be completely true. 
However, from a systems-theoretical point of view, strangers are even more 
immanent than Bauman and Marotta assume. They have not necessarily 
been excluded from society. Rather, the functional differentiation of society 
means complete inclusion. But, at the same time, inclusion is by no means 
the solution for the problem of inequality, but a part of it. Although general 
inclusion has become reality in all modern societies, inclusion does not 
mean equal inclusion. (Nassehi 2004, 5-6.) Inclusion has increased people’s 
inability to communicate equally in each subsystem. Most clearly the 
inequality in taking part in systems’ functions is manifested in the system of 
economy. Similarly, I would say that people have unequal resources to take 
part in the functions of politics, law as well as education. Therefore, 
following Stichweh’s conception of the stranger, there are also more and 
more communicative acts through which somebody in a social context is 
identified as a stranger. If someone is identified as stranger, then he has not 
reached equal inclusion identity within the system. Every functional 
                                                                                                                                                        
absolute precondition for my experience of myself as my Self in contradistinction to the 
otherness of another human being. It is only possible to speak of strangeness, in contrast, 
when the otherness of another human being is experienced as irritating or disturbing. 
Ambivalence and uncertainty characteristically accompany the experience of strangeness. 
(Stichweh 2002, 1.)  
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subsystem thus itself creates its own social (communicative) category of the 
stranger as well as its own inclusion identity. The most visible character of 
this particular type or category of the stranger is a deviant and deficient 
ability to communicate with the media of the system. Thus, the sociological 
problematic of the stranger can be grasped and examined further also in the 
light of inclusion/exclusion-schematism.  Yet this does not revoke the fact 
that strangeness is still a strategic problem of contemporary society. 
    
Return to the Friend/Enemy Binary Opposition 
 
Despite the universalising role of money, increased indifference, and 
changed basis of inclusion identities, it seems obvious that the problem of 
the stranger has not disappeared. Neither is it self-evident that the binary 
opposition friend/enemy would have lost its societal meaning in the age of 
world society. Stichweh (1997, 11) notes also, that “the schematism 
friend/enemy functions only in extreme situations as a political 
schematism”. Rather, he adds, “in democratic politics it is easy to see that 
modern politics is less interested in its enemies than in the question of how 
to motivate the undecided, normally indifferent elector” (Stichweh 1997, 
12).  
 
However, the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 and their 
consequences exemplify a new relationship between ourselves and others 
(Japp 2003, 55). Terrorists affect us through means of violence. According 
to Luhmann (1979, 149), violence is a form of power which is a matter of 
relatively simple action, easily organised and thus can be centralised. We 
live in a world where “the possibility of the use of violence cannot be 
ignored by the person affected” (Luhmann 1979, 149). Violence might 
threaten communication of the world society and even the continuity of 
some systems (like politics or the economy).  
 
After these tragic events Stichweh’s argument, that modern politics would 
be less interested in its enemies than in the question of motivating 
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indifferent electors, becomes questionable. We are now living in conditions 
of resentment and revolt which cannot be divorced from the inequities and 
discontent stemming from globalisation. It is also true that social and 
economic globalisation has opened up new targets for attack, new means of 
attacking and new opportunities for publicity. Most present-day terrorism 
and its consequences have a global effect. (Etzioni 2002.) Terrorism is a 
global risk, which concerns the world society within all its dimensions: 
social, evolutional and factual (Japp 2003, 82). In the functionally 
differentiated world society, the old friend/enemy binary opposition – which 
played an important role in stratified societies – has evidently re-emerged in 
a new form: West and Islam. However, this binary opposition has now been 
emphasised in the context of function systems of world society; especially 
politically, but also socially (in everyday interaction) and culturally (the 
growing suspicion against Muslims). It can be said that the world society’s 
Eigenstructure – which reproduces pre-existent cultural diversity and 
creates new social and cultural patterns – has absorbed this binary 
opposition at the level of almost every function system of the world society 
– such as science, politics, education, law and others.  
 
However, it is also quite obvious that the terrorist is exactly an enemy and 
not a stranger in the Simmelian sense. The terrorist cannot be the 
Simmelian stranger because he is not a potential wanderer who comes 
today and stays tomorrow, and immediate objectivity is not one of his key 
characteristics. He is not an objective neighbour for the group but rather 
something else: a particular type who threatens us by way of hostile rhetoric 
and malevolent acts. The terrorist cannot either be regarded as the 
Stichwehian ‘indifferent stranger’ who becomes an important and 
trustworthy ‘person’ if he has the same interests as the other. Neither can 
these terrorists be identified with Baumannian ‘new poor’ because the 
threat represented by terrorists is fundamental and not only economic.  
 
Nonetheless, it is certain that terrorists are invisible and omnipresent. John 
Urry (2002, 66) calls terrorist groups or organisations “global fluids” which 
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“are hard to defeat because they are made up of very different self-
organizing elements that regularly change their shape, form and activities. 
Such mutating capacity renders the network ‘invisible’, if, on occasion 
awesomely present.” Without these qualities the attacks of terrorists would 
be avoidable and, therefore, impossible. Paradoxically, the terrorists of 
today might be more familiar than strange. We may have trusted them 
before their attacks. They are people who have created trustworthy relations 
in the world they eventually attacked. For example, the terrorists behind the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were members of an 
organised religious terrorist group. Yet they were also members of the 
global, functionally differentiated society. They benefited from Western 
culture (educationally, economically, militarily etc.) and created 
trustworthy relationships in the West, but for one reason or another rejected 
assimilation and continued to adhere to and propagate the values, customs, 
and cultures of their native societies.  
 
These types of people are, thus, enemies within the group of friends. It can 
be concluded, then, that the strategic problem of global society concerns to 
a greater degree – or at least as much – the friend/enemy binary opposition 
as the problem of the stranger.  This is also a fact which underlines the 
importance of trust, but also its susceptibility to risk: The possible enemies, 
especially terrorists, surely abuse our trust more fundamentally than 
‘indifferent strangers’ or the ‘new poor’.  
 
However, we must note that exclusions in the global society and tragic 
events like terrorist attacks affect our self-presentation and readiness to 
trust.  As Luhmann (1979, 82) says: “The inner assurance which comes 
from being equal to the demands of self-presentation in all situations, and 
of always knowing a practicable way out even from bungled situations, is 
one of those inner resources which serve as a foundation for readiness to 
trust”. The ‘person’ who trusts presents himself as someone who is by his 
nature inclined to bestow trust. If the trust then turns out to have been 
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misplaced, the truster is not only disappointed but in the case of ‘new poor’, 
excluded, and in the case of terrorism even killed.    
 
To conclude, it can be argued that the sociological problem of trust never 
posed itself. Strangers were indispensable for natives and did not pose a 
direct threat. Rather, strangers were trustworthy because they had the type 
of knowledge or products without which natives could not live. However, 
the universal strangeness consequent upon money’s universalising role 
raises sociological problems between ‘strangers’ and trust, which cannot be 
explained by Simmel’s conceptual framework.  
 
The advanced and functionally oriented Luhmannian concept of trust is 
better suiter for the society of ‘universal strangers’ than that of Simmel’s, 
because this systems-theoretically oriented concept does not emphasise the 
roles of community and morals but the function of trust is (like it was 
already in Luhmann’s Vertrauen), to put it simply, to reduce complexity. 
However, from a systems-theoretical point of view, money (or the growing 
significance of the economy) was not the only reason for the disappearance 
or universal role of the stranger, but rather the systems-theoretical roots of 
this change can be associated with the gradual development of functional 
differentiation of society. In this type of society, ‘persons’ are, according to 
Stichweh, indifferent to each other, and we don’t register them as individual 
persons, but rather as ‘carriers’ of coded communication. The overcoming 
of strangeness is thus no longer a strategic problem; today’s real problems 
have more to do with the fluidity of functional communication. It is 
systems-theoretically important also to conceive trust more as a functional 
communicative decision than a moral value of a group. 
 
However, in his conception of the indifferent stranger, Stichweh 
overemphasises the figure’s functional disappearance. Through Zygmunt 
Bauman’s conception of the ‘new poor’, we realise that strangeness and 
trusting strangers are still problems of late modern society. Although 
Bauman’s image of the ‘new poor’ is intensely typified to strangers within 
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the system of economy, other function systems (politics, jurisprudence, 
education etc.) also produce strangeness, which becomes explicit in 
communication activities. If a ‘person’ has an unequal capacity for 
participation in the system’s function (communication) he can be quite 
easily typified as functionally constricted, or as the stranger whom we do 
not want trust, because he does not have the same interests as we do. 
Systems-theoretically this can be expressed by stating that these persons 
have not reached an equal inclusion identity in the system.  
 
Finally, Stichweh’s other claim about the lost importance of the 
friend/enemy opposition is also problematic. The rising wave of 
international terrorism proves something completely opposite. Terrorists 
cannot be seen as strangers neither from Simmel’s, Stichweh’s or Bauman’s 
perspectives. Rather, they are invisible and omnipresent enemies. What 
makes them more dangerous than strangers is the fact that we may have 
trusted them before the attacks and their way of abusing our trust is fatal. 
Therefore, some of the most important strategic problems of late modern 
society are better understood in terms of the binary opposition between 












7. Confidence and the Luhmannian System of the 
Welfare State 
 
Having explored how trust functions in the context of strangers I will now 
move the analysis to a systemic level. While the problem of the stranger has 
to do with personal relations of trust, the effects of societal subsystems in 
our lives raise questions concerning system trust, or confidence. We are 
more dependent on the different subsystems than before. This is largely 
because general inclusion has become reality in all modern societies. 
According to my hypothesis, general inclusion is connected to the evolution 
of the modern welfare state. Therefore, in this chapter I will analyse the 
Luhmannian cyclic model of the welfare state and the functions of 
advanced Luhmannian trust and confidence within it. In his book Politische 
Theorie im Wohlfartsstaat (1981; 1990), Luhmann examines the welfare 
state as an autopoietic subsystem which has overheated because it has too 
many obligations to its citizens. In other words, the system of the welfare 
state has made too many demands on itself. I shall explore the taxing and 
steering problems which result from these obligations. In order to be able to 
study the logic of the welfare state, as well as the problems of trust and 
confidence within it, I must also widen the analyses from ‘personal’ and 
systemic contexts to the organisational context. This is necessary because 
the system of the welfare state (as well as other functional subsystems) 
consists of and is affected by several organisations.  
 
Inclusion and the Welfare State 
 
From the Luhmannian perspective, society consists of communication, not 
of people. In other words, it consists of everything that is recognised as 
communication by one or more of its subsystems. These subsystems are 
autopoietic, self-referential and reproduce themselves only via 
communication. The operations of the political system are important from 
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the viewpoint of the differentiation of the welfare state. 42 However, 
Luhmann always stresses that ‘the political’ is not identical with the state. 
The political is an intensely complex fabric of communications, which is 
certainly “oriented around the state” (Luhmann 1990, 123), but which 
cannot be reduced to the conscious decisions made by particular individuals 
or departments (or other organisations) within the state. In contrast to the 
Old-European sociological tradition, Luhmann does not want to separate 
state and society. State is nothing outside society, it is nothing more than a 
“formula of unity for the self-description of the political system… the 
political system describes itself as a state because communication that uses 
this formula is likely to be treated as understandable” (Luhmann 1990, 128; 
123). State is not, then, a ‘centre’ which can steer the society. As Luhmann 
(1990, 31) says: “A society which is structured according to function 
systems has no central agency. It is a society without an apex or center.”  
Rather, the subsystems function in one another’s environment and do not 
directly influence other systems’ operations. But as we know, because of 
structural couplings these systems are also indirectly dependent on other 
systems’ functions. 
 
Society is the all-encompassing social system that orders all possible 
communication among human beings. The political system is one of its 
subsystems alongside other subsystems for religion, science, economy, 
education, family life, medical care etc. The individual subsystems 
actualize society from their specific point of view according to 
correspondingly specific system/environment perspectives. Thus the 
economic and education systems belong to the environment of the political 
system, and conversely the political system belongs to the environment of 
education and the economy. This distinction does not exclude extensive 
                                                 
42 The greatest influential sociologists behind Luhmann’s political writings are perhaps 
Parsons and Helmut Schelsky. Schelsky’s influence in Luhmann’s theory of the welfare 
state is obvious. Schelsky demands that we recognise the importance of the type of 
institutions which reflect the purely functional character of modern humanity. In the essay 
Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation (1965), he argues that the modern 
political apparatus is no longer ordered around the formation of a popular political will, 
and that the classical substance of democracy has been superseded by a logic of functional 
competence. The modern political system thus legitimises itself solely insofar as it can 
develop technical solutions to the problems which it confronts, and politics in the sense of 
a normative will-formation is no longer a sustainable concept. (See King & Thornhill 
2003, 169-170.) Schelsky’s functionalist arguments pave the way for Luhmann’s account 
of a society which cannot be centred on any stable foundation of human reason or agency.  
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reciprocal dependencies. Instead, it assumes demands on and increasing 
fulfilment of the function systems in society. (Luhmann 1990, 30.) 
 
The welfare state is characterised most often as a state that supplies 
extensive social benefits to particular classes of the population, and 
consequently must find constant sources of revenue for this. This usual 
characterisation is strongly connected with economic growth (the economic 
system) and to a lesser degree with political development (the political 
system). For example, the post-war German welfare model, the context for 
Luhmann’s writings on the welfare state,43 “was based on the idea of a 
‘social state’, sometimes rendered as a ‘social market economy’. The 
central principle of this model was that social welfare would most 
effectively be furthered through economic development, and that the 
structure of social services had to reflect that.” (Spicker 2000, 147.) In this 
model, the general concern is “to ensure that public expenditure on welfare 
is directly compatible with the need for economic development and growth” 
(Spicker 2000, 147).    
 
Meanwhile, in systems-theoretical thinking the welfare state is a part of the 
political system, and economic growth is thus not the prime basis of the 
welfare state. Rather, the differentiation of the welfare state is connected to 
the communication of the political system. The subsystems of the economy, 
law, science, education and religion, have affected the development of the 
welfare state, but only indirectly, through structural couplings. For these 
reasons – diverging from the economically oriented approaches - Luhmann 
formulates his concept of the welfare state with the help of the sociological 
principle of inclusion.   
 
Luhmann developed the concept of inclusion to replace the concept of 
social integration (see Habermas 1981; 1985). According to Luhmann 
                                                 
43 It must be mentioned here that before his academic career, Luhmann worked at the 
Higher Administrative Court in Lüneburg working on a file-card system which holds the 
decisions of the court, then at the Ministry of education of Lower Saxony, Hannover, 
dealing with questions of compensation for Nazi injustice. Therefore, he also had 
professional experience of the post-war German welfare system. 
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(1995c, 237-264), the concept of social integration is misleading because it 
lays too much emphasis on normative concurrence and does not schematise 
the problem of exclusion. Furthermore, Luhmann’s approach has some 
similar characteristics with T.H. Marshall’s (1950) theory of the civil, 
political and social rights which revolutionise the hierarchic model of 
society. Diverging from Marshall, who emphasises the expanding rights of 
the citizen, Luhmann stresses the importance of expanding communication 
and gradual inclusion. Through the model of inclusion, society defines not 
rights, but the conditions of functional participation. As Luhmann (1990c, 
34) notes:  
 
The concept of inclusion means an encompassment of the entire population 
in the performances of the individual function systems. On one hand, this 
concerns access to these benefits and, on the other, dependence of 
individual modes of living on them. To the extent that inclusion is achieved, 
groups disappear that do not participate in social living, or do so only 
marginally. 
 
With the help of the inclusion developed within the welfare state, society 
tries to produce and reproduce the conditions of participation, and thus 
prevent people from being pushed into exclusion.44 Furthermore, with 
functional differentiation, individuals in society become dependent on 
being included in most or all of the function systems pertaining to their own 
welfare. According to Roar Hagen (2000, 38), “these interdependencies are 
observed by society, which has developed two main forms of inclusion to 
counter exclusion at the level of subsystems: (1) legal rights to access, more 
ore less backed by economic means, and (2) social policy or social help 
when exclusion is not seen as a failure of the system, but is attributed to the 
affected individual.”  
 
                                                 
44 It should be noted that the distinction of inclusion and exclusion is, at the moment, one 
of the liveliest topics of research and debate in systems theory (see Stäheli & Stichweh 
2002; Schwinn 2004). There are arguments that focus on the system level at which 
inclusions and exclusions operate (organisations and functions systems); one important 
research question regards the interrelations of inequality and exclusion; and probably the 
most interesting research problems have to do with the dynamics internal to the distinction 
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A ‘person’s’ capability to communicate (to be in society) increases if he 
reaches the condition of inclusion within the welfare state. As an individual 
(as an organic and psychic system), a ‘person’ lives outside the function 
systems (in the environment). “But every individual must have access to 
every function system if and insofar as his mode of living requires the use 
of the functions (legal, economic, political etc.) of society. Every function 
system encompasses the entire population, but only with the respective 
aspects that are functionally relevant.” (Luhmann 1990, 35.) Everyone 
enjoys a legal status and the protection of the law. Everyone can acquire 
and spend money. The realisation of the principle of inclusion within the 
functional domain of politics ultimately leads to the welfare state; the 
welfare state is the realisation of political inclusion (Luhmann 1990, 35-36). 
This involves not only the securing and continuous improvement of 
minimum standards (legal rights) of social well-being for everyone but also 
attendance to specific problems (social policy/social help) of the most 
diverse kind that can become serious for those caught in difficult situations. 
Improvement thus proceeds not only in the direction of raising minimum 
standards, but also in the direction of the identification of ever new 
problems as public concerns. These new social problems have gradually 
affected the political agenda through the realisation of democracy and the 
needs and interests of the population. This was “since politicians have to 
win the approval of the population to attain office, it is advisable for them 
to address its interests, to propose improvements and to point out problems” 
(Luhmann 1990, 36). 
 
The Cyclic Model of the System of the Welfare State 
 
In all pre-modern societal systems the social order was based on hierarchy, 
where the function of the medium of political system, power, operated 
between dominating (commands) and dominated (obedience) parts. In 
modern society this is impossible. The transition from a stratified society to 
                                                                                                                                                        
inclusion/exclusion and with its interrelations with the world society (see more Stichweh 
2005; 2005b). 
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a functionally differentiated society has changed things decisively on the 
level of the societal system, and the advanced political systems of today are 
structured in an essentially different way. Complex societies are marked by 
the fact that their democratic political systems actually divide into three 
distinct subsystems. Democratic political systems “are based on the 
threefold differentiation of politics, administration and public where 
authority and command hierarchies can be completely integrated” 
(Luhmann 1990, 47). Because the welfare state is a democratic political 
system, it also consists of these three subsystems. 
 
Following Luhmann, it would be correct to give up the concept of the 
welfare state and examine it as a system. That is because the modern 
welfare state is nothing more than a “formula of unity for the self-
description of the political system” (Luhmann 1990, 128). The concept of 
the welfare state is a paradox or fiction which the political system itself 
produces in order to grasp its unity as a recursive and formally autonomous 
set of communications. As noted before, the political system describes itself 
as a state because communication that uses this formula is likely to be 
treated as understandable. The system of the welfare state is merely a self-
regulative autopoietic system for using power. In this system, power is 
divided and communicated mainly between politics, administration and the 
public, or more precisely, between a great number of distinct points and 
distinct institutions (including legislatures, protest groups, lobbies and so 
on). This type of system, in consequence, is in fact a non-hierarchical 
system which consists of an enormous sequence of recursively closed 
communications of power. This means that “political power loses its linear-
asymmetrical character of ‘from above to below’ and is brought into the 
form of a cyclical dynamics” (Luhmann 1990, 48). The constant increase in 
the structural complexity of the political system means that a functional-
structural internal division of the political system into distinct subsystems 
becomes necessary, so that the political system is equipped for processing 
all the communications which occur in it. I will next examine the way these 
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three subsystems of the system of the welfare state are functioning 
cyclically. How are they affecting each other? 
 
First, I concentrate on the question of the relationship between politics and 
administration.45 “The constant increase in the structural complexity of the 
political system means that a functional-structural internal division of the 
political system into distinct subsystems becomes necessary, so that the 
political system is equipped to process all the communications which occur 
in it” (King & Thornhill 2003, 79). Politics and administration are distinct 
functional components of the political system, both of which operate under 
their own autonomous criteria of rationality, and both of which develop 
their own particular mechanisms for reducing complexity and processing 
information. The most important function of the system of politics within a 
political system is the production of collectively binding decisions. A 
binding decision means that it is “collective in the sense that it binds the 
decision makers themselves as well as the addressee(s) of the decision to 
the selection that is made” (Luhmann 1990, 74). The production of binding 
decisions is the function of ‘real politics’, by which Luhmann means 
parliamentary politics. However, the system of politics cannot carry out all 
of its decisions. This is where it needs bureaucratic administration (the 
widest sense of legislation and government), which organises its decisions. 
Or, as Luhmann (1970, 163-164; King & Thornhill 2003, 79) puts it, 
administration is specialised for the “elaboration and issuing of binding 
decisions, in accordance with politically prescribed criteria of correctness.”  
 
In Luhmann’s theory all systems are autopoietic, and the same goes for 
politics, administration and the public. The environmental reference 
between them is possible through structural couplings or interpenetration. 
Politics and administration are structurally coupled through politicians and 
                                                 
45 This conception of the political system which focuses on the two subsystems of politics 
and administration is especially characteristic to Luhmann’s earlier works, written around 
the mid-1960s. In this model politics establishes broad plans for the administration, and the 
administration, deploying its own separate rationality of decision-making, gives 
universalisable legal form to these plans. (King & Thornhill 2003, 87.) 
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officials. They should not be seen here as ‘persons’ but as ‘carriers’ of 
political communication. “They are the result of office-holding and/or 
political behaviour”, or, “they are political data and decision premises in the 
offices they exercise” (Luhmann 1990, 61). 
 
Second, I shall give an overview of the relation between the public and 
politics. It is well known that in democracy the needs and interests of the 
public have an influence on the themes or binding decisions of the political 
system. The public can influence the binding decisions through public 
opinion and mass media, which are the structural couplings between the 
public and politics. In democratic societies mass media play an important 
role in representing of the public opinion. They also produce topics of 
communication, which are an unavoidable requirement of communication 
(Luhmann 2000d, 12). Besides, mass media produce information, which is 
bound to time. “Information cannot be repeated; as soon as it becomes an 
event, it becomes non-information. A new item run twice might still have 
its meaning, but loses its information value.” (Luhmann 2000d, 19.) The 
public needs information for being able to elect the proper candidates to the 
parliament, and politicians need information about the needs and interests 
of the public. The mass media are thus important structural couplings 
between the public and politics.    
 
How, then, does the relationship between the public and the administration 
function? Luhmann identifies administration as the legislative component 
of politics. Administration is the point of reference within the political 
system, through which the current political agenda ‘communicates’ with the 
public. This relation is externalised in the form of law or money. Law and 
money are the structural couplings between the public and administration. 
They provide the premises for binding decisions and, in this way, are able 
to transfer the binding effect on these decisions (Luhmann 1990, 82). Law 
and money also increase the visibility and the sensibility of changes, they 
“provide external reasons for adjusting one’s behaviour to specific 
conditions” (Luhmann 1990, 83). I would even argue that inclusion has 
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developed from the basis of law and money. They have increased the 
possibilities of participation in function systems like science, education and 
care. The only thing that cannot be attained through law or money is the 
changing of people themselves. As Luhmann (1990, 84) notes: 
 
The whole socio-political domain that is discussed today under the title of 
people changing (people processing) cannot be steered causally and 
technically by means of law and money. This is true of education as well as 
of concerns with social therapy, of rehabilitation measures and of the help 
for individuals who cannot solve their psychical and social problems 
themselves. To be sure, all professional activities within this domain 
depend on law and money. But their results cannot be guaranteed by these 
conditions. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the operations of the cyclic model of the system of the 
welfare state. Some conclusions emerge from the figure. First, the system of 
the welfare state can be grasped as a triadic system, which consists of three 
subsystems: politics, administration and the public. Democracy, to use 
Luhmann’s (1990, 125) own term, is the ultimate “title” for this triadic 
system of differentiated inclusivity, in which these three subsystems 
communicate with and moderate each other by the medium of power. 
Secondly, these three subsystems are autopoietic and self-refential and do 
not have a direct connection to each other. Therefore, in order to be able to 
reduce the complexity and use the medium of power, the system of the 
welfare state needs structural couplings: politicians and officers (between 
politics and the administration), law and money (between the administration 
and the public) and public opinion, mass media and elections46 (between 
public and politics). Thirdly, this cycle does not move only in one direction. 
For example, through a referendum the public can make binding decisions 
and affect the operations (laws) of the administration without the 
intervention of politics. Similarly, government (as a representative of the 
administration) can pressure the subysystem of politics and thereby affect 




Figure 8. The cyclic model of the system of the welfare state (see Jalava 
2005). 
 
The Problems of Taxing and Steering 
 
Luhmann’s estimation of the success of the system of the welfare state is 
quite skeptical. As Luhmann (1984b, 115) argues: “If we wish to 
characterize the welfare state in the most extremely compressed manner, we 
can talk about an overtaxing of the state by politics.” The problems of the 
system of the welfare state may arise from perturbations caused either “by 
the expectation of being able to guarantee a risk-free society”, or by “public 
opinion demanding stricter regulation [of risky situations] than decision 
makers and experts would consider rational” (Luhmann 1993, 162; see also 
King & Thornhill 2003, 188-189). It seems, then, that although there is no 
centre of society, the system of the welfare state is still perceived as a 
centre, which can assume accountability for all kinds of concerns. This 
means, first of all, that the system of the welfare state becomes the 
addressee for problems which may be better addressed by other systems. 
For example, it is made accountable for economic issues, whose 
                                                                                                                                                        
46 I will explore the role of elections within the system of the welfare state more closely in 
the following chapters. 
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susceptibility to regulation by political decisions is minimal. Second, 
overtaxing means that the system of the welfare state itself has become 
excessively inclusive, and so runs the risk of de-differentiating itself in its 
relation to other systems. The system of the welfare state thus continually 
self-overtaxes itself and, at the same time, undermines its own 
differentiation from other subsystems. Luhmann (1990, 84-85) describes 
the overtaxing effects of money and law in a following way: 
 
In the case of money, the welfare state costs too much. It promotes 
inflationary tendencies that in turn ruin it. And the clearer the selectivity of 
the possibilities of the intervention of public means becomes, the more 
urgent the question why one should spend so much money for this (instead 
of for something else). In the case of law, the current ‘expansion of the 
legal domain’ (Verrechtlichung) into many areas of living has attracted 
increasing attention. So problem lies not only in the amount of rules that 
one’s own problems of knowledge and application raise but also in the 
question whether the boundaries of what can be handled adequately by 
legal means are overstepped. 
 
In this type of situation, both politics and administration are hopelessly 
overtaxed by the regulatory burdens which are placed upon them. In the 
system of the welfare state this ‘burden’ comes from the public. The needs 
and interests of the public are structurally coupled with politics (as well as 
with administration) via public opinion. Under these kinds of conditions the 
specific subsystem of politics is forced to assume excessive accountability 
for planning welfare provisions, for resolving social conflicts in the name of 
welfare, and for guaranteeing social conditions likely to foster general 
material security. “In order to do this, however, it is forced to employ the 
administration as a tool for addressing the conflicts and problems which it 
has politicised. The administration thus instrumentalised and colonised for 
the processing and transmission of collectively binding decisions, becomes 
overburdened by the welfare-related tasks which it is expected to execute.” 
(King & Thornhill 2003, 81.)  
 
In addition to its overburdening character, the system of the welfare state 
has an uncontrollable tendency to make political legitimacy contingent on 
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political steering – which means “the reduction of a difference” (Luhmann 
1997b, 42) – and specifically on the implementation of difference-
minimisation programmes between politics and the economy (see Luhmann 
1988b). The system of the welfare state thus has interventionist tendencies, 
especially towards the economic system. This is because “the politics of the 
welfare state that promotes inclusion prefers those function systems whose 
functions can be recalculated quickly and convincingly into gains for 
persons or groups. These are the economy, education and the health 
system.” (Luhmann 1990, 77.) From a systems-theoretical point of view, 
interventionist tendencies cause uncontrollable effects. Following 
Luhmann, no politics can effectively or productively manage the economy 
by directly applying power to money in the form of collectively binding 
decisions. The economy can only be managed by money, by the economy 
itself. 
 
The hopes of social policy are looking for and addressee who could even 
control the self-steering systems and think that it is politics. This leads to 
discrepancies of theoretical, but also of highly practical and, last but not 
least, of political importance, burdens the discourse between politics and 
economy, and revives the idea of the 19th century that what the economy 
cannot achieve (or cannot achieve satisfactorily) by self-steering must be 
performed by politics. But this idea collides hard with the fact of functional 
differentiation which excludes the replacement of systems by each other. 
No policy can renew the economy, parts of the economy or even single 
firms because for this one needs money and thus the economy. (Luhmann 
1997b, 42.)  
 
How, then, has this taxing and steering tendency of the system of the 
welfare state been developed? It would be easiest to accuse the oversized 
needs and interests of the public. However, we should remember that the 
subsystem of public is autopoietic, and cannot thus be the only reason 
behind the problems of the system of the welfare state. Rather, we must 
seek answers for the problem from the perspectives of inclusion and 
equality.  
 
In the Luhmannian approach, modern society is characterised by 
comprehensive inclusion of ‘persons’. This means that all members of a 
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society have to have access to the economy, to the legal system, to religion, 
to scientific knowledge, to the mass media and the political system. The 
realisation of the principle of inclusion in the functional domain of politics 
leads to the development of the welfare state. The system of the welfare 
state is the realisation of modern political inclusion. The idea of 
comprehensive inclusion, at a first sight, seems to be the solution for 
problems of inequality, because modern society seems to have resolved the 
problem of access and participation. But, as already analysed in chapter six, 
inclusion is by no means the solution, but part of the problem. Inclusion, 
although being general, is not equal. For example, a poor person is not less 
included in the economical subsystem than someone with high assets, and 
not to be represented politically is a special form of political inclusion. 
“Inclusion does not imply equality, but rather the modern shape of 
inequality can be regarded as an effect of in principle equal inclusions” 
(Nassehi 2004, 6). Systems-theoretically this means that social inequality is 
positioned at a right angle for functional differentiation and thus social 
inequality can develop into extreme forms which can endanger the social 
order. “The success of the function systems does not depend as a matter of 
principle on the prevention or reduction of social inequality. Neither 
economics, right and science nor religion or education has its purpose in the 
problem of inequality – on the contrary all these function systems now and 
then produce and enforce social inequalities.” (Nassehi 2004, 5.) However, 
there is one exception: the system of the welfare state, whose operations try 
to prevent the reproduction of inequality.  
 
The “postulation of equality” in the system of the welfare state is fraudently 
deployed as a device for legitimising “the steering mania of modern 
society” (Luhmann 1988b, 342). Its tendency to prevent inequality leaves 
the system of the welfare state as the final addressee for all tasks of crisis-
management and crisis avoidance. The differentiation of equal/unequal, and 
the resultant endeavour to alter this difference via the allocation of fiscal 
resources are founded on a misconception of what political systems can 
actually accomplish. Wherever these principles are internalised by the 
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system of the welfare state as programmatic directives, they lead inevitably 
– via steering – to an illegitimate fusion of areas of social activity which 
should remain distinct.  
 
From the Luhmannian perspective, the system of the welfare state has tried 
to create a type of inclusion which covers up inequality. In the case of 
overtaxing, this means that the system of politics has made more and more 
binding decisions and the administration has then externalised these by in 
the form of various laws47 and social benefits. In the case of steering, the 
system of the welfare state has tried to affect the inequal inclusion of other 
subsystems. This has meant a reduction of difference between the system of 
the welfare state and other functional systems, and created complex 
problems which the system of the welfare state cannot solve. As Luhmann 
(1993, 145) puts it: “This astonishing expansion of competence” or 
accountability of politics in the system of the welfare state “begets a 
gigantic and uncontrollable machinery for increasing risk.” The problems of 
overtaxing and steering must have, then, an effect also on confidence 
amidst the three subsystems: the public, politics and the administration. In 
particular, we must ask: How is confidence possible between the public and 






                                                 
47 It should be noted that this type of legislation cannot influence the character of the 
political system. Legislations, in practice, might be seen most accurately as the gradual 
reflexive adjustment, usually via slight alterations to administrative norms, or the 
subsystems of politics and of administration to their own internal and external 
environments, which include the public. The purpose of such legislation is always to 
secure an almost motiveless, unthinking acceptance of binding decisions. As a matter of 
fact, power gradually allows itself to be second-coded by law. The second-coding of power 
by law in a democratic legal state does not imply that law can actually decide over power, 
or that legitimacy of power hinges upon its accountability to substantively determined and 
prescribed standards. (King & Thornhill 2003, 179.) In the Luhmannian political system, 
politics inevitably comes before law, and law has a very limited capacity to make 
prescriptions for politics (Thornhill 2000, 62). 
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Confidence between the Public and Politics 
 
As I have pointed out, to trust is to take a risk. However, situations where 
we place our trust directly upon a politician as a ‘person’ are rare. Rather, 
the problems of the relation between the public and the system of the 
welfare state (precisely between the public and politics or the 
administration) are problems of confidence.48 Yetwe can say that we do not 
trust a politician. However, we must remember that he is the representative 
of the system of politics, which, in turn, is characterised by the fact that 
politics is more about the need for guidance than for other possibilities of 
action. The politician must, therefore, say more than he can do. “This 
situation results from the differentiation of systems, more exactly from the 
fact that the political system is a subsystem of society that is constituted 
along with society but sees it from the perspective of a social function and 
cannot control it” (Luhmann 1990, 111). Therefore, this type of 
untrustworthy politician must here be seen as a representative of the 
overtaxed and steering-oriented system of the welfare state, not as an 
untrustworthy ‘person’ with whom we have (had) a mutual relationship. 
However, the overtaxing and steering of the system of the welfare state 
have increased the need for confidence because they have also entailed 
more risks. 
 
The society of risk knows no heros and no masters. It also discontinues the 
traditional forms of reciprocity. It replaces the mechanism of 
aid/gratitude/aid by the organization of the welfare state, thus engendering a 
climate of rights in which far more help is provided than before – and at the 
same time disappointment increases. (Luhmann 1990, 102.) 
 
Luhmann (1993) makes a division between decision makers and those 
affected. In the case of the system of the welfare state, decision makers 
belong to the subsystem of politics because they make binding decisions. 
Respectively, the subsystem of public here plays the role of those affected. 
                                                 
48 Luhmann was already in his early work convinced that in the context of politics we 
cannot use the term trust. He emphasised that the place of trust as a conceptual category 
has here been taken by support. (Luhmann 1979, 54.) 
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Because of this, politicians take risks when they make binding decisions. In 
taking risks, they trust that they can manage these risks. The public cannot 
directly affect this risk-taking process. For the public, the same risk 
presents itself as a danger. As Luhmann (1993, 107) puts it: 
 
The risks the decision maker takes and has to take become a danger for 
those affected. Within the decision making process itself, one cannot avoid 
attributing consequences to decisions (otherwise the decision would not be 
recognizable as a decision). Thus one can also not avoid an attribution of 
future loss and has to accept it as risk where it cannot be entered under 
costs. The affected party finds himself in a quite different situation. He sees 
himself as endangered by decisions that he neither makes himself nor 
controls. Self-attribution is not possible for him. He is dealing with dangers 
– even when he sees and reflects that, from the point of view of the decision 
maker (perhaps himself!), it is a matter of risk. 
 
The public’s confidence in politics is systems-theoretically dependent on 
the binding decisions, or more precisely, the dangers which these decisions 
establish. Decisions which create many dangerous situations for the public 
are not convenient for the success and confidence of decision makers. 
Although the public cannot affect the binding decisions, it is able to 
evaluate risks and the possibilities of averting or managing them. In the 
system of the welfare state, the public can indirectly affect decisions and 
risks via elections.49 Elections are forms of communication for the 
(cognitive) decisions of confidence. In other words, through elections 
decisions (of confidence) socialise themselves. It must be mentioned that 
this type of confidence cannot be similar with the ‘early’ Luhmannian 
system trust, which “hardly becomes an open matter for public discussion” 
(Luhmann 1979, 57). Rather, the public can through elections (see Figure 7) 
express its confidence in politics and have some influence on the majority 
of the decision makers. Or, as Luhmann (1979, 55) puts it: “The citizen 
                                                 
49 Again, it is important to note the concept of time. Luhmann observes the important part 
that time plays in risk management. Political time is not the same as economic or legal 
time. The sequence of decisions within politics, according to Luhmann (1993, 165), “is 
punctuated by the [specific] time structures of the political system – for example, by the 
rhythm of elections, the legislative periods, the stability or instability of governments.” 
These structures also determine “the foreseeable consumption of time by the process of 
making decisions and seeking consensus” (Luhmann 1993, 165), which may be 
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cherishes certain expectations about what will be decided, possibly about 
what concerns himself or about the style of politics he favours, and he can 
use his vote as an expression of overall disappointment or satisfaction”. 
Public opinion largely defines the programs of politics, which in turn are 
based on the codes of politics: government and opposition.  
 
[Politics is coded] according to government and opposition depending on 
whether political groups enjoy a parliamentary majority, occupy the 
presidency and other important governments offices or not…Holding such 
offices is contingent, a process of selecting persons and programs and is 
under continual examination. Political election and the formation of 
governments serve to bring the code and program into agreement for a 
certain amount of time, i.e., to hand over the government to those who 
personally and professionally seem to offer the guarantee of carrying out 
the preferred political programs. This presupposes a structural uncoupling 
of code and program, i.e., the possibility of opening access to other 
programs. (Luhmann 1989, 86.)               
 
The contingent character of politics is connected with risks. If politics and 
administration have been able to manage the apparent risks, the decision 
makers quite probably succeed in keeping their positions. However, if 
binding decisions – elaborated and issued by the administration – have 
caused dangerous situations for the public, the situation is different. In this 
type of a situation, confidence in the functions of politics cannot be very 
high but there is an ‘order’ to new risk-taking (welfare) programs. In the 
system of the welfare state, the public’s confidence in politics is dependent 
on the functions of the latter. Systems-theoretically, this type of confidence 
goes thus hand in hand with risk-taking binding decisions, which can 
reduce complexity and make living less dangerous. Confidence gives the 
public a relatively stable attitude towards that which is contingent in a 
complex system of the welfare state, makes it live with the realisation that 
politics (as well as administration) could also be arranged otherwise. 
 
Confidence is also tightly bound to the legitimacy of the political system. A 
fundamental function of the entire political system, and especially of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
manipulated by strategic devices of urgency and delay, but only within politically 
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administration in the political system is, Luhmann (1970, 159) argues, “to 
ensure the acceptance of still indeterminate, random decisions – thus, to 
ensure the legitimacy of legality.” In other words, the content of legislation 
is established prior to legislation, and legislation has to make acceptable 
legal sense of this content. “The political system is legitimate, 
consequently, wherever it can pass its rulings off as legitimate: wherever 
these decisions act as trusted and accepted universal motives for obedience” 
(King & Thornhill 2003, 181). Confidence between the public and politics 
is, thus, largely affected by the administration, since “administration is the 
place where virtual forms of legitimacy can become virtually valid laws, 
and as such it is the defining point in the operations [and trustworthiness] of 
the political system” (King & Thornhill 2003, 181). 
 
Moreover, we must remember that politics (as well as the administration) is 
a self-referential system. Through socialised confidence expressed by 
elections (or public opinion), politics is capable of observing itself. I would 
call this a type of a mirror effect. The mirror of elections and public opinion 
makes the observation of observers possible. As Luhmann (1990, 216) puts 
it: “As a social system the political system, accordingly, uses public opinion 
to make itself capable of observing itself and developing corresponding 
expectational structures.” Confidence expressed via elections thus serves 
the self-referential closure of the system of the welfare state, especially the 
return of politics upon itself.  
 
In the end, the public cannot know how the system of politics uses its 
power and vice versa. Power arises under the condition of double 
contingency on both sides of relations. This means that for the politicians 
who have power, as well as for the public who is subordinate to it, the 
relation must be defined so that both could act otherwise. Thus, there is a 
situation of doubly double contingency. (Luhmann 1990, 156.) In this type 
of circumstances, the public can only assume that politicians would behave 
in a specific way. In other words, the public can only have confidence in 
                                                                                                                                                        
acceptable limits. 
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them – in no terms could their actions be predictable and familiar. Neither 
can politicians be sure that they will be re-elected. They just can have 
confidence in the public and hope that they have not caused too many 
dangerous situations.  
 
What makes the concept of confidence between the public and politics 
theoretically even more complex is the growing role of administration and 
mass media. As noted above, it is the performances of law and money that 
operate as structural couplings between administration and public. These 
performances externalise the binding effect for the public. Therefore, these 
performances play a vital role in building the relations of confidence 
between the public and politics, although they have been produced by the 
administration. Law and money have an influence on the public’s behaviour 
and, consequently, also their confidence in politics. Similarly, the mass 
media – which is a forceful system behind opinion building – and the 
information it produces affects the public opinion. It seems, then, that 
double contingency is not enough, but needs to make way for a more 
adequate replacement, namely, triple contingency50 (see Strydom 1999, 11). 
In addition to the public and politics, there is a third perspective, borne by 
the administration and especially by mass media, which observes what the 
public and politics are doing (communicating). By so doing, either the mass 
media or the administration has a constitutive impact on the social situation, 
and thus also on confidence between the public and politics.   
 
To sum up briefly, confidence between the public and politics socialises 
itself in the form of elections. The public’s confidence in politics is 
systems-theoretically dependent of the latter’s risk-taking binding decisions 
                                                 
50 By the concept of triple contingency, Piet Strydom (1999) emphasises the role of public 
communication, which embodies the societal power of definition. Public communication 
defines the communicational situation between I and Thou. From the Luhmannian point of 
view, the public is not the central force in the definition of power or reality. Moreover, 
there is no such concept as public communication. Triple contingency, from the 
Luhmannian perspective, means that there is also a third ‘black box’ which, one way or 
another, affects the process of ongoing communication. 
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that succeed in reducing complexity. Through socialised confidence, 
politics is capable of observing itself, or its success in reducing complexity. 
Because of double (or triple) contingency, confidence has become a very 
important element for stabilising the complex power relations between the 
public, politics and administration (and even the mass media).   
 
After studying the theory of the welfare state and the functions of 
confidence between the subsystems of the public and politics, I will next 
analyse the functions of trust and confidence in and between organisations 
and institutions. In the time of functional differentiation, it is evident that 
we are more dependent on various organisations and institutions than 
before. Furthermore, because of differentiation, organisations and 
institutions need each other to be capable of answering the challenges of 
growing complexity.  
 
In the case of the system of the welfare state, organisations play an 
important role, especially within the subsystem of administration. Luhmann 
calls these organisations bureaucracy. The bureaucratic organisations are a 
result of the requirements, placed upon the political system, to offer 
performances outside those areas organised by collectively binding 
decisions. The rights of the public can be conditioned with the help of 
bureaucracy (Luhmann 1990, 88). In the complex and overtaxed systems of 
the welfare states there are several organisations which have to work 
together. Therefore, organisations also have to trust each other. How, then, 
does the advanced trust between organisations function? 
 
The Decisions of Trust between Organisations 
   
Luhmann wrote two books directly discussing organisation theory: 
Funktionen und Folgen formaler Organisation (1964) and Organisation 
und Entscheidung (2000e). Luhmann characterises organisations as a third 
type of social systems (the others are society and interaction). In 
Luhmann’s theory, the concept of organisation is relatively extensive. It 
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includes businesses as well as organisations connected to politics, along 
with the systems of law, education, economy, religion, and the system of 
care (which I will examine later), which are usually referred to as 
institutions and administrations. Furthermore, voluntary organisations must 
be included within the concept of organisation. Companies, institutions and 
voluntary organisations are thus seen as variants of the social form of 
organisation (Jönnhill 2003, 25). I would say that organisations are the 
visible (organic and social) forms of function systems. Or, as Nassehi 
(2005, 12) puts it: “From Luhmann we learn that function systems are only 
structured by the connectivity of specially coded communications, but that 
empirical reality of such function systems is characterized by 
organizations”. We generally identify the different function systems by 
means of organisational manifestations rather than their media and codes. 
We identify the economic system as the sphere of corporations, banks, etc., 
and the political system (in this study particularly the system of the welfare 
state) is identified by parties and governments, for example. 
 
According to Luhmann (2000e), any form of organisation has four criteria 
through which it functions: membership, program, location and staff, and 
decisions. Any organisation may always decide whether or not a person 
belongs to it. Organisations always have definite, delimited goals 
‘compacting’ communication through the conditioning of a person’s 
behaviour and acting on the basis of roles. To realise their programmes, 
organisations have competent persons at specified positions. The function of 
the organisation is to make and execute decisions; the most important 
function of an organisation is decision-making. “Organisation systems 
continue themselves by connecting decisions to decision. Therefore 
organisations can be designated as decision machines” (Nassehi 2005, 9). 
As a matter of fact, through decision-making the organisation determines 
the other three criteria. Before a decision is made, there is considerable 
contingency and uncertainty, in other words, there are other possibilities. 
After the decision is made, either the contingency and uncertainty have 
dissipated, or the other possibilities remain. Although the decision is made 
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here and now, previous decisions affect it. “On the whole, decisions can 
only be made on the basis of other decisions. As organized events decisions 
thus cannot occur as individual events”. (Jönnhill 2003, 27.) An 
organisation that no longer makes decisions ceases to be an organisation.  
 
What, then, does decision mean in the context of organisations? As 
mentioned above, in Luhmann’s theory, a decision is not understood as a 
psychological mechanism, but as a matter of communication, not as a 
psychological event in the form of an internally conscious definition of the 
self, but as a social event. That makes it impossible to state that decisions 
already taken still have to be communicated. Decisions are 
communications; something that clearly does not preclude that one can 
communicate about decisions. Everything depends on what is explicitly or 
implicitly drawn upon when a decision is made. There is no such thing as 
an independent reality that may influence an organisation directly. As a 
closed system for decision-making, an organisation may only be defined on 
the basis of its own decisions. (Luhmann 2003, 32-33.) As a matter of fact, 
“the rationality of organizations is their ability to concentrate the allocation 
both of goods and observable decisions” (Nassehi 2005, 13). 
 
 For Luhmann, decision-making is a form of communication that limits 
contingency. Its function is, thus, to reduce or reconstruct the complexity of 
the organisation. As Jönnhill (2003, 27) notes: Decisions are made “in what 
could be designated a contingency room: before the decision is made, this 
room is open, or in other words there are other possibilities; after the 
decision is made it is closed, or in other words there were other 
possibilities.” For being able to reduce complexity, organisations must 
make their decisions under some kinds of rules or through different forms 
of compilations (Zusammenfassung). In the words of Herbert Simon (1949), 
one might talk about different forms whereby the “premises for decision-
making” are established (Luhmann 2000e). Through these decision 
premises a certain control of the decision process is made possible. This 
control is something the organisation (obviously) itself decides upon 
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(Jönnhill 2003, 27). In the case of administration, Luhmann (1990, 96) calls 
the premises for steering the bureaucratic organisations planning. “Planning 
is a specific way of producing a self-description of the system. In planning 
this self-description is oriented toward the future”. (Luhmann 1995, 471.) 
Therefore, by planning, the bureaucratic organisations of the system of the 
welfare state, for example, try to rationalise their decisions concerning to 
the performances of law and money.  
 
On the whole, decisions can only be made on the basis of other decisions 
within the same system, and organisations are thus established through 
decisions. Every organisation also has its own premises for decision-
making. Membership is decided through decisions, the program of an 
organisation is formulated in decisions, and the locations and staff are 
appointed through decisions by decision-qualified persons. (See Jönnhill 
2003, 28.) Through decisions, organisations produce also a special kind of 
rationality and make themselves visible. That is to say, by observing the 
decisions of organisations we are also somehow able to ‘observe’ the 
function systems, which by themselves are unobservable. This exemplifies 
the reason why bureaucracy plays a vital role in the system of the welfare 
state. It is bureaucracy that offers visible performances outside those areas 
organised by collectively binding decisions. The rationality of organisations 
is their ability to concentrate the allocation of both goods and of observable 
decisions. 
 
The accountability of organizations makes the structure of function systems 
observable - not that function systems can become really observable, but in 
terms of a special kind of getting some accountable informations about 
economy, politics, religion, art, or the legal order. If we want to observe 
function systems, we usually observe organizations, states and their 
organizations as the political system, decisions of courts as the legal 
systems, decisions and strategies of firms and companies as the economic 
systems and so on. (Nassehi 2004, 10.) 
 
Although Luhmann does not speak extensively about trust (or familiarity 
and confidence) between organisations, it seems quite obvious that 
organisational decision-making would be impossible without 
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interorganisational trust. This is because organisations are the dominating 
and most effective forms for fulfilling functions in almost all functionally 
differentiated subsystems. Furthermore, organisations may also operate 
between the function systems, and thus contribute in reconciling problems 
connected to their autonomy, chiefly in the form of negotiating systems. 
Because of their autopoietic character, organisations’ negotiations are not 
always simple and risk-free. 
 
This communication towards the outside presupposes autopoiesis on the 
basis of decisions. Internally, communication can only be produced within 
the recursive network of decisional activity, i.e. only as decision, otherwise 
it could not be recognised as [the organisation’s] own communication. 
Communication with the outside thus does not contradict the system’s 
operative closure; to the contrary, it presumes it. This also explains quite 
well why organisations’ communications are often flattened to become 
nearly meaningless or exhibit other specifics which are often quite 
surprising for their environment and can hardly be understood. (Luhmann 
1997, 834.) 
 
In today’s world – especially within the area of the system of the welfare 
state – we are dependent on different organisations and in one way or 
another, we must have confidence in them and consider them trustworthy. 
Similarly, organisations are dependent on one another. A person-
organisation relationship is not the same as an organisation-organisation 
relationship. In Luhmannian language, organisational decisions do not 
directly have any individual qualities.51 Organisation systems are not 
systems that are based on the mutual and immediate recognition of persons, 
but systems which have to make their decision-making processes visible 
(Nassehi 2005, 11; Luhmann 2000e, 149). Of course, organisations can be 
said to do things, say things and believe things in the sense that some or all 
their members do, say, or believe these things. It is also true that were there 
                                                 
51 Already the ‘early’ Luhmann was aware of this. He says that “organization in no way 
makes trust and distrust superfluous but it depersonalizes these mechanisms. The person 
who trusts no longer does so at his own risk but at the risk of the system; all he has to do is 
to take care still that no detectable mistakes creep into his own trusting”. (Luhmann 1979, 
93.) But, as can be noted, this argument cannot be valid in the context of advanced systems 
theory, because, here, Luhmann has not yet explicated the difference between psychic and 
social systems, nor developed the threefold concept of communication. In any case, the 
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no individuals to act as members of organisations, there would be no 
organisations. But as we have seen, organisations are built of decisions, not 
by individuals. One reason why organisations are not reducible to their 
members is that organisations survive changes in their membership. If a 
member dies or leaves, an organisation (such as a parliament or an old 
people’s home) persists almost the same. Not only are organisations 
logically distinct from their members; they differ psychologically and 
sociologically as well. The properties and attributes of organisations are not 
simply those of individuals. Thinking that we can reduce the sentiments 
within an organisation to those of individuals is incorrect, because one 
thereby ignores the fact that some of the sentiments of individuals may arise 
simply because they are members of these organisations and participate in 
the organisations’ activities, sharing the organisations’ sense of its history 
and culture. We also have to remember that in Luhmann’s theory, 
individuals are not parts of society but of its environment. They can thus be 
understood as parts of organisations but they are not those elements of 
organisations which affect society, only decisions are. 
 
The organisational frameworks for deliberation and decision-making are 
important factors for discussing trust between organisations. When 
organisations have clear procedures and strategies for decision-making, the 
‘determination’ of the organisation will be manifested, and constituted, by 
statements and decisions. If an organisation decides to trust another 
organisation, this trust emerges through a decision. In other words, an 
organisation decides to trust another one to be better equipped to reduce 
complexity. In this case, the risk involved is quite often higher than that 
involved in personal trust relationships. Organisational trust decisions 
concern wider populations than mutual trust decisions. Organisational trust 
cannot, thus, be built up by a single human being, and its emergence is a 
much larger process than processes leading to personal trust decisions. 
Trust ascribed to an organisation has the same sense and interpretations as it 
                                                                                                                                                        
concept of organisation explored here seems to be valid even in the context of advanced 
systems theory. 
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does for individuals, although the phenomena described are more complex, 
and it would be harder to gather evidence to confirm a statement to the 
effect that one organisation trusts another (see Govier 1997, 202).52  
 
Furthermore, the discontinuity of life also stresses the importance of trust in 
the operations of organisations. An organisation might make some 
decisions, which cause risky situations to another organisation. After that, it 
is the latter organisation’s turn to decide whether it should continue to trust 
the first one or not. This situation is typical in today’s world, where 
organisations are continuously under influence of new and strange 
organisations. In addition to this, organisations’ functioning principles have 
changed. They are now polyphonic, have many functions and are linked to 
many subsystems. These are the reasons why long-lasting processes have 
become more difficult and the need for risk-taking trust decisions has 
grown. Sinde decision-making is a social event, it can happen only once. 
Decisions produce new decisions which can be totally different from the 
earlier ones. Decision-making is not a process but an event. Trust, in 
Luhmannian thinking, is not a continued state similar to that implied by 
Parsons and Giddens (see Jalava 2001; 2003). The trusting relationship 
reached between organisations is not continuous but has to be rebuilt again 
and again. Thus, we should also reckon with the possibility of mistrust 
because there is always the possibility that the world which we take for 
granted gets turned upside down. Continuity may turn into discontinuity, 
just as trust may turn into mistrust. This is why ‘process’ needs to be 
                                                 
52 It can be said that in the context of organisations, trust is more strongly connected to the 
concept of contract than in the interpersonal context. The term ‘contract’ is used here in 
reference to devices for conducting exchanges. According to Stewart Macaulay (1963, 56), 
“contract involves two distinct elements: (a) Rational planning of the transaction with 
careful provision for as many future contingencies as can be foreseen, and (b) the existence 
or use of actual or potential legal sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to 
compensate for non-performance.” Trust decisions between organisations are one way or 
another connected to planning and contingency, but these decisions are not by themselves 
bound to potential legal sanctions. However, the process of creating trust between 
organisations is often enforced as formal and juridical contracts, which in turn are bound to 
sanctions. From a Luhmannian point of view, it even seems that these types of 
relationships no longer contain the risks that are present in ‘pure’ trust relationships. 
Therefore, I would say that organisational relations based on contracts are more tightly 
connected with confidence towards the authorities which enforce legal sanctions than with 
trust.  
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supplemented by ‘event’. Process largely expresses continuity while events 
allow for discontinuity. Or, as Luhmann (2000e, 26) says: “Process is to 
event as continuity is to discontinuity.”  
 
Similarly, I would like to remark that familiarity can be to trust as 
continuity is to discontinuity. In some cases, familiarity and processes are 
important for organisations. In the circumstances where organisations have 
a long collaboration history and are engaged in continuous processes with 
one another, we must talk about familiar or established practices and co-
operation. This type of interorganisational co-operation is not so much 
linked with new risk taking decisions and the need for trust, but refers to 
operating in a familiar world. However, familiar co-operation can be seen 
as a precondition for interorganisational trust and confidence. In the case of 
organisations, we cannot talk about confidence, which would be connected 
to psychic systems or consciousness. This is because organisations cannot 
have mental states. Rather, organisations’ decision-making processes are 
based on the principles of the subsystems’ functional communication. 
Organisations’ confidence in subsystems’ functions can be seen as built-in 
elements of the organisations’ decision-making processes.   
 
The public, politics and the administration as well as the numerous 
organisations they consist of and are affected by, have influenced the 
further differentiation of the system of the welfare state. In the next chapter, 
I shall study one such modern functional subsystem, the differentiation of 
which is largely affected by the welfare state (the public, politics, the 
administration and organisations). My aim is to examine whether the 
differentiation and the functions of the system of care (the duty of which in 
general is to help ‘people’) can be adapted to the context of Luhmannian 
systems theory. Care, when viewed as a secondary social system, is also 
surrounded by the problems of trust and confidence.    
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8. Care as Communication, Organisation and 
Interaction – Trust and the Luhmannian Subsystem 
of Care 
 
In this chapter I consider care, especially care of the elderly, as a functional 
subsystem of society, which has been built over the years in the modern 
welfare state. My hypothesis is that care consists of three important 
elements: communication, organisations and interaction. It should be noted 
that organisations also consists of communication, whilst interaction 
consists of communication and perception. This is because in Luhmann’s 
systems theory there are three social systems: society (consisting functional 
subsystems), interaction and organisation. But by using communication as 
an element of care I wish to lay special emphasis on communication at the 
level of the subsystem of care. I also address the connections between trust, 
confidence and the systems-theoretical model of care. Before going in 
greater depth into the possible Luhmannian model of care, I briefly set it in 
context by overviewing some influential theories of care. 
 
Realms of care 
 
Theories of care have been discussed since the 1970s, and in the 1980s the 
study of care was of particular interest to feminist scholars. British feminist 
researchers theorised the problems and structures of family (informal) 
caring. In the Nordic countries, on the other hand, the study of care has 
mainly emphasised the conceptualisation and structural importance of the 
professional (formal) model of care. Early Scandinavian feminist analyses 
of social policy argued that the entry of women into jobs in day care 
centres, schools, hospitals and old people’s homes – in the service of the 
welfare state – represented a form of ‘public patriarchy’ (see Siim 1987). 
Women were now doing work in the public sphere that they had 
traditionally carried out at home.  
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Over time, the concept of care was broadened to reflect both the changing 
nature of caring in practice and the complexity introduced by the 
increasingly comparative nature of scholarship. There are two basic 
approaches in the modern study of care. The first has concentrated on moral 
questions at an abstract theoretical level (see Ungerson 1990; Graham 
1991). The vast majority of work in this area focusses on relations among 
humans and the influence of societal structures on these relations (see 
Tronto 1993). The second approach is empirical and firmly linked to 
practice. Here, care has been studied from the perspective of the so-called 
social service state, and approaches have been developed in an attempt to 
cover both caregivers’ and patients’ viewpoints (see Waerness 2000; Sipilä 
2003). 
 
In British discussion, the distinction has been made between medical care 
and social care. The public sector, or the welfare state, is responsible for 
medically prescribed care. Social care, on the other hand, refers to everyday 
forms of care that are not medically determined. Social care belongs to the 
area of everyday routines and communication, and is a multi-dimensional 
concept. Of its different dimensions, particularly three merit emphasis: care 
as labour, care within a normative framework of obligation and 
responsibility, and care as activity that has costs both financial and 
emotional, which extend across public/private boundaries (Daly and Lewis 
2000, 85). This three-dimensional approach leads us to define social care as 
the activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and emotional 
requirements of dependent adults and children, and the normative, 
economic and social frameworks within which these are assigned and 
carried out.  
 
From the caregiver’s perspective, care basically means providing for the 
continuation of bodily existence (Tedre 2001). This lateral thinking has 
been inspired by the theory of the body revived in the 1990s. It conceives 
care in terms of physical work, physical encounters and close bodily 
contact. From the Luhmannian point of view this lateral thinking 
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emphasises the importance of organic systems. This approach stresses the 
fact that caring for the elderly (among others) is physically very demanding 
work. In other words, good will, professional knowledge and a warm heart 
are not enough to solve the problems of everyday care. Rather, it is the 
physical body of the caregiver which determines the possible alternative 
ways for care (Tedre 2001, 182).  
 
According to Carol Thomas (1993, 667), the concept of care is problematic 
in sociological research because it has been inconsistently defined and thus 
it means different things to different researchers, and because not enough 
theoretical work has been done on the relationship between different forms 
of care. In this work, a new interpretation of ‘care’ and caring will be 
developed as we discuss the concept of care from the perspective of 
Luhmann’s systems theory. I shall show how can care be conceived of as a 
subsystem of society, and how such a system functions. Finally, I shall, in 
the light of this analysis, deliberate upon whether it is more fruitful to 
conceive of care as a functional subsystem or, rather, as an organisation 
conditioned by primary subsystems.  
 
Differentiation and the Medium of Modern Care 
 
The emergence of the concept of modern care is here linked to the 
evolution of the welfare state and the idea of new caring professions. As a 
matter of fact, care itself is historically not a new phenomenon. In Western 
history, an obvious connection can be found between the concepts of 
culture and care. As Luhmann (1980) notes, Greek and Roman cultures had 
been, among other things, expressions of care, attention, and worship, as 
documented in phrases like cultura animi, Cicero’s name for philosophy, or 
cultura dolorum, an expression used for the Christian faith. 
 
The evolution of social policy dramatically changed the notion of care. 
Through public funding, welfare states have enhanced the operations of 
systems of care. Caring is an essential part of social policy in modern 
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welfare states. As said before, the welfare state is characterised most often 
as a state that supplies extensive social benefits to particular classes of the 
population and consequently must find constant sources of revenue for this 
purpose. This type of characterisation is connected intensively with 
economic growth. As noted in the previous chapter, diverging from this 
traditional approach, Niklas Luhmann formulates his concept of the welfare 
state with the help of the sociological principle of inclusion. Furthermore, 
in this work the welfare state is viewed as a triadic system, which consists 
of the public, politics and administration. The concept of the welfare state is 
itself a paradox or a fiction. For these reasons, I would not say that care 
would be a result of the differentiation of welfare state. Rather, the 
differentiation of the modern system of care is bound to the communication 
of the public, politics and administration.  
 
The differentiation of the modern system of care has largely been 
dependent on the binding decisions made by politics within the system of 
the welfare state. Behind these binding decisions the are needs and interests 
of the public. Furthermore, binding decisions have been externalised in the 
forms of law and money. From this point of view, through this cyclic model 
of the system of the welfare state, a modern system of care has gradually 
differentiated. It has an own specific function and symbolic medium, which 
are not directly affected by the public, politics or administration (or other 
subsystems of society).  
 
The symbolically generalised media establish all communicative codes that 
demarcate communication at the level of facts. Without these codes, the 
development or differentiation of the subsystems would be impossible. A 
code is understood as a basic and unambiguous binary preference in which 
a distinction is made between a positive and a negative value. In relation to 
the medium of the system of care, the code is to help/not to help. Not to 
help can here be seen as equal to a lack of need for care. In general, help 
can also be associated with many other things than caring. For example, a 
professor can lend a book for a student or we can ask advice from the locals 
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when lost in a strange city. Help can be spontaneous, connected to moral 
preferences or an organised program. In any case, its essential intention is 
to neutralise the needs of the target of help (Luhmann 1973, 22).  
 
According to Luhmann (1973, 32), from an evolutionary point of view, one 
can distinguish between three types of help. Firstly, in archaic societies help 
was directly connected to societal interdependencies. Secondly, in high 
cultural societies help was based on general and morally oriented structures 
of expectations. These types of societies were class societies, where help 
was based on laws and charity. Thirdly, functionally differentiated societies 
must have other ways to characterise help than interdependency, morals or 
charity. In these societies the needs for help are affected by functional 
subsystems. This is because functional subsystems can also weaken the 
inclusion or participation of ‘people’. For example, the economy can incur 
unemployment and homelessness. This type of society needs organised 
functional subsystems, which are specialised for helping or sustaining 
inclusion. In other words, the function of these systems is to prevent 
exclusion and seek means for re-inclusion through helping programs.53 
Functionalised help is not, then, bound (only) to individual motives but to 
professional interventions and programs as well (see Luhmann 1973, 34).   
 
These types of systems can also be called “secondary function systems” 
(sekundäres Funktionssysteme) because they enter into problems produced 
by primary function systems (Primärsysteme). As Luhmann (1997, 633) 
puts it: “One cannot expect that the problem [of exclusion] can be solved by 
[primary] function systems. Rather, we should be prepared to build a new, 
secondary function system, which is specialised in the consequences of 
                                                 
53 According to Dirk Baecker (1994, 100), one such system, specialised to prevent 
exclusion, is the system of social work, the binary code of which is also help/not help 
(Hilfe/Nicht-Hilfe). However, the system of social work may be better understood through 
the code fall/not fall (Fall/Nicht-Fall) developed by Peter Fuchs (2000). On the whole, this 
latter code expresses better the reasons why the system of social work is needed or 
differentiated. Through this code it becomes obvious that the other subsystems have made 
‘people’ fall into the area of the system of social work. Social work produces new chances 
(Möglichkeiten) for these fallen ‘people’. 
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exclusion.” 54 The emergence of this type of systems can also be linked to a 
new type of specialist-client relationships. In this type of systems, inclusion 
is achieved through interaction wherein the specialist expresses himself 
through general symbolic codes, which have a specific professional 
function (Stichweh 2005b, 21).  
 
The modern system of care is an example of such (secondary) systems, 
which are specialised in the consequences of exclusion and for sustaining 
inclusion. Care is the form of this system. The medium of this system is need 
for help, since care operations are formed to meet the needs of help caused 
by other subsystems. Niels Andersen (2003, 163) characterises the 
communication of the modern system of care in the following way: 
 
[If the symbolically generalised medium for a decision is need for help,] the 
organisational environment immediately emerges in the shape of needs that 
require specification. The decisions of the system of care become 
diagnostic and pertain usually to the specification of unspecified needs and 
interests of public (but also other subsystems). Care communication 
systematically designates new demands for methodical intervention, and 
decisions about care become decisions about this kind of intervention. 
 
Although the programs of care are changing all the time (for example, there 
are new professional requirements for caregivers and new needs of 
patients), the only medium of communication through which the 
reproduction and self-reference of the care system is possible is the need for 
help, the binary code of which is to help/not to help. In other words, the 
inclusion realises itself through interactive caring professions. The 
environmental changes of the care system are usually affected by the 
system of the welfare state – for example, the development of public health 
care and subsistence subsidies – have radically influenced today’s model of 
                                                 
54 Rudolf Stichweh (2005, 7) goes even further than Luhmann by arguing that “one 
specificity of modern society consists of the exclusions it effects nearly always being 
transformed into inclusions of another kind. Prisons and corrective educational institutions, 
psychiatric wards and old people’s homes are examples for institutions which are 
specialized on institutionalizing exclusions in ways which intend to effect new 
inclusions…There seems to be nearly no way to escape the inclusive grip of world society 
and this may be responsible for the reversibility of all exclusions as well as inclusions to be 
observed in this system which has no social environment anymore.” 
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the care system. On the one hand, the changes have pared down the 
functions of the traditional care systems (interdependency, moral and 
charity) but, on the other, they have created a more specialised and 
professionalised care system, the duty of which is to help/not help children 
and adults (especially the elderly).  
 
I will next specify the elements of contemporary care organisations which 
specialise in taking care of the elderly. It should be noted here that the 
system of care for the elderly is quite exceptional because the ‘persons’ it 
encompasses do not directly need help because of their weakened inclusion 
within the functional subsystems (economy, law or science etc,). Basically, 
they need help because of their deteriorating organic and psychic systems. 
Of course, this quite often consequentially leads to weakened inclusion 
within the functional subsystems. 
 
Care as Organisation 
 
One way to approach the practices and functions of the care system is to 
examine it as an organisation. It is through organisations that care within 
the system of the welfare state reaches its systemic status in society. In the 
same way that politics needs governments and ministries or the economy 
needs financial institutions to make decisions and reproduce their 
communication media (power and money), care also needs different 
organisations (e.g. old people’s homes) where decision-making and the 
reproducing of its communication media (need for help) is possible. Care 
organisations such as old people’s homes or informal voluntary associations 
specialised in taking care of the elderly are thus also established through 
decisions. Membership – those who are eligible or ineligible for care – is 
decided through decision-making. The program of the care organisation – 
how to provide care for the elderly – is similarly formulated. Location and 
staff – the latter fulfilling the professional and educational standards for 
taking care of the elderly – are designated and appointed through decisions 
made by qualified persons. Nonetheless, we must remember that every 
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decision in an organisation is based upon other decisions. For example, the 
programme of a care organisation is tightly bound to the composition of the 
staff. The more specialised social workers and nurses the organisation has, 
the greater its means for taking care of patients. 
 
The subsystems (law, the economy, politics etc.) are directly independent of 
each other, but intensely dependent on organisations that constitute their 
institutional backbone (Luhmann 2000e). However, organisations may also 
operate between the function systems, and thus contribute to reconciling 
problems connected to their autonomy, chiefly in the form of negotiating 
systems. No function system may consist of only one organisation (see 
Jönnhill 2003, 28-29). The system of care, likewise, consists of many 
different caring organisations. Furthermore, the same caring organisations 
could also operate between the different function systems – for example, 
care and economy – and work, then, through the medium of need for help 
as well as that of money. In practice, a nurse who belongs to the staff of an 
organisation can help a patient who is unable to walk by moving him in his 
wheelchair. In this case the medium of communication is need for help 
(help/not help). But if the director of the organisation has refused to buy 
wheelchairs, because of budgetary constraints, the nurse cannot help the 
patient by moving him in a wheelchair. In this case the medium of 
communication is money (have/not have). 
 
Today, there are a growing number of organisations – for example caring 
organisations – that no longer have a primary connection to a single 
function. Andersen (2003, 167) calls these kinds of organisations 
polyphonic:  
 
An organization is polyphonic when it is connected to several function 
systems without a predefined primary function systems…the polyphonic 
organization emerges as a result of the way that the function systems 
explode beyond their organizational forms. In this context explosion means 
that the function systems expand their themes without leaving their 
operational closure, they expand what was included as political, 
economical, juridical, pedagogical etc. Themes, including organizations, are 
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articulated, based on the code of the function systems. What happens is that 
the symbolically generalized communication media become available to a 
much greater number of communication forms that originally employed by 
the functionally related forms. 
 
This type of explosion has occurred also in the sphere of care. In the 
developed welfare states (such as Finland and Sweden), four different 
models of providing care can be found (see Sipilä 2003, 29). The first one is 
informal care, which has always been important. The provider of care, in 
this case, is a family member, a relative or a close friend. We could say that 
the informal model represents a traditional form of care. It is more 
homophonic (linked firmly to the primary codification: help/not help) than 
polyphonic. Informal care is surely – at least in the case of the family – 
linked also to feelings of intimacy and love (see more Luhmann 1998). 
Secondly, there is the formal or public model, more complex than the 
informal one. Here the provider is a municipality and the care services are 
meant only for its inhabitants (the taxpayers) who need them. The care is 
dispensed by professionals and controlled by the public administration. The 
public model of care is thus polyphonic: the media of politics (power: 
govern/governed), the economy (money: pay/not pay or have/not have), 
jurisdiction (law: legal/not legal or lawful/unlawful) as well as of care (need 
for help: help/not help) are all involved. Third is the commercial model, 
offered by companies and primarily bound to the media of the economy and 
care. It is meant for people who are able to buy it. Fourth is the voluntary 
model of care, received through voluntary action. This model is also 
polyphonic. It consists of the media of care, the economy, as well as that of 
law, which controls the structure and activity of the voluntary association. 
In spite of the multiplicity of the models of care organisations, it is either 
families or the public administration that are liable to provide the elderly 
with care. 
 
However, the explosion and universality of the function systems have not 
led to the dissolution of their boundaries. The care system is still 
autopoietic, closed and reproduced only by itself. In other words, the care 
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system is produced and reproduced by professional care communication. 
Organisational polyphony implies more links between function systems, 
organisations being these links. They can be seen as structural couplings of 
the system, through which the system can respond to the demands and 
actions of the environment. Still, a direct connection between system and 
environment is impossible. A polyphonic organisation is one that describes 
itself through many codes and not just one (unlike function systems). In 
other words, an organisation chooses first in which subsystem’s context it 
would function, and then communicates in order of the code by the chosen 
subsystem.  
 
To summarise, the differentiation of the care system is intimately linked to 
the communication of the public, politics and administration, which in turn 
has developed the type of inclusion that encompasses ‘people’ who cannot 
carry out their daily routines by themselves. Inclusion is maintained here 
through specialised and interactive caring professions, which are tied to the 
medium and code of the care system. The medium of the care system is 
need for help and the primary code is to help/not help. Although the care 
system is always autopoietic (it reproduces itself through its own elements) 
it consists of different organisations (among other things). The fact that 
makes organisations visible and societal is their ability to make decisions. 
Through decisions, organisations determine their membership, location and 
staff, and programme criteria. Today, a function system cannot consist of 
merely one organisation, and care organisations, as well as others, have 
become polyphonic. They must also make more risk decisions and create 
strategies for solving the growing problems related to care. In other words, 
they have to make decisions based on a future which is full of complexity 
and contingency.  
 
Thus far care has been studied as a medium of communication and the 
elements of contemporary organisations of care have been also specified. 
However, the system of care does not consist only of organisations, and 
care cannot be seen only as a technical communication medium. It should 
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be noted that a great part of care is interconnected with everyday practices, 
in this case between a caregiver (specialist) and a patient (client). This 
becomes evident when I examine the third element of care: interaction.   
    
Care as Interaction 
 
As noted before, the system of elderly care is quite exceptional because the 
‘people’ (or communicative actors) it encompasses are old and their 
communicational capabilities are often very limited. That is to say, ‘people’ 
who are eligible for care can no longer do without everyday care. 
Furthermore, their abilities to communicate in other subsystems are also 
limited. It is thus more through a person’s inability than ability to 
communicate that he reaches inclusion to the system of care within the 
welfare state. Despite this, there have to be minimal rules or conditions by 
which communication is possible. That is to say, the patient must 
communicate one way or another so that the system of care can be 
functional, and the patient can be a ‘carrier of communication’.  
 
The minimal conditions for communication to come about us is, that the 
part of ego be played by a system that is not completely determined by its 
own past and so can react to information as such. In contrast to the mere 
perception of informative events, communication comes about only because 
ego distinguishes two selections and can manage the difference. The 
inclusion of this difference is what makes communication communication, 
a special case of information processing per se. The difference lies basically 
in the observation of alter by ego. Ego is in a position to distinguish the 
utterance from what is uttered. If alter knows that he is being observed, he 
can take over this difference between information and utterance and 
appropriate it, develop it, exploit it, and use it to steer the communication 
process. (Luhmann 1995, 143.) 
 
In the case of elderly care, a patient as a communicative actor (ego) is able 
to react only slightly to information. This is because of the weakened 
capacity of his organic and psychic systems. He cannot understand 
everything the caregiver (social worker or nurse) says and does, and thus is 
not able to make further selections or reproduce communication (or at least 
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his ability to reproduce it is very limited). As far as a patient can distinguish 
two selections – information and utterance – and can manage the difference, 
and furthermore through then understand as well as reproduce 
communication, he can be considered to be as a ‘carrier of communication’. 
But usually when it comes to the communicational media of care (need for 
help), patients’ capabilities to appropriate, develop and exploit 
communication are, one way or another, very finite.  
 
However, the caregiver’s communication is largely affected by the patient’s 
communication. Caring is seen here as a way to support, through 
communication, the patient in his actual everyday routines and to give him 
everything he needs. Being capable of caring, the caregiver must also be 
able to understand the patient’s communication. This understanding 
incorporates the practical, experiential and professional qualities of the 
caregiver (or the caregiver’s psychic system). For example, if a social 
worker or nurse is highly skilled and experienced he is able to infer a 
patient’s communication – from speech, gestures or even bodily functions – 
better than those who have worked in an old people’s home only for a short 
time. Of course, in some cases, caring for close relatives can beget better 
terms of reference for understanding the patient’s communication. Is there, 
then, anything meaningful left to be constituted by a subsystem of care, 
when mutual and threefold communication between a caregiver and patient 
is impossible? Is the patient a ‘carrier of communication’ anymore? Surely 
the caregiver alone cannot produce communication and improve inclusion 
based on communicative caring professions. 
 
If a patients’ capability to communicate in functional subsystems is in one 
way or another limited, it would be better to examine mutual care as 
interaction. Basically, it can be said that the care system relies heavily on 
face-to-face interaction. It takes place in old people’s homes, where the 
physical presence of caregiver and patient is guaranteed. While societal 
subsystems such as politics, economy, law or science have become less 
dependent on interaction situations and on the existence of personal bonds 
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between partners, care has evolved in another direction. Systems of 
interaction, for Luhmann, are confined to exchange between people who are 
present. ”Presence is the constitutive and boundary-forming principle of 
interaction systems, presence means that people’s being together there 
guides the selection of perceptions and marks out prospects for social 
relevance.” (Luhmann 1995, 414-415.)  
 
Care of patients who have limited resources for communication, is more 
bound to simple interaction than complex communication processes 
consisting of several and continuous selections. Already a threefold 
communication is quite often impossible and a caregiver’s actions ensue his 
perceptions more than an understanding of the uttered information of a 
patient. In any event, interactions between people may use and operate 
upon communications in a self-referring way, but these communications do 
not automatically reach the subsystemic level of communication. Although 
care is here seen as a simple social system from the point of view of 
communication, I would argue that these interactions are often constituted 
by the subsystem of care. In the case of care, even simple interactions are 
constituted by the subsystem of care because they are connected to 
functions of help. In this type of situation, patients are still constructions of 
the care system’s communication. Therefore, these interactions also become 
a part of functionally differentiated society and we cannot say that limited 
capability to communicate would exclude a patient from the subsystem of 
care.  
 
Care as interaction is not thus only a simple social system, because these 
interactions (mainly care givers’ treatments to a patient) can be regarded as 
closely tied to the professions and functions of help. As a matter of fact, 
through these professional interactions care givers (specialists) maintain the 
patients’ (clients’) inclusion within the system of care.The very meaning of 
caring is to support, and make this natural progression possible; to promote 
and maintain life. Put briefly, the system of care sustains the inclusion of 
‘people’ within society.  
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It seems obvious that the possible systems-theoretical model of care is 
closely connected to simple interaction, because patients who reach a 
condition of inclusion in the system of care often have very limited 
resources for complex communication. Limited communication resources 
do not mean that a patient would not be a ‘carrier of communication’. Care 
can also be seen as simple interaction that is constituted by the functional 
subsystem of care. This is because these interactions are closely connected 
to functions of help.  
 
Some Problems of the System of Care 
 
In the previous chapters I have analysed care as a functional subsystem of 
society and examined it through Luhmannian concepts. However, the 
position of secondary subsystems, such as the system of care, is not clearly 
defined in Luhmannian systems theory. Secondary subsystems are 
conditioned by primary subsystems and, consequently, can be seen as 
operating through the media and codes of these primary systems. It is 
therefore not self-evident that the only way to conceptualise care in the 
Luhmannian framework would be to see it as a separate secondary system.  
 
Firstly, although it can be said that the system of care has been built over 
the years in the modern welfare state, it is obvious that the development and 
differentiation of the medical system has affected today’s model of care at 
least as much as the operations of the welfare state. Besides, caring would 
be impossible without specialised education (the system of education), new 
scientific developments (the system of science), new products of markets 
and economic resources (the system of economic) and legal regulation (the 
system of law). Therefore, care cannot only be conceived as an autopoietic 
secondary system because it is largely conditioned by primary subsystems. 
As said before, the very meaning of care is to sustain the inclusion of 
‘people’ within society or primary subsystems. This type of inclusion is not 
necessarily sustained by the means of care but by medical professions, 
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different payments, political decisions etc. In other words, help concretises 
itself through the media and codes of primary systems and the very 
meaning of help is to enable the functions of meaning-processing systems 
(consciousness and communication) within primary systems. 
 
Secondly, we can ask does care have a functional code – help/not help – 
that demarcates communication at the level of facts. All distinctions are not 
important for system formation. It could be objected that it is impossible to 
define such a specialist-client relationship within care, in which the 
systems’ inclusion is achieved through interaction constructed only by the 
code of help/not help.  
 
A possible alternative would be to analyse care only as a program or 
organisation, which would function on the grounds of the media and codes 
of primary systems. As said before, there are now more models for 
organising care than before. Caring organisations cannot be seen as 
homogenous because they are polyphonic. “Polyphonic organisation is one 
that describes itself through many codes and not just one” (Andersen 2003, 
169). Caring organisations can, through specialist-client relationships, 
prevent exclusion and sustain inclusion but they do this in different ways. 
The inclusion of organisations is thus achieved through interaction in which 
the specialist (as a representative of the organisation) expresses himself 
through several symbolic codes. For example, although being medically 
sick, a patient cannot get a bed from a private old people’s home if he does 
not have enough money. Here inclusion is prevented and help disqualified 
by the economic code (have/not have). Furthermore, it would be 
unprofitable to offer a bed for a patient who does not have enough money. 
In this situation, a patient can be directed to get help from other 
organisations, wherein his inclusion within the primary systems can be 
sustained. After all, the multiplicity and polyphonic character of caring 
organisations confirm the supposition that it is very difficult to specify the 
boundaries and structure of the system of care.  
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In despite of a speaking about systemic or organisatorical model of care, the 
fact remains that the limited communication resources of patients affect 
their abilities to trust. They do not have many choices besides trusting in the 
caregivers. Trust between caregivers and patients plays a crucial role in the 
system of care and in caring organisations. In the following section I will 
attach the elements of care (systemic communication, organisation and 
interaction) to the ideas of trust and confidence. I will also give an overview 
of the way in which the interaction between caregiver and patient can be 
intimate and connected to the communication of love.     
 
Trust and Care 
 
A care provider is specifically expected to demonstrate impartial concern 
for a patient’s well-being. Patients trust that caregivers will take care of 
them as well as they can. (See Davies 1999.) But what actually is this kind 
of trust? In relationships resulting from a lack of choice or occurring in a 
context of inequality, such as that between a care provider and patient, a 
form of involuntary trust may appear to exist. However, as trust cannot be 
coerced into existence (see Misztal 1996), the involuntary trust evident in 
these relationships is more correctly seen as a form of dependency. 
Nonetheless, where institutions such as formal models of care are 
established by the system of the welfare state to protect the dependent 
partner, they may also provide the basis for the emergence of voluntary 
trust within the relationship.  
 
As noted before, in the context of advanced systems theory, trust 
concretises itself socially in communication, it is a decision that reduces the 
complexity of the subsystems. It demands mutual commitment and can only 
be put to the test by both sides becoming involved in it, in a fixed order: 
first the truster, and then the trustee. Furthermore, the actors who engage in 
the process of trust must recognise the situations that involve trust. It is also 
impossible to demand the trust of others; trust can only be offered and 
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accepted. Trust must also be earned. The role of trust is emphasised in a 
risk society, as we do not need trust in a familiar world or familiar situation. 
Trust presupposes a situation of risk. It requires a previous engagement on 
one’s part; that is to say, to trust is to take a risk.  
 
Through caring, caregivers try to help patients and increase their feelings of 
security. Optimal care requires co-operation or mutual communication 
between patient and caregiver. At the centre of care, provision is the 
communication between a patient and a provider, and caregivers must know 
the exact situations where the building of the trust relation between them 
and their patients is possible. The effective delivery of care requires not 
only the care service but also its acceptance and use by the patient. A 
trusting relationship between caregiver and patient can have a direct 
therapeutic effect. Some form of trust is always important in providing a 
context in which caregivers and patients can work co-operatively to 
establish care objectives and seek reasonable ways of achieving them 
(Gilson 2003, 1459).  But care givers cannot force patients to trust them. 
They must earn the trust.  
 
How, then, are trust, risk and care connected to each other? When elderly 
persons begin residence at an old people’s home they face a completely 
new environment, where everyday routines and schedules are very different 
from their own and where many things are difficult to comprehend. They 
are thus living in a world of risks or strangeness because the environment is 
no longer familiar. From the caregiver’s point of view, new patients are 
strange as well, and there is a great need for trust. Patients’ relatives and 
friends also take risks when they decide that their close ‘person’ should go 
to old people’s home. Therefore there is also a great need for trust between 
caregiver and relatives or friends of a patient. Thomas (1993, 652) calls this 
type of care relationship – between individuals who usually are unknown to 
each other – a contingent caring relationship. Almost every 
communicational meeting between unfamiliar caregivers and patients – in 
contingent caring relationships – is a risk-based selection. But without these 
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selections, trusting relationships between caregiver and patient would be 
impossible.  
 
Interpretated from an advanced Luhmannian point of view, when the caring 
relationship is bound to simple interaction and not more complex 
subsystemic communication, it is no longer mainly a question of trust, but 
of familiarity or confidence. However, as said before, in the case of care, 
even simple interactions can be constituted by the possible subsystem of 
care or professional caring organisations’ decision-making process. As long 
as a patient is capable of thinking, he is (usually) also capable of 
communicating one way or another. However, these communications are no 
longer so complex that there would be a need for trust which is linked to 
risks. If anything, this type of simple interaction recognised by the 
subsystem of care or the caring organisations can be connected to 
familiarity and confidence. A patient who has limited resources of 
communication can only have confidence in the functions of the system of 
care or caring organisations, or in a caregiver (a representative of the 
system).   
 
This does not mean that familiarity and simple interaction would not exist, 
although a patient would still be capable of threefold communication and 
thus capable of making communicative trust decisions. In the case of care, 
familiarity can also be seen as a precondition for trust. Familiarity increases 
within a time. Long-lasting caring relationship in the familiar sphere might 
also become intimate, not in the sexual but in the emotional sense. This, of 
course, brings intimacy and love to the relationship. The problem of love, 
however, “lies in the fact that communication is highly personalized, which 
is taken to mean that one endeavours to set oneself off from other 
individuals” (Luhmann 1998, 20). This can be achieved by talking about 
oneself, or by making one’s grasp of the topic the hub of conversations. 
“The more individual, idiosyncratic or strange one’s own standpoint or 
view of the world, the more improbable that it will find the consensus of 
others or meet with their interest.” (Luhmann 1998, 20.) Love or the 
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trustworthiness based on it cannot thus be achieved through impersonal and 
strange views of the world. Through love, a caregiver is able to show 
himself trustworthy only if he is capable of showing himself familiar and 
not strange. Furthermore, he has to internalise patients’ subjectively 
systematised views of the world. Same preferences also touch a patient. In 
Luhmann’s (1998, 21) words: 
 
[In love,] a universal frame of reference is expected of the other partner in 
the sense of a constant consideration of oneself in all possible situations. In 
other words, the informative content of all communication is constantly 
being enriched by the ingredient of ‘for you’.  
 
The kind of trust relations noted above occur only at the interpersonal level. 
They do not explain wider processes of trust within the system. In addition 
to interpersonal communicative elements, there must also be other ways to 
build trust. This is where confidence comes back into play because anyone 
who has confidence in a system places his confidence in its function, not in 
‘people’. 
 
As said before, a tactical and supportive framework functions behind 
confidence. If trust involves risk-oriented communication, confidence, in 
turn, is an element of psychic systems or thoughts (which can be socialised 
in various ways). That is to say, only psychic actors, not communicative 
actors, can have or build confidence. Furthermore, the analytical distinction 
between trust and confidence is essential because it allows us to dispose of 
the muddled-though, frequently advanced idea of ‘trust in organisations’. 
Organisations are factual arrangements that provide incentives and options 
to actors who are connected to or live in them. As such, they are factual 
constraints of action, the durability and validity of which we can view with 
confidence. Trust, then, concretises itself at interpersonal level, but what we 
feel or have against organisations can be called confidence. Nonetheless, as 
I have noted, confidence cannot be totally separated from trust. Confidence 
affects trust and vice versa. 
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‘Persons’ who accept moving to an old people’s home always have some 
level of confidence in these institutions. This type of confidence works at 
the level of thoughts (psychic systems). Annette Baier (1994, 105) has 
proposed interpreting this type of trust (that I here call confidence) as 
“letting other persons take care of something the truster cares about, where 
such ‘caring for’ involves some kind of discretionary power”. For her, trust 
implies “reliance on another’s competence and willingness to look after, 
rather than harm things one cares about which are entrusted to the 
caregiver” (Baier 1994, 128).55 This type of confidence has been built 
because of patients’ socialisation and cultural background. In other words, 
familiarity affects indirectly on confidence. In the case of the system of 
care, a level of confidence is largely dictated by the actions of the system of 
the welfare state, the medical system, and the inclusive caring professions.  
 
For example, in the context of social Catholicism – a philosophy that to 
varying degrees underpins all of the Central and South European welfare 
states – the giving and receiving of care is part of the normal reciprocity 
between individuals who are defined by the nature of their embeddedness in 
the range of social relations (see Daly 1999). Here, family solidarity has 
been understood as a readiness to care for one another, and in line with this 
philosophical thread, social policies have been constructed in such a way as 
to enable the family to carry out the caring functions and programs 
considered as normal and appropriate to it. Indeed, the very role of the state 
                                                 
55 Baier’s approach to trust is quite a sensitive one. She wants to examine the concept of 
trust from a feminist perspective. According to Baier, women operate in a different system 
of ethics than men. Males base their ethic on obligation (or justice), whereas women 
depend on ethics of caring (trust). The history of moral philosophy, having been written by 
men, does not account for this gender difference. As Baier (1986, 248-249) says: “It 
becomes fairly easy to see one likely explanation of the neglect in Western moral 
philosophy of the full range of sorts of trust. Both before the rise of a society which needed  
contract and commercial device , and after it, women were counted on to serve men, to 
raise their children to fill the roles were expected to fill and not deceive their men about the 
paternity of these children. What men counted on one another for, in work and war, 
presupposed this background domestic trust, trust in women not merely no to poison their 
men, but to turn out sons who could trust and be trusted in traditional men’s roles and 
daughters who would reduplicate their own capacities for trust and trustworthiness. Since 
the women’s role did not include the writing of moral treatises, any thoughts they had 
about trust, based on their experience of it, did not get into our tradition.” 
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is defined in such as way as to allow the family the first right to care (Daly 
and Lewis 2000, 288). With this type of welfare policy, the elderly have 
more confidence in their families – as well as trust in their family members 
– than in other forms of care and caregivers. But in countries that have a 
broad public care policy, for example in Scandinavia, the situation is of 
course quite different.  
 
Trust, then, is a key factor in building relationships between caregivers and 
patients. Building trust at the interpersonal level always requires at least 
two actors: the caregiver and the patient. When these are unfamiliar with 
each other, they live in a situation of risk and complexity. The reducing of 
this complexity is possible with the help of trust. However, trust building 
would be impossible without familiarity and confidence. Confidence affects 
our thoughts and is a product of our thoughts. It can be socialised in various 
ways, and it can indirectly affect our ability to trust and reduce complexity. 
If people have confidence in the system of care and caring organisations, it 
means that they know the system’s constituent elements (the care policy 
and regimes of the system of the welfare state). Without this confidence it 
would be much more difficult to build the interpersonal trust relations 
between caregivers and patients. 
 
To conclude, in this chapter I have attempted to clarify the emergence or 
differentiation and functions of the subsystem of care, especially care of the 
elderly, from the perspective of Luhmann’s systems theory. The most 
important elements of the Luhmannian system of care are represented in 
Figure 9. I would like to conclude with some general observations 




Figure 9. The basic elements of the subsystem of care. 
 
 
First, the possible differentiation of the care system can be closely linked to 
the notion of inclusion within the system of the welfare state. As shown in 
figure 9, care consists of professional communication, the code of which is 
to help/not help. From a systems-theoretical point of view, communication 
is the most important element of the system of care. A system of care can 
be seen here as an encompassing system that includes anything which 
appears as caring communication. This means that the system makes 
possible the functions of caring organisations and interaction connecting to 
care. Through communication, the functional communication and simple 
interaction between a care giver and a patient or an organisation become 
possible and tenable. 
 
Second, the visible elements of various forms of care consist of different 
organisations (see figure 9), for example old people’s homes, whose duty it 
is to make decisions, through which the development and extension of care 
is possible. Today, care organisations can be seen as polyphonic, hence 
their only primary code is not to help/not help, but they also have to answer 
to financial, political, medical and legal demands.  
 
Third, with regard to its systemic form and organisation, care also consists 
of interaction between caregiver and patient, which is the third element of 
care (see figure 9). What makes the possible system of care exceptional, 
compared to other subsystems, is the fact that the human beings it includes 
                        The System of the Welfare State 
                                        System of Care 
                                 Professional Communication 
                                         (help/not help) Organisation Interaction 
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have, one way or another, a limited communicating ability. This is what 
makes even a simple interaction very important. Even though the mutual 
communication between a caregiver and patient ends, caring takes place in 
the society because there is still simple interaction, which is connected to 
the function of help and is thus constituted by the functional subsystem of 
care.  
 
However, some problems remain that question the subsystemic character of 
care. Because care is largely conditioned by primary systems, it cannot only 
be conceived as an autopoietic secondary system. Rather, help offered by 
the system of care concretises itself through the media and codes of primary 
systems, and the very meaning of help is to enable the functions of 
meaning-processing systems within primary systems. Therefore, a possible 
alternative would be to analyse care only as a program or organisation, 
which would function on the grounds of the media and codes of primary 
systems. Care organisations’ inclusion is achieved through interaction 
wherein the specialist expresses himself through several symbolic codes. 
 
Last, it would be almost impossible to imagine the possible subsystem of 
care or caring organisations functioning without trust between caregivers 
and patients. Communicative trust within care is needed because patients 
cannot manage everyday routines without help, and are dependent upon the 
caregivers. Caregivers can also make their work easier if they show 
themselves to be trustworthy and capable of reducing the strangeness and 
complexity of the patients’ new environment. Furthermore, both patients 
and caregivers must have confidence in the caring organisations as well as 
the functions of the system of care. Without such confidence it would be 
much harder, if not impossible, to build mutual trust relations. As I have 
emphasised on several occasions, confidence needs trust and vice versa. 
Finally, a caring relationship is usually bound to simple interaction, which 
is based on norms and familiar routines. This type of caring relationship is 
no longer connected to risk-based selections and there is no need for trust. 
Long-lasting caring relationship might also become intimate. However, 
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because even simple interaction in the case of care is constituted by the 
possible subsystem of care or caring organisations, patients can in these 
situations – in addition to familiarity – also have confidence in the functions 























Conclusion: Why Did the Question of Trust 
Disappear? 
 
In the above chapters I examined the problems and functions of trust (as 
well as familiarity and confidence) in Luhmannian systems theory. I also 
analysed the general systems theory, Luhmann’s conception of the welfare 
state, organisation theory, and the problematics of the system of care and 
caring organisations. I will now briefly sum up the most important results 
concerning the main research problem of this work, trust.   
 
I began my analysis by examining Luhmann’s own writings on trust. For 
Luhmann, familiarity, confidence and trust are different modes of asserting 
expectations. Our ability to trust other people is not a self-evident thing, but 
needs familiarity as its historical background. However, because of growing 
complexity, living in a completely familiar world is no longer possible. 
Therefore, behind the need for trust is the growing complexity of society. 
Following Luhmann, I have grasped trust as a decision through which one 
can reduce complexity. Trust, for Luhmann, is principally interpersonal. 
The decision to trust is oriented towards the future; to trust is to take a risk. 
However, personal trust is not enough to explain the wider processes. This 
is where confidence (or system trust) comes into play. Following Luhmann, 
to be able to act within the context of different systems (economy, politics, 
law etc.) we must have confidence in their functions. Confidence is general, 
and not personal, as is trust.   
 
Chapter Three dealt with Talcott Parsons’ and Georg Simmel’s concepts of 
trust, which have had an important influence on Luhmann’s research in this 
area. I also considered Anthony Giddens’ and Piotr Sztompka’s concepts of 
trust, which in turn have been largely affected by Luhmann. The boundaries 
of a system, its particular form, and the family’s socialising role, were 
important milestones in Parsons’ as well as Luhmann’s conceptions of trust. 
The connections between Simmel and Luhmann, in turn, can be 
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summarised as follows: both coupled trust with the problem of knowledge 
and ‘non-knowledge’ – how to renew trust was an important question for 
Simmel as well as Luhmann – and Simmel’s theory of the stranger also 
influenced Luhmann. Giddens and Sztompka, like Luhmann, emphasise 
that trust has something to do with risks. Giddens follows Luhmann in 
distinguishing trust in people and trust in systems. Sztompka does not make 
this distinction, but argues that the functions of trust occur at the personal, 
communal and systemic levels. 
 
In Chapter Four I outlined the basic concepts of Luhmann’s autopoietic 
systems theory: autopoiesis, interpenetration and three-part communication, 
evolution and differentiation. This was because only by means of these 
theoretical ideas is it possible to examine the functions and problems of 
Luhmannian trust in the context of advanced systems theory. These ideas 
provided the necessary backgroung for Chapter Five, where I studied 
Luhmann’s own theory of trust in the context of his advanced systems 
theory. From this point of view, familiarity can be seen as a precondition 
for trust as well as for confidence. It is a part of simple interaction, but has 
no great importance at the level of subsystemic communication. Trust as a 
decision is a part of communication and, thereby, a part of social systems. 
Confidence, for its part, is a part of thought or psychic systems, which, 
because of interpenetration, affects the decision to trust. Similarly, trust 
indirectly affects our confidential thinking. However, confidence can be 
concretised through the media of subsystems or in some other way, such as 
through elections and opinion polls. Unlike trust, confidence is not 
connected to risk but to danger. 
 
In the last three chapters the fruitfulness of the Luhmannian concepts of 
familiarity, trust and confidence was tested in the contexts of ‘strangers’, 
the welfare state and care. The first of these concentrated on interpersonal 
problems of trust, whereas in the latter two the problems of confidence and 
trust were discussed in the context of the functions of systems and 
organisations. In Chapter Six I examined the problematics of the ‘stranger’ 
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and trust. The Luhmannian concept of trust fits a society of ‘universal 
strangers’ well, where ‘persons’ are invisible or omnipresent. All are, as 
Rudolf Stichweh would say, indifferent to each other. In this type of society 
we do not register ‘persons’ as individuals, but rather, as ‘carriers’ of 
functional communication. These ‘indifferent strangers’ are not familiar to 
us. Therefore, the role of communicative trust becomes essential because 
through accepting or providing trust, the ‘indifferent stranger’ becomes 
important to us.We only trust strangers who we think have the same 
interests as ours. Trust is one way to transform the ‘indifferent stranger’ 
into an interested one.  
 
Chapter Seven dealt with the problematics of the system of the welfare state 
and trust. In the context of the welfare state, it is not very fruitful to speak 
of trust, but rather, of confidence. This is because situations where we place 
our trust directly in a political decision-maker as an individual are rare. The 
public’s confidence in politics is systems-theoretically dependent on the 
binding decisions made by politicians. Although the public cannot affect 
these decisions, it is able to evaluate the risks and the possibilities of 
averting or reducing them. In the system of the welfare state, the public can 
indirectly affect decisions and risks through elections. Confidence between 
the public and politics socialises itself in the form of elections. The public’s 
confidence in politics is systems-theoretically dependent of the latter’s risk-
taking binding decisions that succeed in reducing complexity. Through 
confidence, the system of politics is capable of observing itself and its 
success in reducing this complexity. The system of the welfare state 
consists of several organisations that need each other. Organisations, too, 
must therefore trust each other. It is again fruitful to speak of trust, because 
organisations must take risks. The organisational framework of deliberation 
and decision-making are important factors of trust between organisations. 
Organisational trust decisions concern wider populations than mutual trust 
decisions. Organisational trust cannot be constructed by a single human 
being, and its emergence is a much larger process than the processes 
leading to personal trust decisions. The trusting relationship reached 
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between organisations is not continuous but has to be rebuilt again and 
again. However, if we talk about organisations that have a long history of 
collaboration with one another, the situation is quite different. In these 
cases, organisations are familiar to one another. This type of 
interorganisational co-operation is not closely linked to new risk-taking 
decisions and the need for trust, but instead refers to operating in a familiar 
world. 
 
Chapter Eight considered the problematics of the system of care, caring 
organisations and trust. The subsystem of care consists of three basic 
elements: communication, organisation and interaction. Here, trust deals 
with subsystemic communication, confidence with organisation, and 
familiarity with simple interaction. Communicative trust within the system 
of care is connected to risk-based selections between caregivers and 
patients. Furthermore, both caregivers and patients must have confidence in 
the caring organisations as well as the functions of the system of care. 
Confidence within the system of care concretises itself especially at the 
organisational level. Furthermore, a caring relationship is bound to simple 
interaction, which is based on familiar routines. However, in the context of 
the system of care and caring organisations, familiarity, trust and 
confidence need each other here as well.      
 
Having analysed Luhmann’s theory of trust, and after examining it in the 
context of advanced systems theory and applying it to the contexts of 
‘strangers’, the welfare state and care, I now would like to conclude this 
work with some critical reflections. In particular, I will deal with the 
question: Why did the question of trust disappear from Luhmann’s systems 
theory?  
 
As noted above, Luhmann’s writings on trust are very well-known and 
largely cited by researchers in many disciplines. Therefore it is quite 
surprising, even paradoxical, that Luhmann himself did not write about trust 
or confidence after 1988, although during the 1980s and especially the 
 206
1990s his concept of trust was an essential concern or theoretical 
background for numerous researchers. In any case, I am critical of the 
disappearance of the question of trust in Luhmann’s writings. As stated in 
Chapter One, the systems-theoretical ‘silence’ on trust was also an 
important starting point for the study at hand. Furthermore, Luhmann left 
open the question of how trust and confidence function in the context of 
advanced systems theory. Many researchers have cited only two or three 
sentences from Luhmann’s Vertrauen, and have left Luhmann’s advanced 
systems theory completely ‘untouched’. In other words, they have only 
familiarised themselves with the ‘early’ writings of Luhmann. Why, then, 
did Luhmann not deal with the question of trust and confidence after 1988? 
 
Luhmann does not answer this question. We are therefore greatly dependent 
on speculation. The easiest answer might be that because Luhmann wanted 
to stand apart from mainstream sociology, he did not intervene in the 
sociological discussion of trust, which did not operate in the context of 
autopoietic systems theory.  
 
Nonetheless, the silence on the issue of trust in Luhmann’s later systems-
theoretical writings was not complete. In his most important books, Soziale 
Systeme (1984) and Die Gesellschaft der Gesellshaft (1997), the topic was 
touched upon, but only cursorily. In Soziale Systeme Luhmann writes about 
trust in the context of double contingency. This analysis is not very 
intensive, and it seems that trust had somehow lost its explicit importance 
in Luhmann’s advanced systems theory. The second reason for the 
disappearance of trust, then, deals with the fact that in his advanced 
systems-theoretical thinking there seemed to be no real ‘room’ for trust, and 
the functionality of the mediums (e.g. money, power, law) of subsystems 
(economy, politics, justice) assumed more importance. Functionally 
thinking, then, the problem of trust is already included in the larger problem 
of double contingency.56 This is because the doubly contingent character of 
                                                 
56 The Dutch system theorist Raf Vanderstraeten familiarised me with this hypothesis in 
our discussion in Bielefeld in the winter of 2001. At the time, he had just completed an 
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social interaction is a consequence of the confrontation of at least two 
autonomous systems that make their own selections in relation to one 
another. These types of relationships are connected to risks and complexity 
because the participants are always opaque and incalculable to each other.  
 
However, the explicit absence of trust might also be explained from a 
different point of view. The third reason could be that Luhmann may have 
thought that he had already said everything of importance with regard to the 
problematic of trust. Luhmann’s aim was presumably to explain the nature 
of the phenomenon of trust and not to test it in special spheres such as those 
of ‘strangers’, enemies, different subsystems etc. For Luhmann, trust may 
have been such a self-evident feature of risk societies that he did not want 
to literally repeat or overemphasise its importance. In risk society, trust 
makes system formations possible; it seems to be like a ‘social contract’ 
through which living in the conditions of double contingency and risks is 
possible. As Luhmann (1995, 129) puts it:  
 
Above all, trust has the circular, self-presupposing and confirming character 
that belongs to all structures emerging from double contingency. It makes 
the formation of systems possible and in return acquires strength from them 
for increased, riskier reproduction. This is why it depends on symbolic 
cover: it reacts to critical informations not because the facts that they report, 
but because they function as indicators of trustworthiness. 
 
Fourthly, Luhmann may have left the concept of trust to ‘rest in peace’, 
because he perhaps noticed that trust does not, after all, reduce complexity 
quite in the manner he had thought earlier. I would argue that trust is not a 
general ‘remedy’ against complexity in world society. As stated earlier, for 
Luhmann, complexity is a way of thinking, and thus can be connected to 
almost all things and phenomena. If to trust is to take a risk, this can reduce 
one type of complexity: the type present in certain risk-taking situations. At 
the same time, however, new risk-taking situations develop, resulting in 
                                                                                                                                                        
article, Parsons, Luhmann and the Theorem of Double Contingency (2002), where he deals 
with the Luhmannian problems of social relations.  
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new needs for trust. The circle of the need for trust thus seems to be 
endless. It may be better to become reconciled to the fact that the functions 
of trust are connected only to trust’s ability to ‘cut’ contingency. 
Complexity itself means being forced to select, being forced to select means 
contingency, and contingency means risk (Luhmann 1995, 25). This means 
that trust – affected by complexity – amounts to a selection of a situation of 
contingency and risk, which in turn does not necessarily mean reducing 
complexity, but only that the situation of contingency changes, or at least is 
challenged.  As Luhmann (1995, 26) says; “Only complexity can reduce 
complexity”. Therefore a decision to trust someone only means the 
reduction or ‘cutting’ of contingency, and might also be a precondition for 
reducing one type of complexity (the type present in a certain risk-taking 
situation). 
 
Finally, Luhmann may not have wanted to theorise about trust in his later 
works because it does not fit very well in to his larger systems-theoretical 
context. This is the strongest argument for explaining the disappearance of 
the issue of trust. As noted in Chapter Two, Luhmann already argued at the 
end of the 1960s – in Vertrauen – that personal trust yields to system trust. 
For Luhmann (1979, 58; 22), system trust counts on explicit processes and 
is not only applicable to social systems but also to other people as personal 
systems. This opinion seems to become only stronger in his later writings 
on the system of science (Luhmann 1990b)57 or on the computer age, which 
he studied in his last major work Die Gesellschaft der Gesellshaft (1997). 
Luhmann explored the growing expansion of computers, and particularly 
the new forms of communication enabled by the computer age. In an era of 
electronic data processing there cannot be that much trust which is bound to 
the truster’s and trustee’s personal characteristics or social status; but 
instead, system trust gathers way. (Luhmann 1997, 313.) It could also be 
that in his later writings Luhmann may have emphasised the role of system 
                                                 
57 Luhmann strongly stresses the importance of confidence in the system of science. We 
have confidence in science, because it reports on real findings. New findings are more 
important than older ones. Therefore, the importance of trustworthy new and real findings 
is emphasised in the context of science. (Luhmann 1990, 227; 588.)   
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trust or confidence because he wanted to separate individuals as ‘full 
persons’ from society. If society does not consist of ‘persons’ (but of 
communication instead), how can there then be personal trust of the kind 
that is present in the ‘early’ Luhmannian writings.  
 
According to Luhmann, in the modern world it is system trust, then, not 
personal trust, that is paramount. Luhmann does not deny the existence of 
interpersonal trust or denigrate its importance. But in the modern world, or 
‘uncertainty society’58, it will never be enough. To live in a complex society 
without going mad, we must have confidence in systems as well. It even 
looks like Luhmann takes the same path as Giddens, who also emphasises 
the role of system trust in modern society. Emphasising the importance of 
system trust over personal trust in modern society might sound logical, but 
from an advanced systems-theoretical point of view it cannot be true. Here 
lies an obvious paradox. Why? 
 
At least four facts can be found that explain why the preference of system 
trust or confidence is misleading in the context of advanced systems theory. 
First, as I have shown earlier, only trust is an element of communication 
and, thus, an element of social systems. Confidence is an element of 
psychic systems and so cannot have a direct influence on trust. However, 
because of interpenetration, confidence needs trust and vice versa. Second, 
we can live in a complex society and have confidence or system trust, but to 
be able to reduce this complexity we must trust. Third, trust is the visible 
part, while confidence is invisible (although it can be socialised and, thus, it 
can become visible). Fourth, Luhmann thinks that in modern society there 
                                                 
58 According to Risto Eräsaari (2003, 38), in the modern ‘uncertainty society’ science 
provides us with new knowledge and expertise which are most often used to broaden, 
extend and reframe knowledge in the forms of technical know-how or other knowledge 
spirals. But this knowledge generates further uncertainties, further complexity and further 
unknown factors. Eräsaari means that uncertainty must here be seen as ambivalence, which 
is an epistemic state of not believing or knowing for certain. In this type of society he 
prefers uncertainty to risk. From the Luhmannian standpoint, we can thus say that in an 
ambivalent ‘uncertainty society’ the role of system trust – directed at expertise and 
technical know-how – is emphasised.  
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is no centre or periphery; in other words, every subsystem is equally 
important.    
 
On the grounds of these facts, I criticise Luhmann’s preference for 
confidence. How could confidence be more important than trust, if there is, 
at the same time, no order of importance between the societal subsystems? 
Luhmann’s division between trust and confidence becomes a problematic 
one if we try to prioritise them. It seems that here Luhmann has forgotten 
one of his main themes: society consists only of communication, and this 
means that in society there can only be trust and socialised confidence. 
Another question is this: Did Luhmann notice the paradox he created, 
which others, although citing him, did not notice? In other words, was 
Luhmann familiar with the systems-theoretical paradox of prioritising 
confidence or system trust, and aware of the fact that other researchers 
mainly swallow this paradox by arguing that in modern society system trust 
or confidence is more important than personal trust? I would say yes, 
because Luhmann, if anyone, loved paradoxes. With his silence, he left the 
paradox open to later developments in systems theory. 
 
In addition, it is also interesting to ask: Where does trust come from? 
Luhmann does not give us a direct or unequivocal answer to this question 
either. One possible answer might be that trust has the characteristics of an 
‘imaginary institution’ that no one has seen but everyone talks about, and it 
exists only because we do talk about it. Trust, therefore, exists only because 
of communication. However, one might now ask: What happens to trust if 
we do not communicate, if there is sometimes a total silence? As noted 
above, by silence Luhmann may have left the paradox of trust open. As a 
matter of fact, silence is itself a Luhmannian paradox; namely, as long as a 
double contingent encounter exists, one person’s silence is always 
interpreted by the other. This means that silence becomes a form of 
communication. A social system, then, cannot be silent per se. It can only 
exist, or not exist. (Arnoldi 2001, 8.) Luhmann’s point is that non-
communication is in fact communication. Therefore we might say that trust, 
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too, can only exist, or not exist. We could say that by a paradox of silence, 
Luhmann ‘communicates’ the paradox of trust. To say it ‘paradoxically’: 
after 1988, Luhmann did not talk about trust, but in any case 
‘communicated’ about it through silence. In this work I have tried to end 
this systems-theoretical silence regarding trust. Through communication the 
‘early’ Luhmannian trust has been considered in the context of advanced 
systems theory, which, in turn, has been put to the test in the spheres of 
‘strangers’, the system of the welfare state and the system of care. Trust 
exists for as long as we communicate it, but through ‘silence’ it cannot 
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